

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

*Address presented to H. E. Lord Minto, Viceroy and Governor General of India by a Deputation of the Muslim Community of India on 1st October 1906 at Simla; and Reply thereto*¹

ADDRESS

"May it please your excellency,—Availing ourselves of the permission accorded to us, we, the undersigned nobles, jagirdars, taluqdars, lawyers, zamindars, merchants and others representing a large body of the Mahomedan subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor in different parts of India, beg most respectfully to approach your Excellency with the following address for your favourable consideration.

This document has a great importance and significance in the history of India. It marks the beginning of the British Government's policy of giving favourable treatment to the Muslims in the administration of India which, it is alleged, was intended to wean them away from the Congress and to create a breach and disunity between the Hindus and the Musalmans. It has also acquired a certain amount of notoriety in the minds of the Indians in view of the statement made by late Maulana Mohammad Ali in his address as President of the Congress, stating that "it was a command performance", meaning thereby that the address was arranged by the British Government. On this account there has been a great deal of curiosity on the part of many Indians to know the text of the address and the reply given by Lord Minto. I had made a long search to obtain the same. I had even approached elderly Muslim politicians prominent in those days for a copy but none of them had it or knew where it was available. Newspapers of that day do not appear to have carried the text of the address and the reply. I was however lucky to get a copy of it from my friend Sir Raza Ali, M.L.A. (Central), who happened to have kept a cutting of the *Indian Daily Telegraph*—a paper then published from Lucknow but had long ago become defunct, in which the full text of the address as well as of the reply was printed. I am grateful to Sir Raza Ali for a loan of the cutting. As the document marks a historic event in the political history of British administration in India, it might be of some interest to reproduce details about the function which the Simla correspondent of the *Indian Daily Telegraph* had published in its issue of October 3rd, 1906. Says the correspondent:—

"The representatives of the Mahomedan community who were to present the address to His Excellency the Viceroy this morning at Viceregal Lodge collected in the Ballroom at 11 A.M. They numbered thirty-five and were seated in a horse-shoe facing His Excellency's chair. Precisely at 11 A.M. Lord Minto, preceded by his staff, entered the room, all standing to receive him. His Excellency was taken round and personally introduced to each member by the Aga Khan. The Khalifa from Patiala then asked, permission for the presentation of the address and the Aga Khan then advanced and facing His Excellency read the petition given below, all the representatives standing."

Those who formed the deputation were:—His Highness Aga Sir Sultan Mahomed Shah Aga Khan, G.C.I.E., (Bombay), Shahzadah Bakhtiar Shah, O.I.E., Head of the Mysore family, Calcutta; Hon'ble Malik Omar Hayat Khan, C.I.E., Lieutenant 17th Prince of Wales' Tiwana Lancers, Tiwana, Shahpur (Punjab) ; Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian Mohomed Shah Din, Bar.-at-Law, Lahore; Hon'ble Maulvi Sharfuddin, Bar.-at-Law, Patna; Khan Bahadur Syed Nawab Ali Chowdhury, Mymensingh (Eastern Bengal); Nawab Bahadur Syed Amir Husan Khan, C.I.E., Calcutta; Naseer Hussain Khan Khayal, Calcutta; Khan Bahadur Mirza Shujaat Ali Beg; Persian Consul-General, Murshidabad, Calcutta (Bengal); Syed Ali Imam, Bar.-at-Law, Patna (Behar); Nawab Sarfraz Husain Khan, Patna (Behar); Khan Bahadur Ahmad Mohiuddin Khan, Stipendiary of the Carnatic family (Madras); Maulvi Rafiuddin Ahmed, Bar.-at-Law (Bombay); Ebrahimbhoy, Adamji Peerbhoy, General Merchant (Bombay) ; Mr. Abdur Rahim, Bar.-at-Law, Calcutta; Syed Allah-dad Shah, Special Magistrate and Vice-President, Zamindars' Association, Khairpore (Sindh); Maulana H. M. Malak, Head of Mehdi Bazh Bohras, Nagpur (Central Provinces) ; Mushir-ud-Doula Mumtazal-ul-Mulk Khan Bahadur Khalifa Syed

¹ B.R. Ambedkar, (1946), *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, Bombay, Thacker and Co. Appendix XII. Also available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00ambedkar/ambekar_partition/appendices/12app.html

Moha-med Hussain, Member of the State Council of Patiala (Punjab); Khan Bahadur Col. Abdul Majid Khan, Foreign Minister, Patiala (Punjab); Khan Bahadur Khwaja Kusuf Shah, Hony. Magistrate, Arnritsar (Punjab) ; Mian Mahomed Shafi, Bar.-at-Law, Lahore (Punjab); Shaikh Ghulam Sadik, Arnritsar (Punjab); Hakim Mohamed Ajmul Khan, Delhi (Punjab); Munshi Ihtisham Ali, Zamindar and Rais, Kakori (Oudh); Syed Nabi Ullah, Bar.-at-Law, Rais Kara, Dist. Allahabad; Maulvi Syed Karamat Husain, Bar.-at-Law, Allahabad; Syed Abdulraoof, Bar.-at-Law, Allahabad; Munshi Abdur Salam Khan, retired Sub-Judge, Rampur; Khan Bahadur Mohamad Muzammil Ullah Khan, Zamindar, Secretary, Zamindars' Association, United Provinces, and Joint Secretary, M. A. O. College Trustees, Aligarh; Haji Mohamed Ismail Khan, Zamindar, Aligarh; Sahabzadas Aitab Ahmad Khan, Bar.-at-Law, Aligarh; Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain, Rais, Arnroha, United Provinces; Maulvi Habibul Rahaman Khan, Zamindar, Bhikhanpur, United Provinces; Nawab Syed Sirdar Ali Khan, son of the late Nawab Sirdar Diler-Ul-mulk Bahadur, C.I.E., Hyderabad (Deccan); Maulvi Syed Mahdee Ally Khan (Muhsin-ul-Mulk), Hony. Secretary, M. A. O. College, Etawah, United Provinces.

The following gentlemen intended to have attended the presentation of the address to the Viceroy, but were prevented by illness or other causes:— Hon'ble Nawab Khwaja Salimulla, Nawab of Dacca, Hon'ble Nawab Haji Mohamed Fateh Ali Khan, Qazel-bash, Lahore; Hon'ble Syed Zainul-Edros, Surat, Khan Bahadur Kasim Mir Ghayas-uddin Peerzadah of Broach; Khan Bahadur Raja Jahandad of Hazara and Shaik Shahid Hussain of Lucknow. The correspondent of the *Telegraph* adds:—

Lady Minto, the Ladies Elliot and the Hon. Mrs. Hewett were present at the function.

At the presentation of the address today most of the deputies wore ordinary European dress with a fez as distinguishing head-dress, but the Patiala representatives, Lieut. Hon. Malik Omar Hayat Khan, Khan Bahadur Ali Choudhary, Khan Bahadur Ahmad Mohiuddin Khan and a few others, were in Indian dress, while a few others wore uniforms with gold lace. His Excellency the Viceroy was in morning dress with the Order of the Star of India on his frock coat.

Garden Party at Viceregal Lodge

This afternoon a garden party was held in the Viceregal Lodge grounds when the Mahomedan representatives were received by the Viceroy, who spoke with each deputy individually.

The Hon. Mr. Baker, Financial Secretary, has invited the following Bengal gentlemen of the Mahomedan deputation to lunch tomorrow :—

Nawab Amir Hosein, Mirza Shujat Ali, Nawab Nasar Hossein, Hon. Shurfuddin and Ali Imam.

We fully realise and appreciate the incalculable benefits conferred by British rule on the teeming millions belonging to diverse races and professing diverse religions who form the population of the vast continent of India, and have every reason to be grateful for the peace, security, personal freedom and liberty of worship that we now enjoy. Further, from the wise and enlightened character of the Government, we have every reasonable ground for anticipating that these benefits will be progressive, and that India will in the future occupy an increasingly important position in the comity of nations.

One of the most important characteristics of British policy in India is the increasing deference that has so far as possible been paid from the first to the views and wishes of the people of the country in matters affecting their interests, with due regard always to the diversity of race and religion which forms such an important feature of all Indian progress.

Claims of the Community

Beginning with the confidential and unobtrusive method of consulting influential members of important communities in different parts of the country, this principle was gradually extended by the recognition of the right of recognised political or commercial organisations to communicate to the authorities their criticisms and views on measures of public importance, and finally by the nomination and election of direct representatives of the people in Municipalities, District Boards, and above all in the Legislative Chambers of the country. This last element is, we understand, about to be dealt with by the Committee appointed by your Excellency with the view of giving it further extension, and it is with reference mainly to our claim to a fair share in such extended representation and some other matters of importance affecting the interests of our community, that we have ventured to approach your Excellency on the present occasion.

Past Traditions

The Mahomedans of India number, according to the census taken in the year 1901, over sixty-two millions or between one-fifth and one-fourth of the total population of His Majesty's Indian dominions, and if a reduction be made for the uncivilised portions of the community enumerated under the heads of ani-mist and other minor religions, as well as for those classes who are ordinarily classified as Hindus but properly speaking are not Hindus at all, the proportion of Mahomedans to the Hindu majority becomes much larger. We therefore desire to submit that under any system of representation extended or limited a community in itself more numerous than the entire population of any first class European power except Russia may justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the State.

We venture, indeed, with your Excellency's permission to go a step further, and urge that the position accorded to the Mahomedan community in any kind of representation, direct or indirect, and in all other ways affecting their status and influence should be commensurate, not merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they make to the defence of the empire, and we also hope that your Excellency will in this connection be pleased to give due consideration to the position which they occupied in India a little more than hundred years ago and of which the traditions have naturally not faded from their minds.

The Mahomedans of India have always placed implicit reliance on the sense of justice and love of fair dealing that have characterised their rulers, and have in consequence abstained from pressing their claims by methods that might prove at all embarrassing, but earnestly as we desire that the Mahomedans of India should not in the future depart from that excellent and time-honoured tradition, recent events have stirred up feelings, especially among the younger generation of Mahomedans) which might, in certain circumstances and under certain contingencies easily pass beyond the control of temperate counsel and sober guidance.

We therefore pray that the representations we herewith venture to submit, after a careful consideration of the views and wishes of a large number of our co-religionists in all parts of India, may be favoured with your excellency's earnest attention.

European Representative Institutions

We hope your excellency will pardon our stating at the outset that representative institutions of the European type are new to the Indian people; many of the most thoughtful members of our community in fact consider that the greatest care, forethought and caution will be necessary if they are to be successfully adapted to the social, religious and political conditions obtaining in India, and that in the absence of such care and caution their adoption is likely, among other evils, to place our national

interests at the mercy of an unsympathetic majority. Since, however, our rulers have, in pursuance of the immemorial instincts and traditions, found it expedient to give these institutions an increasingly important place in the Government of the country, we Mahomedans, cannot any longer in justice to our own national interests hold aloof from participating in the conditions to which their policy has given rise. While, therefore, we are bound to acknowledge with gratitude that such representation as the Mahomedans of India have hitherto enjoyed has been due to a sense of justice and fairness on the part of your Excellency and your illustrious predecessor in office and the heads of Local Governments by whom the Mahomedan members of Legislative Chambers have almost without exception been nominated, we cannot help observing that the representation thus accorded to us has necessarily been inadequate to our requirements, and has not always carried with it the approval of those whom the nominees were selected to represent. This state of things was probably under existing circumstances unavoidable, for while on the one hand the number of nominations reserved to the Viceroy and Local Governments has necessarily been strictly limited, the selection on the other hand of really representative men, has, in the absence of any reliable method of ascertaining the direction of popular choice, been far from easy.

The Results of Election

As for the results of election, it is most unlikely that the name of any Mahomedan candidate will ever be submitted for the approval of Government by the electoral bodies as now constituted unless he is in sympathy with the majority in all matters of importance. Nor can we in fairness find fault with the desire of our non-Muslim fellow-subjects to take full advantage of their strength and vote only for members of their own community, or for persons who, if not Hindus, are expected to vote with the Hindu majority on whose goodwill they would have to depend for their future re-election. It is true that we have many and important interests in common with our Hindu fellow-countrymen and it will always be a matter of the utmost satisfaction to us to see these interests safeguarded by the presence in our Legislative Chambers of able supporters of these interests, irrespective of their nationality.

A Distinct Community

Still, it cannot be denied that we Mahomedans are a distinct community with additional interests of our own which are not shared by other communities, and these have hitherto suffered from the fact that they have not been adequately represented. Even in the provinces in which the Mahomedans constitute a distinct majority of the population, they have too often been treated as though they were inappreciably small political factors that might without unfairness be neglected. This has been the case, to some extent, in the Punjab, but in a more marked degree in Sind and in Eastern Bengal.

Before formulating our views with regard to the election of representatives, we beg to observe that the political importance of a community to a considerable extent gains strength or suffers detriment according to the position that the members of that community occupy in the Service of the State. If, as is unfortunately the case with the Mahomedans, they are not adequately represented in this manner, they lose in the prestige and influence which are justly their due.

Employment in Government Service

We therefore pray that Government will be graciously pleased to provide that both in the gazetted and the subordinate and ministerial services of all Indian provinces a due proportion of Mahomedans shall always find place. Orders of like import have at times been issued by Local Governments in some provinces, but have not, unfortunately, in all cases been strictly observed on the ground that qualified Mahomedans were not forthcoming. This allegation, however well founded it may have been at one time, is, we submit, no longer tenable now, and wherever the will to employ them is not wanting the supply of qualified Mahomedans, we are happy to be able to assure your excellency, is equal to the demand.

The Competitive Element

Since, however, the number of qualified Mahomedans has increased, a tendency is unfortunately perceptible to reject them on the ground of relatively superior qualifications having to be given precedence. This introduces something like the competitive element in its worst form, and we may be permitted to draw your Excellency's attention to the political significance of the monopoly of all official influence by one class. We may also point out in this connection that the efforts of Mahomedan educationists have from the very outset of the educational movement among them been strenuously directed towards the development of character, and this we venture to think is of greater importance than mere mental alertness in the making of good public servants.

Mahomedans on the Bench

We venture to submit that the generality of Mahomedans in all parts of India feel aggrieved that Mahomedan Judges are not more frequently appointed to the High Courts and Chief Courts of Judicature. Since the creation of these Courts only three Mahomedan lawyers have held these honourable appointments, all of whom have fully justified their elevation to the Bench. At the present moment there is not a single Mahomedan Judge sitting on the Bench of any of these Courts, while there are three Hindu Judges in the Calcutta High Court, where the proportion of Mahomedans in the population is very large, and two in the Chief Court of the Punjab, where the Mahomedans form the majority of the population. It is not, therefore, an extravagant request on our part that a Mahomedan should be given a seat on the Bench of each of the High Courts and Chief Courts. Qualified Mahomedan lawyers eligible for these appointments can always be found, if not in one province then in another. We beg permission further to submit that the presence on the Bench of these Courts of a Judge learned in the Mahomedan Law will be a source of considerable strength to the administration of justice.

Municipal Representation

As Municipal and District Boards have to deal with important local interests affecting to a great extent the health, comfort, educational needs and even the religious concerns of the inhabitants, we shall, we hope, be pardoned if we solicit for a moment your Excellency's attention to the position of Mahomedans thereon before passing to higher concerns. These institutions form, as it were, the initial rungs in the ladder of self-government, and it is here that the principle of representation is brought home intimately to the intelligence of the people, yet the position of Mahomedans on these Boards is not at present regulated by any guiding principle capable of general application, and practice varies in different localities. The Aligarh Municipality, for example, is divided into six wards and each ward returns one Hindu and one Mahomedan Commissioner, and the same principle we understand is adopted in a number of Municipalities in the Punjab and elsewhere, but in a good many places the Mahomedan tax-payers are not adequately represented. We would, therefore, respectfully suggest that the local authority should in every case be required to declare the number of Hindus and Mahomedans entitled to seats on Municipal and District Boards, such proportion to be determined in accordance with the numerical strength, social status, local influence and special requirements of either community. Once their relative proportion is authoritatively determined, we would suggest that either community should be allowed severally to return their own representatives as is the practice in many towns in the Punjab.

Fellows of Universities

We would also suggest that the Senates and Syndicates of Indian Universities might be similarly dealt with, that is to say, there should, so far as possible, be an authoritative declaration of the proportion in which Mahomedans are entitled to be represented in either body.

Nomination to Provincial Councils

We now proceed to the consideration of the question of our representation in the Legislative Chambers of the country. Beginning with the Provincial Councils, we would most respectfully suggest that as in the case of Municipalities and District Boards the proportion of Mahomedan representatives entitled to seats should be determined and declared with due regard to the important considerations which we have ventured to point out in paragraph 5 of this address, and that the important Mahomedan landowners, lawyers, merchants and representatives of other important interests, the Mahomedan members of District Boards and Municipalities and the Mahomedan graduates of universities of a certain standing, say five years, should be formed into Electoral Colleges and be authorised, *in* accordance with such rules of procedure as your Excellency's Government may be pleased to prescribe in that behalf, to return the number of members that maybe declared to be eligible.

The Viceroy's Council

With reward to the Imperial Legislative Council whereon the due representation of Mahomedan interests is a matter of vital importance, we crave leave to suggest (1) that in the cadre of the Council the proportion of Mahomedan representatives should not be determined on the basis of the numerical strength of the community, and that in any case the Mahomedan representatives should never be an ineffective minority; (2) that as far as possible, appointment by election should be given preference over nomination; (3) that for the purposes of choosing Mahomedan members, Mahomedan landowners, lawyers, merchants and representatives of other important interests of a status to be subsequently determined by your Excellency's Government, Mahomedan members of the Provincial Councils and Mahomedan fellows of universities should be invested with electoral powers to be exercised in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed by your Excellency's Government in that behalf.

The Executive Council

An impression has lately been gaining ground that one or more Indian Members may be appointed on the Executive Council of the Viceroy. In the event of such appointment being made we beg that the claims of Mahomedans in that connection may not be overlooked. More than one Mahomedan, we venture to say, will be found in the country fit to serve with distinction in that august chamber.

A Mahomedan University

We beg to approach your Excellency on a subject which must closely affect our national welfare. We are convinced that our aspirations as a community and our future progress are largely dependent on the foundation of a Mahomedan University which will be the centre of our religious and intellectual life. We therefore most respectfully pray that your Excellency will take steps to help us in an undertaking in which our community is so deeply interested.

Inconclusion, we beg to assure your Excellency that in assisting the Mahomedan subjects of His Majesty at this stage in the development of Indian affairs in the directions indicated in the present address, your Excellency will be strengthening the basis of their unswerving loyalty to the Throne and laying the foundation of their political advancement and national prosperity, and your Excellency's name will be remembered with gratitude by their posterity for generations to come, and we feel confident that your Excellency will be gracious enough to give due consideration to our prayers. We have the honour to subscribe ourselves) Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servants.

LORD MINTO'S REPLY

Appreciation of Mahomedan aspirations

After the address; His Excellency rose and delivered a most sympathetic reply, which was frequently punctuated with cheers and cries of "Hear, hear" from the members of the deputation, particularly when his Excellency declared that he was entirely in accord with the views of the deputation that any electoral system must take cognizance of the various religious beliefs of this great Empire and that the British Government would always in the future as in the past safeguard the political rights of the different communities entrusted to their charge. The Viceroy concluded by thanking the deputation for affording him the unique opportunity of meeting so many representative men.

The Viceroy said :—

Your Highness and Gentlemen, Allow me before I attempt to reply to the many considerations your address embodies, to welcome you heartily to Simla. Your presence here to-day is very full of meaning.

To the document which you have presented me are attached the signatures of nobles, of Ministers of various States, of great landowners, of lawyers, of merchants and of many others of His Majesty's subjects. I welcome the representative character of your deputation as expressing the views and aspirations of the enlightened Muslim community of India. I feel that all you have said emanates from a representative body basing its opinions on a matured consideration of the existing political conditions of India, totally apart from the small personal or political sympathies and antipathies of scattered localities, and I am grateful to you for the opportunity you are affording me of expressing my appreciation of the just aims of the followers of Islam and their determination to share in the political history of our Empire.

As your Viceroy, I am proud of the recognition you express of the benefits conferred by British rule on the diverse races of many creeds who go to form the population of this huge continent. You yourselves, the descendants of a conquering and ruling race, have told me to-day of your gratitude for the personal freedom, the liberty of worship, the general peace and the hopeful future which British administration has secured for India.

Help in the Past

It is interesting to look back on early British efforts to assist the Mahomedan population to qualify themselves for the public service. In 1782 Warren Hastings founded the Calcutta Madrasah with the intention of enabling its students to compete on more equal terms with the Hindus for employment under Government. In 1811 my ancestor, Lord Minto, advocated improvements in the Madrassah and the establishment of Mahomedan Colleges at other places throughout India. In later years the efforts of the Mahomedan Association led to the Government resolution of 1885 dealing with the educational position of the Mahomedan community and their employment in the public service, whilst Mahomedan educational effort has culminated in the College of Aligarh that great institution which the noble and broad-minded devotion of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan has dedicated to his co-religionists.

The Aligarh College

It was in July 1877 that Lord Lytton laid the foundation stone of Aligarh, when Sir Syed Ahmed Khan addressed these memorable words to the Viceroy : " The personal honour which you have done me assures me of a great fact and fills me with feelings of a much higher nature than mere personal gratitude. I am assured that you, who upon this occasion represent the British rule, have sympathies with our labours and this assurance is very valuable and a source of great happiness. At my time of life it is a comfort to me to feel that the undertaking which has been for many years, and is now the sole object of my life has roused on the one hand the energies of my own countrymen, and on the other has won the sympathy of our British fellow-subjects and the support of our rulers, so that when the few years I may still be spared are over, and when I shall be no longer amongst you, the College will still prosper and succeed in educating my countrymen to have the same affection for their country, the same feelings of loyalty for the British rule, the same appreciation of its blessings, the same sincerity of friendship with our British fellow-subjects as have been the ruling feelings of my life."

SIR SYED'S INFLUENCE

Aligarh has won its laurels. Its students have gone forth to fight the battle of life strong in the tenets of their own religion, strong in the precepts of loyalty and patriotism, and now when there is much that is critical in the political future of India the inspiration of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and the teachings of Aligarh shine forth brilliantly in the pride of Mahomedan history, in the loyalty, commonsense and sound reasoning so eloquently expressed in your address. But, gentlemen, you go on to tell me that sincere as your belief is in the justice and fair dealings of your rulers, you cannot but be aware that "recent events " have stirred up feelings amongst the younger generation of Mahomedans which might "pass beyond the control of temperate counsel and sober guidance."

Policy in Eastern Bengal

Now I have no intention of entering into any discussion upon the affairs of Eastern Bengal and Assam, yet I hope that without offence to anyone I may thank the Mahomedan community of the new Province for the moderation and self-restraint they have shown under conditions which were new to them, and as to which there has been inevitably much misunderstanding, and that I may at the same time sympathise with all that is sincere in Bengalee sentiments. But above all, what I would ask you to believe is that the course the Viceroy and the Government of India have pursued in connection with the affairs of the new Province, the future of which is now I hope assured, has been dictated solely by a regard for what has appeared best for its present and future populations as a whole, irrespective of race or creed and that the

Mahomedan community of Eastern Bengal and Assam can rely as firmly as ever on British justice and fairplay for the appreciation of its loyalty and the safeguarding of its interests.

The unrest in India

You have addressed me, gentlemen, at a time when the political atmosphere is full of change. We all feel it would be foolish to attempt to deny its existence, hopes and ambitions new to India are making themselves felt. We cannot ignore them—we should be wrong to wish to do so—but to what is all this unrest due? Not to the discontent of misgoverned millions—I defy anyone honestly to assert that—not to say uprising of a disaffected people.

Fruits of Western Education

It is due to that educational growth in which only a very small portion of the population has as yet shared, of which British rule first sowed the seed and the fruits of which British rule is now doing its best to foster and to direct. There may be many tares in the harvest we are now reaping. The Western grain which we have sown may not be entirely suitable to the requirements of the people of India but the educational harvest will increase as years go on, and the healthiness of the nourishment it gives will depend on the careful administration and distribution of its products. You need not ask my pardon, gentlemen, for telling me that "Representative institutions of the European type are entirely new to the people of India" or that their introduction here requires the most earnest thought and care. I should be very far from welcoming all the political machinery of the Western world amongst the hereditary instincts and traditions of Eastern races. Western breadth of thought, the teachings of Western civilisation, the freedom of British individuality can do much for the people of India, but I recognise with you that they must not carry with them an impracticable insistence of the acceptance of political methods.

Political Future of Mahomedans

And now, gentlemen, I come to your own position in respect to the political future; the position of the Mahomedan community for whom you speak. You will, I feel sure, recognise that it is impossible for me to follow you through any detailed consideration of the conditions and the share that the community has a right to claim in the administration of public affairs. I can at present only deal with generalities. The points which you have raised are before the Committee, which, as you know, I have lately appointed to consider the question of presentation (? representation), and I will take care that your address is submitted to them, but at the same time I hope I may be able to reply to the general tenor of your remarks without in any way forestalling the Committee's report.

The Question of Representation

The pith of your address, as I understand it, is a claim that in any system of representation whether it affects a Municipality, a District Board or a Legislative Council, in which it is proposed to introduce or increase an electoral organisation, the Mahomedan community should be represented as a community. You point out that in many cases electoral bodies, as now constituted, cannot be expected to return a Mahomedan candidate, and that if by chance they did so it could only be at the sacrifice of such a candidate's view to those of a majority opposed to his own community whom he would in no way represent, and you justly claim that your numerical strength both in respect to the political importance of your community and the service it has rendered to the Empire entitle you to consideration. I am entirely in accord with you; please do not misunderstand me. I make no attempt to indicate by what means the representation of communities can be obtained, but I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent. The great mass of the people of India have no knowledge of representative institutions. I agree with you, gentlemen, that the initial rungs in the ladder of self-government are to be found in the Municipal and District Boards and that it is in that direction that we must look for the gradual political education of the people.

An Assurance

In the meantime I can only say to you that the Mahomedan community may rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded in any administrative reorganization with which I am concerned and that you and the people of India may rely upon the British Raj to respect,

as it has been its pride to do, the religious beliefs and the national traditions of the myriads composing the population of His Majesty's Indian Empire.

Your Highness and Gentlemen, I sincerely thank you for the unique opportunity your deputation has given me of meeting so many distinguished and representative Mahomedans. I deeply appreciate the energy and interest in public affairs which have brought you here from great distances, and I only regret that your visit to Simla is necessarily so short.

APPENDIX II

Evidence before the Southborough Committee on Franchise²

27th January 1919

From the Report of the Reforms Committee (Franchise) Vol. II, 1919

The Committee was constituted as under: The Rt. Hon. Lord Southborough, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.C.M.C. (*Chairman*). Sir Frank G. Sly, K.C.S.L, I.C.S. Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan. The Hon'ble Babu Surendranath Banerjea. The Hon'ble Mr. M. N. Hogg. W. M. Hailey, Esq., C.S.I, C.I.E., I.C.S. The Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri (Not present on 25-1-1919 and 27-1-1919). And the following added members : L. C. Crump, Esq., I.C.S. K. Natarajan, Esq. P. C. Tallents, Esq., I.C.S. (*Secretary*).

WRITTEN STATEMENT

The most difficult and the most momentous question of Government (is) how to transmit the force of individual opinion and preference into public action. This is the crux of popular institutions." So says Professor A. B. Hart. But this is only half the definition of popular Government. It is therefore necessary to emphasize the other half which is equal if not more in importance. As the Government is the most important field for the exercise of individual capacities, it is in the interest of the people that no person as such should be denied the opportunity of actively participating in the process of Government. That is to say popular Government is not only Government for the people but by the people. To express the same in a different way, representation of opinions by itself is not sufficient to constitute popular Government. To cover its true meaning it requires personal representation as well. It is because the former is often found without the latter that the Franchise Committee has to see in devising the franchises and constituencies for a popular Government in India, it provides for both, i.e., representation of opinions and representation of persons. Any scheme of franchise and constituency that fails to bring this about fails to create a popular Government.

2. Success in this task will ultimately depend upon the accuracy of the *de facto* conception of the society which is to be given the popular form of Government. *De facto* India was well portrayed by Lord Dufferin when he described it as a . . .

"Population ... composed of a large number of distinct nationalities, professing various religions, practising diverse rites, speaking different languages, while many of them... still further separated from one another by discordant prejudices, by conflicting sources of usages, and even antagonistic material interests. But perhaps the most patent characteristic of our Indian cosmos is its division into two mighty political communities as distant from each other as the poles apart—On the one hand the Hindus—with their elaborate caste distinctions—on the other hand, the Mohammedans—with their social equality. To these must be added a host of minor nationalities most of them numbering millions—almost as widely differentiated from one another by ethnological or political distinctions as are the Hindus from the Mohammedans, such as Sikhs, with their warlike habits and traditions and their enthusiastic religious beliefs, the Rohillas, the Pathans, the Assamese, the Baluchis and other wild and martial tribes on our frontiers, the hill men dwelling in the folds of the Himalayas, our subjects in Burma, Mongol in race and Buddhist in religion, the Gonds, Mhars, Bheels and other non-Aryan people in the centre and south of India, and the enterprising Parsees, with their rapidly developing manufactures and commercial interests. Again, amongst these numerous communities may be found, at one and the same moment, all the various stages of civilization through which mankind has passed from the pre-historic ages to the present days."

3. Englishmen have all along insisted that India is unfit for representative Government because of the division of her population into castes and creeds. This does not carry conviction with the advanced wing of Indian politicians. When they say that there are also social divisions in Europe as there are in India they are amply supported by facts. The social divisions of India are equalled, if not outdone, in a country like the United States of America. Corresponding to those in the former, we have in the latter men bonded together in a criminal conspiracy and trust or combinations that prey upon the public. Not only are there political sub-divisions but also industrial, scientific, and religious associations, differing in their aims and their

² <http://www.ambedkar.org/ambcd/07.%20Evidence%20before%20the%20Southborough%20Committee.htm>

attitudes towards each other. Apart from political parties with diverse ends, social sets, cliques and gangs we find in the United States of America more permanent divisions of the population such as the Poles, Dutch, Swedes, Germans, Russians, etc., each with its own language, religious and moral codes and traditions. If social divisions unfit a country for representative Government, it should unfit the United States of America as much as India. But if with all the social divisions, the United States of America is fit for representative Government, why not India? Ask the Indian politicians, so entrenched, it is difficult to dislodge them, and show that the social divisions of India are of a different kind or grant them their contention. Without these two there is no third alternative possible.

4. In my opinion their contention cannot be granted for the social divisions of India do matter in politics. How they matter can be best shown by understanding when they don't matter. Men live in a community by virtue of the things they have in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge, a common understanding; or to use the language of the Sociologists, they must be like-minded. But how do they come to have these things in common or how do they become like-minded? Certainly, not by sharing with another, as one would do in the case of a piece of cake. To cultivate an attitude similar to others or to be like-minded with others is to be in communication with them or to participate in their activity. Persons do not become like-minded by merely living in physical proximity, any more than they cease to be like-minded by being distant from each other. Participation in a group is the only way of being like-minded with the group. Each group tends to create its own distinctive type of like-mindedness, but where there are more groups than one to be brought into political union, there would be conflict among the differently like-minded. And so long as the groups remain isolated the conflict is bound to continue and prevent the harmony of action. It is the isolation of the groups that is the chief evil. Where the groups allow of endosmosis they cease to be evil. For endosmosis among the groups makes possible a resocialization of once socialized attitudes. In place of the old, it creates a new like-mindedness, which is representative of the interests, aims, and aspirations of all the various groups concerned. Like-mindedness is essential for a harmonious life, social or political and, as has just been shown, it depends upon the extent of communication, participation or endosmosis. Applying this test to the divisions in India, we must pronounce upon them as constituting an obstacle in the path of realizing a harmonious political life.

5. The groups or divisions each with its set like-mindedness that are sure to be in conflict may be given as follows:

(1) Hindus ; (2) Mohammedans; (3) Christians; (4) Parsees, (5) Jews, etc.

Except the Hindus the rest of the divisions are marked by such complete freedom of communication from within that we may expect their members to be perfectly like-minded with respect to one another. Regarding the Hindus, however, the analysis must be carried on a little farther. The significant fact about the Hindus is that before they are Hindus they are members of some caste. The castes are so exclusive and isolated that the consciousness of being a Hindu would be the chief guide of a Hindu's activity towards non-Hindu. But as against a Hindu of a different caste his caste-consciousness would be the chief guide of activity. From this, it is plain that as between two Hindus, caste-like-mindedness is more powerful than the like-mindedness due to their both being Hindus. Thus from within the Hindus, as from without, there is likely to be a conflict of like-minded persons. There are some who argue that this conflict runs through the whole gamut of the caste system. But this is protesting too much. From the point of view of communication the Hindus, in spite of castes, divide themselves into two significant groups—the touchables and the untouchables. The touchables have enough communication between them to enable us to say that the conflict of like-mindedness so far as they are concerned is not much to be dreaded. But there is a real difference and consequent conflict between the like-mindedness of the touchables and the untouchables. Untouchability is the strongest ban on the endosmosis between them. Their complete isolation accounts for the acuteness of the difference of like-mindedness.

The real social divisions of India then are:

(1) Touchable Hindus. (2) Untouchable Hindus. (3) Mohammedans. (4) Christians. (5) Parsees. (6) Jews.

6. It will not do good to ignore these real divisions in devising a system of policy, if the policy is to take the form of popular Government. But if the success of popular Government depends upon how well the constituencies and franchises transmit the social forces and how well they secure personal representation; we must first study the form which the conflict between these groups will assume in an election.

7. In a territorial constituency, which will group together voters belonging to the above groups, a majority of votes will declare a candidate to be a representative for the constituency in question. Now the

question arises : is such a candidate, a true representative of the groups, covered by the territorial constituency ? Is he a true mirror of the mind of the constituency ? Is he a representative of all the interests in the constituency ? To be concrete, will a Hindu candidate represent Mohammedan interests ? At this stage it must be recalled that the various divisions described above are held together by a community of interests which are non-secular or purely religious. We cannot say that each division is held together by a community of interests which are secular or material. If so, then for secular purposes the groups will be broken up. From the point of view of material interests, there are no such people as Mohammedans, Parsees, Hindus, etc. There will be in each of these groups landlords, labourers, capitalists, free traders, protectionists, etc., each of the groups having community of interests which are material will be composed of Hindus, Mohammedans, Parsees, etc. Consequently, a Hindu candidate can very well represent the material interests of the Mohammedans and *vice versa*. There is thus no conflict of material interest in the main among the communities as such. If we suppose that religious interests in future will occupy a subordinate place in the affairs of men, the secular interests of a group can be well represented by a candidate from another group.

8. From this point of view a territorial constituency will be sufficient for a popular Government. A little more consideration will show that it will be sufficient for only one-half the definition of popular Government. How true it is, will be shown presently. In an electoral fight between the various groups in a territorial constituency the voters will discriminate in favour of a candidate with whom they are in sympathy. But with whom they will be in sympathy is determined for them in advance. Given two candidates belonging to different groups but purporting to represent the same interest, the voters will mart their votes on the person belonging to the same community. Any group yielding a large number of electors will have its own candidate elected. This discrimination on the part of the voters, though it may not leave unrepresented the interests of the members of the minor groups, leaves them without any chance of personal representation.

9. To those who are busy in devising schemes for the proper and adequate representation of interests and opinions dilating on the importance of personal representation is likely to seem idle. But personal representation is not therefore unimportant. In recent times " Government for the people " has claimed more attention than " Government by the people ". In fact there are instances to show that " Government for the people " can exist in the best sense of the phrase without there being a "Government by the people.". Yet all political theorists will unanimously condemn such a form of Government. And the why of it is important to know. It will be granted that each kind of association, as it is an educative environment, exercises a formative influence on the active dispositions of its members. Consequently, what one is as a person is what one is as associated with others. A Government for the people, but not by the people, is sure to educate some into masters and others into subjects; because it is by the reflex effects of association that one can feel and measure the growth of personality. The growth of personality is the highest aim of society. Social arrangement must secure free initiative and opportunity to every individual to assume any role he is capable of assuming provided it is socially desirable. A new rule is a renewal and growth of personality. But when an association—and a Government is after all an association—*is* such that in it every role cannot be assumed by all, it tends to develop the personality of the few at the cost of the many—a result scrupulously to be avoided in the interest of Democracy. To be specific, it is not enough to be electors only. It is necessary to be lawmakers; otherwise who can be lawmakers will be masters of those who can only be electors.

10. Territorial constituencies are therefore objected to, and rightly, on the ground that they do nothing to prevent this absurd outcome. They erroneously suppose that electors will vote on the programmes of the candidates without any regard for their persona. As a matter of fact, the electors before they are electors are primarily members of a group. The persona of the candidates does matter with them. Naturally, therefore, as members of a group they prefer the candidate who belongs to their group to another candidate who does not belong to their group though both of them claim to represent the same interest. As a result of this preference the electors of a large group are destined to rise to a higher position of becoming eventual lawmakers, while the electors of a smaller group for no fault of theirs are doomed to a lower position of remaining electors. One crux of popular Government is the representation of interests and opinions. The other crux is personal representation. Territorial constituencies fail to create popular Government because they fail to secure personal representation to members of minor groups.

11. If this is a correct analysis as to how the social divisions operate to the prejudice of the political life of some communities, never was a more improper remedy advocated to meet the situation than proportional representation. Proportional representation is intended to give proportionate representation to views. It presupposes that voters vote for a candidate because of his views and not because of his persona. Proportional representation is ill suited for the purpose in hand.

12. We have therefore two possible methods of meeting the situation: either to reserve seats in plural constituencies for those minorities that cannot otherwise secure personal representation or grant communal electorates. Both have their usefulness. So far as the representation of the Mohammedans is concerned, it is highly desirable that they should participate in a general election with seats reserved for them in plural constituencies. The angularity of the division that separates the Hindus and Mohammedans is already sharp and communal representation, it may be urged, sharpens it the more. Communal election, however, seems to be a settled fact, so far as the Mohammedans are concerned and nothing is likely to alter it, even though alteration is likely to be beneficial.

13. But this argument is mainly intended to concern itself with the representation of the Hindus in general, and of the untouchable Hindus in particular. The discussion of the representation of the Hindus may be best introduced by a quotation which expresses the newer consciousness that has arisen in the various Hindu groups. It is said :

"A community may claim representation only on the ground of separate interests which require protection. In India, such interests are of three kinds only : either they arise out of religious antipathies which are pretty strong in India, or out of the backward state of a community in educational matters, or out of the socio-religious disabilities to which a community may be subject. Confining ourselves to the Hindu communities there are certain communities who, besides being very backward, are suffering under a great social tyranny. The untouchable classes must have their own *men* in the Council Hall to fight for the redress of their grievances. The non-Brahmins as a class are subjected to the social and intellectual domination of the Brahmin priesthood and may therefore rightly advocate separate representation."

14. From this it will be seen that the- new consciousness among the Hindus while acknowledging the separate interests of the untouchables does not accept the position that the touchable Hindus form a group by themselves. The new consciousness insists on dividing the touchable group into Brahmins and non-Brahmins each with its own separate interests. Separate electorates or reserved seats in mixed electorates are demanded for the three groups in which the Hindus are divided. Before dealing with the problems of the representation of the untouchables something will be said on the question of the Brahmins and non-Brahmins.

15. That the non-Brahmins are "backward in educational matters" cannot be said in any way to be their special interest. It is the general interest of all even of those Brahmins who are educationally backward. "The intellectual and social domination of the Brahmins is not a matter that affects the non-Brahmins alone. It affects all and it is therefore the interest of all. What remains then as a special interest for the non-Brahmins to require their protection? The case for separate representation for non-Brahmins fails because they cannot prove to have a common non-Brahmin interest.

16. But do they fail to secure personal representation? This can be best shown by reference to figures—

Group I			Group II	
Caste of Local Board voters	No. of voters for the Local Boards of the districts of Belgaum, Bijapur and Dharwar	Total population of the three districts	No. of voters for the Local Boards of the districts of Ratnagiri and Kolaba	Total population of the two districts
1	2	3	4	5
Brahmins	4,600	85,739	4,477	89,786
Lingayats	12,730	933,123
Marathas	1,074	255,526	3,667	446,077
Mahars	22	196,751	33	138,738
Mohammedans	661	295,838	1,169	106,273
Others	4,241	1,065,821	2,837	1,016,930
Total	23,328	2,832,798	12,183	1,797,804

Reducing the above figures to the basis of a thousand we have the following interesting result:

Group I					Group II	
Names of Castes	Proportion of population of a caste to every thousand of the population covered	Proportion of voters of a caste to every thousand of the population of the same caste	Proportion of voters of a caste to every thousand of voters	Proportion of population of a caste to every thousand of the population covered	Proportion of voters of a caste to every thousand of the population of the same caste	Proportion of voters of a caste to every thousand of voters
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Brahmins	30.2	53.7	197-2	50-8	49-8	367-4
Lingayats	329.4	13-6	545-7			
Marathas	90.2	4-2	46-0	248-8	8-2	300-9
Mahars	69.5	0-1	0-9	74-5	0-2	2-7
Mohammedans	104.4	2-2	28-3	59-2	10-9	95-9
Others	376.2	3-9	181-3	562-2	2.,8	232-8

So arranged, the conclusions to be drawn from these figures are highly important.

(1) The Brahmins, given a uniform franchise for all, though a small minority so far as numbers are concerned becomes a majority so far as the total of voters is concerned as is the case in Group II.

(2) Though with an uniform franchise the non-Brahmin communities like the Lingayats and Marathas do not fail to figure on the voters' list, the proportion of their voters to their population is insignificant as compared with the proportion which the Brahmin voters bear to the Brahmin population.

17. The proportion of the Brahmins to their voters is really extravagant. It is justified neither by faith in them nor by their own numbers. The Lingayats though they can legitimately complain that the proportion of their voters is small will succeed in securing personal representation. The Marathas though larger in numbers than the Brahmins, besides the very small proportion of their voters suffer on the voters' list and very likely will fail to secure personal representation for themselves.

So argued, the case for special provision of the Marathas can be sustained and should be admitted.

18. The question is in what form the provision should take. In my opinion such provision instead of taking the form of separate electorates of reserved seats should take the form of a low-pitched franchise. The franchise for the non-Brahmin should be lower than that for the Brahmin. By this arrangement the Marathas would improve their position on the voters' list and the altogether favoured position of the Brahmin would be equalized. It is in the interest of all that the Brahmin should not play such a preponderant part in politics as he has been doing hitherto. He has exerted a pernicious influence on the social life of the country and it is in the interest of all that his pernicious influence should be kept at a minimum in politics. As he is the most exclusive he is most anti-social.

19. Even the authors of the report on constitutional reforms are not in favour of a limited or uniform franchise. They say, " We consider that the limitations of the franchise, which it is obviously desirable to make as broad as possible, should be determined rather with reference to practical difficulties than to any prior considerations as to the degree of education or amount of income which may be held to constitute a qualification. It is possible that owing to unequal distribution of population and wealth it may be necessary to differentiate the qualifications for a vote not merely between provinces, but between different parts of the same province " (P. 147) To this I should like to add that we should differentiate the qualifications for a vote not merely between provinces or parts thereof but between communities of the same province. Without this differentiation some communities with a small but wealthy or educated population will secure more votes than a large community consisting of poor and uneducated members. Uniformity in franchise should be dispensed with. An important result will be that communal representation or reservation of seats for some non-Brahmin communities who are now clamouring for it would be avoided.

20. The untouchables are usually regarded as objects of pity but they are ignored in any political scheme on the score that they have no interests to protect. And yet their interests are the greatest. Not that they have large property to protect from confiscation. But they have their very *persona* confiscated. The socio religious disabilities have dehumanised the untouchables and their interests at stake are therefore the interests of humanity. The interests of property are nothing before such primary interests.

21. If one agrees with the definition of slave as given by Plato, who defines him as one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct, the untouchables are really slaves. The untouchables

are so socialized as never to complain of their low estate. Still less do they ever dream of trying to improve their lot, by forcing the other classes to treat them with that common respect which one man owes to another. The idea that they have been born to their lot is so ingrained in their mind that it never occurs to them to think that their fate is anything but irrevocable. Nothing will ever persuade them that men are all made of the same clay, or that they have the right to insist on better treatment than that meted out to them.

22. The exact description of the treatment cannot be attempted. The word untouchable is an epitome of their ills and sufferings. Not only has untouchability arrested the growth of their personality but also it comes in the way of their material well being. It has also deprived them of certain civil rights. For instance, in Konkan the untouchables are prohibited from using the public road. If some high caste man happens to cross him, he has to be out of the way and stand at such a distance that his shadow will not fall on the high caste man. The untouchable is not even a citizen. Citizenship is a bundle of rights such as (1) personal liberty, (2) personal security, (3) rights to hold private property, (4) equality before law, (5) liberty of conscience, (6) freedom of opinion and speech, (7) right of assembly, (8) right of representation in a country's Government and (9) right to hold office under the State. The British Government by gradual growth may be said to have conceded these rights at least in theory to its Indian subjects. The right of representation and the right to hold office under the State are the two most important rights that make up citizenship. But the untouchability of the untouchables puts these rights far beyond their reach. In a few places they do not even possess such insignificant rights as personal liberty and personal security, and equality before law is not always assured to them. These are the interests of the untouchables. And as can be easily seen they can be represented by the untouchables alone. They are distinctively their own interests and none else can truly voice them. A free trade interest can be voiced by a Brahmin, a Mohammedan or a Maratha equally well. But none of these can speak for the interests of the untouchables because they are not untouchables. Untouchability constitutes a definite set of interests which the untouchables alone can speak for. Hence it is evident that we must find the untouchables to represent their grievances which are their interests and, secondly, we must find them in such numbers as will constitute a force sufficient to claim redress.

23. Now, will a general territorial electorate provided for the adequate return of the untouchables to the law-making body? Referring back to the figures we find that the untouchables (represented in the table by the Mahars), though they formed 69.4 in every thousand of the population, did not claim even a voter from their class. Under such circumstances it is impossible for them to elect their own man in a general electorate. On the other hand they must despair of any votes being cast by the touchable Hindus for an untouchable candidate. The gradation of castes produces a certain theological basis which cuts the untouchables both ways : in the minds of the lower orders it creates a preference for the higher orders while it creates a contempt for the lower orders in the minds of the higher orders. Thus the ascending scale of preference and the descending scale of hatred and contempt beggars the untouchables both ways. Without giving a single vote to the untouchables the touchables are sure to make a large draft on the already meagre voting strength of the untouchables.

24. So situated, the untouchables with the largest interests at stake will be the greatest sufferers in a general territorial electorate. To give them an opening, special provision shall have to be made for their adequate representation. But before a scheme can be outlined it is necessary to see how much is the untouchable population in the Bombay Presidency. The Census Report for the Bombay Presidency for the year 1911 gives the following figures for castes which " cause pollution ":

Bhungis	93,691
Chamars, Mochis, Machigars	306,478
Sochis, Mhars, Holiyas Dheds	1,470,992
Mangs, Madigs	274,037
Total	2,145,193
To this must be added the Dhors amounting to	13,506
TOTAL UNTOUCHABLES	2,158,699

The following figures give the distribution of the untouchables by districts:

District	Total population 1911	Total Hindu population	Total untouchable Population	Percentage of untouchables to the total population	Percentage of untouchables to the Hindu population
1	2	3	4	5	6
British Districts (excluding Aden).-	19,628,477	14,920,267	1,627,980	8	10.9
1. Bombay City	979,445	664,042	89,052	9	11.6
Northern Division ..	3,685,383	3,117,263	245,050	6.6	7.8
2. Ahmadabad	827,809	693,155	78,869	10	11.4
3. Broach	306,717	192,935	22,390	7	11.6
4. Kaira	691,744	598,164	41,497	5.9	6.9
5. Panch Mahals	332,695	274,339	14,410	4	5
6. Surat	654,109	571,745	36,509	5.6	6
7. Thana	882,309	786,925	50,010	5.6	6
Central Division ..	6,387,064	5,998,828	7,73,184	12	13
8. Ahmednagar	945,305	855,676	116,929	12	13.6
9. Khandesh (East) ..	1,034,886	902,131	112,391	10.8	12
10. Khandesh (West) ..	580,723	474,200	36,809	6	7.7
11. Nasik	905,030	843,705	97,740	10.7	11
12. Poona	1,071,512	991,725	113,118	12.4	13.3
13. Satara	1,081,278	1,028,176	144,688	13	14
14. Sholapur	768,330	703,215	125,063	16.7	18
Southern Division..	5,061,150	4,502,708	385,470	7.6	8.5
15. Belgaum	943,320	817,797	83,199	8.8	10.1
16. Bijapur	862,973	757,542	80,501	9	10.6
17. Dharwar	1,026,005	872,885	52,540	5	6
18. Kanara	430,548	383,624	10,767	2.4	2.9
19. Kolaba	594,156	560,266	51,108	8.5	9.1
20. Ratnagiri	1,203,638	1,110,594	107,354	8.9	9.7
Sind (British Districts)	3,513,435	837,426	135,224	3.8	16

25. The total population of the Bombay Presidency by the Census of 1911 (British districts only) is 19,626,477. Of this the untouchable population is 1,627,980 or 8 per cent of the total. Assuming for the present the Bombay Legislative Council to consist of 100 elected members, the untouchables should have 8 representatives to represent them in the Council. If we distribute one representative to every 200,000 of the people (which is just the ratio of 100 representatives to the 20 millions of the population), then the untouchables can by right claim 8 representatives to themselves. But the untouchables of the Bombay Presidency may be allowed to elect 9 members in all. The election of one additional member will be justified later on.

26. The 9 elected members should form a constituency to elect one member from among themselves to represent the untouchables of this Presidency in the Imperial Legislative Council.

28. It may be objected that though 8 representatives are not in excess to the untouchable population it may be in excess to the voting strength of untouchables. That the untouchables are a poor community and that under the same franchise they yield per thousand a smaller proportion of voters than other communities is a fact. But if the grave position of the untouchables is admitted instead of restricting their number of representatives, the aim should be to increase the number of their voters, i.e., we must aim at lowering the franchise so far as the untouchables are concerned.

29. What the franchise should be is a very important question. There is a line of argument which urges that franchise should be given to those only who can be expected to make an intelligent use of it. As against this view it can be said in the words of Prof. L. T. Hobhouse that it is true that " the success of democracy depends on the response of voters to the opportunities given them. But conversely the opportunities must be given in order to call forth the response. The exercise of popular Government is itself all education. enfranchisement itself may precisely be the stimulus needed to awaken interest The ballot alone effectively liberates the quiet citizen from the tyranny of the shouter and the wire-puller. An impression of existing inertness alone is not a sufficient reason for with-holding responsible Government or restricting the area of suffrage." Taking into consideration that suffrage is an education and that there are groups with unequal distribution of wealth and education among them and that these groups are not sympathetically like-minded, the authors of the reports rightly argue that the case for uniformity of franchise cannot be sustained.

30. But in the case of the untouchables there are as few reasons for curtailing the number of their representatives, as the reasons for widening their electorate are many. If under a given franchise the untouchables do not muster strong as electors, it is not their fault. The very untouchability attached to their person is a bar to their moral and material progress. The principal modes of acquiring wealth are trade, industry or service. The untouchables can engage in none of these because of their untouchability. From an untouchable trader no Hindu will buy. An untouchable cannot be engaged in lucrative service. Military service had been the monopoly of the untouchables since the days of the East India Company. They had joined the Army in such large numbers that the Marquis Tweeddale in his note which he submitted to the Indian Army Commission of 1859 wrote. " It should never be forgotten that India was conquered with the help of the low-caste men." But after the mutiny when the British were able to secure soldiers from the ranks of the Marathas, the position of the low-caste men who had been the prop of the Bombay Army became precarious, not because the Marathas were better soldiers but because their theological bias prevented them from serving under low-caste officers. The prejudice was so strong that even the non-caste British had to stop recruitment from the untouchable classes. In like manner, the untouchables are refused service in the Police Force. In a great many of the Government offices it is impossible for an untouchable to get a place. Even in the mills a distinction is observed. The untouchables are not admitted in Weaving Departments of the Cotton Mills though many of them are professional weavers. An instance at hand may be cited from the school system of the Bombay Municipality. This most cosmopolitan city ruled by a Corporation with a greater freedom than any other Corporation in India has two different sets of schools . one for the children of touchables and the other for those of the untouchables., This in itself is a point worthy of note. But there is something yet more noteworthy. Following the division of schools it has divided its teaching staff into untouchables and touchables. As the untouchable teachers are short of the demand, some of the untouchable schools are manned by teachers from the touchable class. The heart-killing fun of it is that if there is a higher grade open in untouchable school service, as there is bound to be because of a few untouchable trained teachers, a touchable teacher can be thrust into the grade. But if a higher grade is open in the touchable school service, no untouchable teacher can be thrust into that grade. He must wait till a vacancy occurs in the untouchable service !!! Such is the ethics of the Hindu social life. Under it if the untouchables are poor, the committee, it may be hoped, will not deny them representation because of their small electoral roll but will see its way to grant them adequate representation to enable the untouchables to remove the evil conditions that bring about their poverty. At present when all the avenues of acquiring wealth are closed, it is unwise to require from the untouchables a high property qualification. To deny them the opportunities of acquiring wealth and then to ask from them a property qualification is to add insult to injury. Just what sort of franchise and just what pitch are required to produce sufficient voting strength from the untouchables ? In absence of data, I leave it to the Committee to decide. It would be better to pitch the franchise so low as to educate into political life as many untouchables as possible. They are too degraded to be conscious of themselves. I only wish to emphasize that in deciding upon the representation of the untouchables the Committee looking to their interests at stake will not let the extent of the electorate govern the number of representatives, but will rather let the number of representatives govern the extension of the electorate.

31. In this connection it would not be improper to remind the Committee of Lord Morley who is reported to have said that " the object of Government was that the Legislative Councils should represent truly and

effectively with reasonable approach to the balance of real social forces, the wishes and needs of the communities concerned. This could not be done by Algebra, Arithmetic, Geometry or Logic, but by a wide outlook. He saw no harm as to a compromise that while numbers should be the main factor in determining the extent of representation modifying causes might influence the number of representatives" It is therefore proposed that the untouchables of the Bombay Presidency should be allowed to elect 9 members through the constituencies made up as above. These 9 members will further form a constituency to elect one member from among themselves to represent the untouchables in the Imperial Legislative Council leaving 8 members to represent the untouchables in the Bombay Legislative Council.

32. Besides communal electorates there are other schemes in the field for the representation of the untouchables. It would not be proper to close this statement without a word of comment on those Schemes.

33. The Congress has denied communal representation except in the case of Mohammedans and it also denies the extensive use of nomination, the only way then left open to the untouchables is to fight in a general electorate. Now this is as it should be if all were equally free to fight. To educate the untouchables by Shahtras into pro-touchables and the touchables into anti-untouchables and then to propose that the two should fight out at an open poll is to betray signs of mental aberration or a mentality fed on cunning. But it must never be forgotten that the Congress is largely composed of men who are by design political Radicals and social Tories. Their chant is that the social and the political are two distinct things having no bearing on each other. To them the social and the political are two suits and can be worn one at a time as the season demands. Such a psychology has to be laughed at because it is too interested to be seriously taken into consideration either for acceptance or for rejection. As it pays to believe in it, it will die a hard death. Starting from this unnatural premise the Congress activities have been quite natural. Those who attend the Congress do not care to attend the National Social Conference held in the same pandal. In fact those who attend the Congress had once started a campaign to refuse the use of the pandal to the Conference which was once refused the pandal in the city of Poona, the roosting place of the intelligentsia of our Presidency, As the Congress is a non-national or antinational body, its views on communal electorates are worthy of no serious consideration.

34. The moderates in their separate meeting have been more kindly than just. They proposed the reservation of seats for backward communities in plural constituencies. They have not specified the number of seats for the untouchables. But the general sense of many enlightened moderates and others kindly inclined is that one or two representatives of the untouchables in the Legislative Council would suffice. It is impossible to agree with these gentlemen though they are entitled to gratitude for this much sympathy. One or two representatives of the untouchables are as good as having none.

A Legislative Council is not an old curiosity shop. It will be a Council with powers to make or mar the fortunes of society. How can one or two untouchables carry a legislative measure to improve their condition or prevent a legislative measure worsening their state? To be frank, the untouchables cannot expect much good from the political power to be given over to the high caste Hindus. Though the power may not be used against the untouchables and one cannot be altogether sure of this, it may not be used for their betterment. A Legislative Council may be sovereign to do anything it likes, but what it will like to do depends upon its own character. The English Parliament, we may be certain, though it is sovereign to do anything, will not make the preservation of blue-eyed babies illegal. The Sultan will not, though he can, change the religion of Mohammed just as the Pope will not, though he can, overthrow the religion of Christ. In the same way legislature, mainly composed of high caste men, will not pass a law removing untouchability, sanctioning inter-marriages, removing the ban on the use of public streets, public temples, public schools; in short, cleansing the person of the untouchables. This is not because they cannot, but chiefly because they will not. A legislature is the product of a certain social condition and its power is determined by whatever determines society. This is too obvious to be denied. What may happen in future can be guessed from what has happened in the past. The high caste men in the Council do not like any social question being brought before the legislature, as may be seen from the fact of the Resolution introduced by the Honourable Mr. Dadabhoy in 1916 in the Imperial Legislative Council. That it was adversely criticized by many who claimed to evince some interest in the untouchables is too well known to need repetition. But what is not well known is that though the resolution was lost the mover was not pardoned; for the very moving of such a nasty resolution was regarded as a sin. At a subsequent election the mover had to make room for the Honourable Mr. Khaparde, who once wrote in an article: "Those who work for the elevation of the untouchables are themselves degraded."

Isn't this sympathy of the higher castes for the untouchables, sympathy with a vengeance?

35. Those who tell that one or two members would suffice for the untouchables fail to grasp the true import of political right. The chief import of a political right though technically summed up in the power to

vote does lie either in voting upon for laws or for those who make laws; neither does it consist in the right to speak for or against a certain measure nor in being able to say "yea or nay" upon roll-call; to be able to put into a ballot-box a piece of paper with a number of names written thereon is an act which, like those mentioned above, of itself possesses no value which stamps it as inherently superior to many of the most ordinary transactions of daily life. They are educative but as much as any transaction is. The chief significance of suffrage or a political right consists in a chance for active and direct participation in the regulation of the terms upon which associated life shall be sustained. Now the terms upon which the associated life between the touchables and untouchables is carried on today are the most ignominious to the former and highly detrimental to the latter. To make effective the capacities of a people there must be the power to fix the social conditions of their exercise. If the conditions are too obdurate, it is in the interest of the untouchables as well as of the touchables that the conditions should be revised. The untouchables must be in a position to influence the revision. Looking to the gravity of their interests, they should get their representation as proposed in proportion to their population. One or two is only kind but neither just nor sufficient. As Lord Morley says in an earlier quotation, needs not numbers should govern the extent of representations'.

36. Recently there is brought into the forefront a rival scheme for the representation of the untouchables by the Depressed Class Mission. The scheme is known as co-option. The scheme proposes that the representatives of the untouchables should be nominated by the co-option of the elected members of the Council. Whether one should laugh or cry at the solicitude of the Mission for the untouchables it is rather difficult to decide. To cry is to believe that such a silly scheme would ever be adopted. The best way is to laugh it out. From the scheme can be easily seen that what is sometimes called benevolent interest in others may be an unwilling mask for an attempt to dictate to them what their good shall be, instead of an endeavour to agree with them so that they may seek and find the good of their own choice. The Mission, it must be said, was started with the intention of improving the condition of the Depressed Classes by emancipating them from the social tyranny of their high caste masters. But the Mission has fallen on such bad times that it is forced to advocate a scheme by which its wards or their representatives will be bounden slaves of their past masters. The masters and the mission have thus met and evolved a scheme which will keep the Depressed classes eternally depressed without any hope of deliverance. Such tactics do not deceive the untouchables ignorant as they are; much less will they deceive the Franchise Committee. From another point of view the scheme of the Mission is unacceptable. It is aggravating to see the Mission proposing a scheme for the representation of the untouchables while persistently refusing to admit an untouchable in its governing council. Interested and officious as it is, its scheme must be rejected.

37. Nomination even though by Government in itself to be preferred to the former kind of nomination, is to be objected to from the standpoint of the untouchables. Apart from restricting the freedom of the representatives it fails to give political education which is the urgent need of all communities, much more of the untouchables.

38. At this stage we must consider the argument against communal representation. The first argument raised by the authors of the report is to the effect "that the history of self-government among the nations who have developed it is decisively against" communal representation. But on an earlier page the authors say that the difference of caste and creeds must be taken "into account as presenting a feature of Indian Society which is out of harmony with the ideas on which elsewhere in the world representative institutions rest" (page 97). In writing the former the later analysis of the situation must have vanished from their minds, else we must say that the authors could hold two opposing views at the same time. Presented in juxtaposition, the authors must be expected to agree to communal representation on the score of an exceptional remedy required to meet an exceptional situation.

39. Another and chief argument against communal representation is that it will perpetuate social divisions. The fun of it is that those who uphold the social divisions are the loudest in their expression of this adverse argument. The committee will please note that those who are the opponents of communal representation on this score are also the staunchest opponents of Mr. Patel's Inter-Caste Marriage Bill as a caste-breaking bill. The sincerity of those who bring forward this argument is seriously to be doubted. But as even the authors of the report have put it as a second count against communal representation, this particular argument must be met if possible.

Does communal representation perpetuate social divisions? If you look upon communal representation as making electoral Colleges of social divisions, the criticism may be said to be valid. This is true only if it is presupposed that the divisions are no real divisions and that they don't matter. This is as false a presupposition as that of inviting India which is made when it is said that Englishmen are unsocial. Communal Representation is a device to ward off the evil effects of the divisions. To those who, while agreeing to this particular benefit of communal representation, object to it on the score that it perpetuates the divisions it

can be shown that there is another perspective from which it can be said that communal representation instead of perpetuating the social divisions is one of the ways of dissolving them.

40. While communal electorates will be co-terminus with social divisions their chief effect will be to bring together men from diverse castes who would not otherwise mix together into the Legislative Council. The Legislative Council will thus become a new cycle of participation in which the representatives of various castes who were erstwhile isolated and therefore anti-social will be thrown into an associated life. An active participation in an associated life, in its turn, will not leave unaffected the dispositions and attitudes of those who participate. A caste or a religious group to day is a certain attitude. So long as each caste or a group remains isolated its attitude remains fossilized. But the moment the several castes and groups begin to have contact and co-operation with one another the resocialization of the fossilized attitude is bound to be the result. If the Hindus become resocialized with regard to their attitude towards Mohammedans, Christians, etc., and the Mohammedans, Christians, etc., become resocialized with regard to their attitudes towards the Hindus, or the touchable Hindus with regard to the untouchables, caste and divisions will vanish. If caste is an attitude and it is nothing else, it must be said to be dissolved when that particular attitude symbolizing the caste is dissolved. But the existing set attitude representing the diverse castes and groups will be dissolved only if the diverse groups meet together and take part in a common activity. Such changes of disposition and attitudes will not be ephemeral but will, in their turn influence associated life outside the Council Hall. The more opportunities are created for such conjoint activities the better. The resocialization will then be on a larger scale and bring about a speedier end of caste and groups. Thus those who condemn communal representation on the score of perpetuating the existing divisions will welcome it, on reflection, as a potent solvent for dissolving them.

41. The importance and necessity of communal and adequate representation of untouchables is beyond question. The depth of emotion with which the untouchables speak on this topic must have been easily gauged when the untouchables of the Madras Presidency told Mr. Montague that there would be bloodshed if Home Rule for India was not accompanied by communal representation to the untouchables. The authors of the Report however are actuated by a faith in the intelligentsia to effect all reforms for the elevation of the untouchables from permanent degradation and ostracism. They say " they find the educated Indian organizing effort not for political ends alone but for various forms of public and social service." As the authors have connived at the demands of the untouchables on this score it is but proper to investigate whether their faith is well grounded. On education and its social value the words of Joseph Addison are not too stale to be recalled. He said, "There can be no greater injury to human society than that good Talents among men should be held Honourable to those who are endowed with them without any regard how they are applied. The Gifts of Nature and the Accomplishments of Art are valuable but as they are exerted in the interest of virtue or governed by the Rules of Honour, we ought to abstract our minds from the observation of an excellence in those we converse with, till we have taken some notice or received some good information of the Disposition of their Minds, otherwise they make us fond of those whom our reason and judgment will tell us we ought to abhor."

42. Statistics will show that the intelligentsia and the Brahmin caste are exchangeable terms. The disposition of the intelligentsia is a Brahmin disposition. Its outlook is a Brahmin outlook. Though he has learned to speak in the name of all, the Brahmin leader is in no sense a leader of the people. He is a leader of his caste at best, for he feels them as he does for no other people. It is not intended to say that there are no Brahmins who feel for the untouchables. To be just, there are a few more moderate and rational Brahmins who admit the frightful nature of the institution of untouchability in the abstract and perceive the dangers to society with which it is fraught. But the great majority of the Brahmins are those who doggedly deny the horrors of the system in the teeth of such a mass of evidence as never was brought to bear on any other subject and to which the experience of every day contributes its immense amount; who, when they speak of freedom, mean the freedom to oppress their kind and to be savage, merciless and cruel, and whose inalienable rights can only have their growth in the wrongs of the untouchables Their delicate gentility will neither bear the Englishmen as superior nor will it brook the untouchables as equal. " I will not tolerate a man above me, and of those below none must approach too near " sums up the true spirit of their social as well as political creed. Those who speak against the anti-social spirit of the Brahmin leaders are often cautioned that in their denunciation they do not pay sufficient regard to the existence of the first class of Brahmin leaders. This is no doubt the case. Noble but very rare instances of personal and pecuniary sacrifice may be found among them just as may be found to be tender in the exercise of their unnatural power. Still it is to be feared that this injustice is inseparable from the state of things with which humanity and truth are invoked to deal. The miserable state of the untouchables is not a bit more tolerable because some tender hearts are bound to show sympathy, nor can the indignant tide of honest wrath stand still because in its course it overwhelms a few who are comparatively innocent among a host of guilty.

43. The trend of nationalism in India does not warrant us to believe that the few who are sympathetic will grow in volume. On the other hand it is the host of guilty that time is sure to multiply. With the growth of political agitation, the agitation for social reform has subsided and has even vanished. The Prarthana Samaj, the Brahmo Samaj with their elevating influence have become things of the past. The future has few things like these in store. The growth of education if it is confined to one class, will not necessarily lead to liberalism. It may lead to the justification and conservation of class interest; and instead of creating the liberators of the down-trodden, it may create champions of the past and the supporters of the *status quo*. Isn't this the effect of education so far? That it will take a new course in future *ceteris paribus*, there is no ground to believe. Therefore, instead of leaving the untouchables to the mercy of the higher castes, the wiser policy would be to give power to the untouchables themselves who are anxious, not like others, to usurp power but only to assert their natural place in society.

44. This gigantic world war however motivated, has yielded what is known as the principle of self-determination which is to govern international relations of the future. It is happy to note that the pronouncement of the 20th August 1917 declared the application of the principle to India—a principle which enunciates the rule that every people must be free to determine the conditions under which it is to live. It would be a sign of imperfect realization of the significance of this principle if its application were restricted to international relations, because discord does not exist between nations alone, but there is also discord between classes from within a nation. Wittingly our Indian politicians in their political speeches and harangues hold to the *de jure* conception of the Indian people. By the *de jure* conception they conceive of the Indian people as by nature one and emphasize the qualities such as praiseworthy community of purpose and welfare, loyalty to public ends and mutuality of sympathy which accompany this unity. How the *de jure* and *de facto* conceptions conflict, it is hoped, the committee will not fail to realize. As an instance the following may be noted. The moral evil to the Indian people of their conquest and subjugation by the British is a theme which is very attractive to the Brahmin politicians, who never fail to make capital out of it. The moral evils were once portrayed by John Shore in his "Notes on Indian Affairs" written in 1832. The late Honourable Mr. Gokhale once voiced the same feeling when speaking about the "excessive costliness of the foreign agency". He said :

"There is a moral evil which, if anything, is even greater. A kind of dwarfing or stunting of the Indian race is going on under the present system. We must live all the days of our life in an atmosphere of inferiority and the tallest of us must bend, in order that the exigencies of the existing system may be satisfied. The upward impulse, if I may use such an expression, which every schoolboy at Eton and Harrow may feel, that he may one day be a Gladstone or Napoleon or a Wellington, and which may draw forth the best efforts of which he is capable is denied to us. The full height to which our manhood is capable of rising can never be reached by us under the present system. The moral elevation which every self-governing people feel cannot be felt by us. Our administrative and military talents must gradually disappear, owing to sheer disuse till at last our lot as hewers of wood and drawers of water in our own country. is stereotyped."

45. I beg to invite the attention of the Committee whether these sentiments which have been voiced by a Brahmin (a noble Brahmin to be sure) to the disgrace of the British bureaucracy cannot be more fittingly voiced by the untouchables to the disgrace of the Brahmin oligarchy? May it be said to the credit of the bureaucracy, that it has disproved the charge of being wooden and shown itself susceptible to feeling by proposing changes in the system of the Government which has dwarfed the personality of those for whom it was devised. But can the oligarchy claim anything half as noble? Their belief is that the Hindu social system has been perfected for all time by their ancestors who had the superhuman vision of all eternity and supernatural power for making infinite provision for future ages. This deep ingrained ethnocentrism has prevented a reconstruction of Hindu Society and stood in the way of a revision of vested rights for the common good. A farce of a conference for the removal of untouchability was enacted in March 1918 in Bombay. Doctor Kurtakoti, the Shankaracharya of Karvir fame, though promised to attend, left for Northern India just a day or two before the conference met, on some urgent business. Mr. Tilak is credited with a short speech at the conference which has for the good luck of Mr. Tilak remained unreported. But this was only lip sympathy shown to hoodwink the untouchables for when the draft of the proclamation removing untouchability was presented to Mr. Tilak. It is known on creditable evidence that he refused to honour it with his signature.

46. Here is disclosed a patent disharmony within a nation and therefore a proper field for the application of the principle of self-determination, if the advanced classes are clamouring for its application to India and if the powers that be have sanctioned it, however partially, to ward off the future stunting and dwarfing of the Indian people, may not the untouchables with justice claim its benefit in their own interest? Admitting the necessity or self-determination for the untouchables communal representation cannot be withheld from

them, for communal representation and self-determination are but two different, phrases which express the same notion.

Supplementary Written Statement of Mr. Bhimrao Ambedkar.

The object of this supplement is primarily, to show how the scheme of representation which I have recommended for the untouchables "of the Bombay Presidency in my previous statement can be fitted into the scheme of representation proposed by the Government of Bombay for the composition of the Legislative Council.

First I wish to propose certain changes in number of seats assigned by the Government to the various main constituencies. The several changes proposed are indicated in the following table :

Distribution of Seats among	By Govt	By me
(1) Zamindars and Jahagirdas of Sind	1	1
(2) Sardars of Gujarat	1	1
(3) Sardars of Deccan	1	1
(4) Bombay University	2	2
(5) Europeans	4	4
(6) Sindh Hindus	3	4
(7) Mohammedans	18	10
(8) Six cities	18	17
(9) Twenty-six Districts of the Presidency	52	60
Total	100	100

1. As regards the method of election proposed for I, II, III, IV & V of the above constituencies, I agree with the Government.
2. The Government has reserved 3 seats for the Sindh Hindus. I have proposed 4 for them, one of which should be earmarked for the untouchables of Sind to be filled by a communal electorate.
3. For the 6 cities I have reserved 17 seats. Of this I propose that Bombay should be given 10. Of the 10 seats the untouchables of the city should be given 1 seat, also to be filled by a communal electorate.
4. So far it is shown how the Sind untouchables and their fellows in Bombay can be provided for. In addition to these two seats the untouchables of the Presidency proper, excluding the city of Bombay, should be given 7 seats. The constituencies among which these 7 seats are to be distributed, I have indicated on page 7 of my previous statement. It is in this fashion that the 9 seats for the untouchables of the Presidency should be carved out. The Government of Bombay finds difficulty in defining the Depressed Classes.

The difficulty is not a real difficulty, for, for all practical purposes the untouchables and the Depressed classes are the same. Knowing full well the degradation of the untouchables, the callousness of the Bombay Government is appalling. By refusing to make provision for the representation of the Depressed classes the Government have deliberately thrown the gravest of interests into the greatest of perils—a calamity which I am sure the Committee will avert.

5. Having taken out 7 seats from the 60, I propose to distribute the remaining 53 among the touchable population of the 26 districts as follows:

I allow, though cannot quite agree with the Government, that the 7 districts of Sind should elect 14 members on the basis of 2 per district. But in the case of the 19 districts which are outside Sind I feel that a two-member constituency will not suffice, principally because the touchable Hindu population is not homogeneous. In order to satisfy the aspirations of the subdivisions of the touchable Hindus we must at least in some cases give up the principle of a two-member constituency. [91 (2)] To distribute the 39 seats among the 19 districts in question I should first group the districts on linguistic basis as follows :

Districts

	Touchable Hindu Population
(1) Ahmedabad	614,286
(2) Broach	170,545
(3) Kaira	556,667
(4) Panch Mahals	259,929
(5) Surat	535,236
Total	21,36,663

II MARATHI

	Touchable Hindu Population
(1) Thana	736,915
(2) Kolaba	509,158
(3) Ratnagiri	1,003,240
(4) Ahmednagar	738,747
(5) Khandesh East	789,740
(6) Khandesh West	437,391
(7) Nasik	745,965
(8) Satara	883,488
(9) Poona	858,607
(10) Sholapur	574,152
Total	72,77,403

III KANARESE

	Touchable Hindu Population
(1) Belgaum	734,598
(2) Bijapur	677,041
(3) Dharwar	820,345
(4) Kanara	372,857
Total	26,04,841

Grand total of touchable Hindus in the 19 Districts concerned 12,018,907. Of the 39 seats to be distributed I should give 8 seats to the Gujarati 23 to the Marathi and 8 to the Kanarese districts.

The actual constituencies may be as under:

Language District	Population in each constituency	Number of the constituency	Number of representatives to be elected by the constituency
1	2	3	4
I Gujarathi			
1. Ahmednagar	614,286	I	2
2. Broach	727,212	II	3
3. Kaira			
4. Panch Mahals	614,286	III	3
5. Surat			
II Marathi			
1. Thana	1,246,073	IV	4
2. Kolaba			
3. Ratnagiri	1,003,240	V	2
4. Ahmednagar	1,484,712	VI	3
5. Nashik			
6. Khandesh East	1,227,131	VII	3
7. Khandesh West			
8. Satara	883,488	VIII	*
9. Poona	858,607	IX	3
10. Sholapur	574,152	X	3
III Kanarese			
1. Belgaum	1,411,639	XI	4
2. Bijapur			
3. Dharwar	1,193,202	XII	4
4. Kanara			

* No Figure is shown against the Satara district in the original.

Total number of representatives for the 19 districts 39.

The Principal advantage of such a grouping is that the demand of the Marathas and the Lingayats can be satisfied without resorting to communal representation. There is no sacredness about a district that can plead against transcending its boundaries for political purposes when such a transcending enables us to minimise the field for communal representation.

8. I have differed from the Government of Bombay on the number of representatives to be given to the Mohamedans. Of the two bases, population and the Congress Scheme, the Government of Bombay have preferred the latter without even making a show of reasoning. In doing so they have contravened the most considered opinion of the authors of the Reforms Scheme who say that there is no basis other than that of negotiation for the proportion of Mohammedan representation fixed in the Congress League Scheme. It must be urged that looking to its composition the Congress is a body whose vicarious promises can never be binding on the vast population who have played no part in its deliberations.

9. The Mohammedans of this presidency form 20 per cent of the total population. On the basis of population therefore, they are entitled only to 20 seats out of the 100 elective seats. But tempering

population by need I think 24 seats ought to satisfy them. Any excess over this cannot be tolerated, as it will be at the cost of the other communities. Of these 24, the 7 districts of Sind on the basis of 2 per district will return 14 Mohammedans. The other 10 seats may be distributed as follows:

	Population	No. of Representatives
(1) Bombay City	179,246	2
(2) Northern Division	342,696	2
(3) Central Division	367,509	3
(4) Southern Division	457,997	3
	Total	10

I should prefer linguistic grouping to divisional grouping even in the case of the Mohammedans. I fail to see how a Mohammedan from Thana can have any affiliation with a Mohammedan of Surat though both the districts come under the same division. To group together for political purposes people who are ethnically different is absurd

Mr. Bhimrao R. Ambedkar called and examined

Sir Frank Sly: He was a professor in the Sydenham College of Commerce. He graduated from the Elphinstone College, Bombay and was an M.A. of the Columbia University, New York. He was a Mahar by caste and his statement dealt largely with the depressed classes.

So far as the Hindu community was concerned, he divided them into two classes, touchables and untouchables; a distinction which was unmistakable in practice and more convenient than a division by castes. He recognised also a distinction between Brahmins and non-Brahmins, but this was of less importance. The distinction between Brahmin and non-Brahmin would not make much difference as regards the attitude of voter to a candidate, but the distinction between touchable and untouchable would make a very great difference.

He did not think there was any necessity for communal electorates for non-Brahmins as, if three-member constituencies were granted according to his supplementary statement, non-Brahmins would get some seats. From the figures in Para 16 of his written statement he intended to show that on a uniform property qualification, a community which might be in a minority with regard to population might be in a majority in respect of voting strength; some of the communities that he had mentioned might be minorities in the whole province, but majorities in particular districts. They should try to reduce the fever for communal representation as much as possible, and he therefore recommended three-member constituencies.

He wanted a variation of the franchise for the untouchables; but, if constituencies with more than two members were adopted, the lowering of the franchise became a matter of less importance. In the case of a small constituency, for instance, the Marathas, it might be desirable to group them.

If a particular community had a majority of votes in a constituency, there was no need for that community to have separate communal representation. If the untouchables had a majority of votes in a particular constituency, he would not ask for communal representation. It was because they were in a minority and would always remain so on a uniform franchise that he asked for separate representation. His justification for asking for a low franchise was that as a result of being untouchable, the untouchables had no property; they could not trade because they could not find customers. He remembered a case in which a Mahar woman was taken to the police court for selling watermelons. He was not aware of the conditions outside the Bombay Presidency. In the mills in the Bombay Presidency the untouchables were not yet allowed to work in the weaving department: in one case an untouchable did work in the weaving department of a mill saying that he was a Mohammedan, and when found out, he was severely beaten. The definition of an "untouchable" as a person, who would cause pollution by his touch, was a satisfactory one for electoral purposes. It was not the case that some castes were considered to be untouchable in some districts and touchable in others.

According to his classification the untouchables amounted to about 8 per cent of the population, but he had proposed 9 seats which would make about 9 per cent. These seats should be filled by separate communal election.

He was aware that the untouchable in his present state of development was in no way qualified to give a responsible vote. In the whole Bombay Presidency there were one B.A. and 6 or 7 matriculates among the depressed classes. The proportion of those who were literate in English was very small, but not much

smaller than in the case of the backward classes. The depressed classes especially the Mahars and the Chamars, were fit to exercise the vote. He would also give them the votes by way of education. He could find at least 25 or more men amongst them who had passed the 6th or the 7th Standards of a High School, and, although the number was not large, the 9 seats which he suggested for the depressed classes could be filled from amongst them. Such a candidate in practical matters would be as good as a graduate although the latter might be able to express himself better.

He was opposed to any system under which the representatives of the depressed classes were drawn from other classes. Representation by missionaries, for instance, would not be representation in any real sense of the word.

He suggested large constituencies for the depressed classes; if such large constituencies had been accepted for the Mohammedans he did not see why they were not practicable in the case of the depressed classes.

In order to obtain the required number of seats for the depressed classes he would reduce the number of seats suggested by Government for the Mohammedans, from 38 to 10. This reduction was justifiable, as on the population basis the Mohammedans were only entitled to 20 per cent of the seats. He did not consider the Congress League Pact as binding on all.

Mr. Hailey: Untouchables were persons to whom certain rights of citizenship had been denied. For instance, it was the right of every citizen to walk down the street, and if a man were prevented from doing so, even temporarily, it was an infringement of his right. Whether a man was prevented from exercising his rights by law or social custom, made very little difference to him. Government had recognised custom and persons belonging to the untouchable classes were not employed in Government service.

He suggested the lowering of the franchise qualification in the case of the depressed classes, as it should be the object of the Government to improve the lot of the community.

From an examination of the Census Report he would say that the problem of touchable and non-touchable existed in Sind, as although the greater proportion of the population there were Mohammedans, there were also Hindus. If special provision was going to be made for the Hindus in Sind, he did not see why special provision should not be made for the depressed classes also.

Mr. Banerjee: The depressed classes would be able to find 9 men who were able to speak English and who could represent their cause in the Council. The 6th standard was the class below the matriculation, and a man who had passed the 6th standard would be able to follow the debates in the Council. They had about 25 persons who had passed that standard.

For political purposes there would be no difficulty in defining the depressed classes, who were the same as the untouchables. No one who was not a member of a depressed class would think of trying to make himself out to be such, though such a thing might occur in the case of the backward classes.

He would accept 8 representatives as the minimum for the depressed classes, and they should be elected. Nominated representative would not be in a position adequately to represent their interests.

Mr. Crump: He had no experience of the problem and conditions of the untouchable classes in Sind, and could not say anything with regard to the statement that there was only one such class, viz., the Bhangis, there. His information was that the total Hindu population in Sind was 837,426, and the total of the untouchable classes was 135,224.

Mr. Natarajan: His view was that British rule in India was meant to provide equal opportunities for all, and that in transferring a large share of the power to popular assemblies, arrangements should be made whereby the hardships and disabilities entailed by the social system should not be reproduced and perpetuated in political institutions. As regards the exact position at present, he admitted that, for instance, at the Parel school which was meant for the depressed classes, there were many higher-caste pupils, who came there because it was a good school. Similarly as a professor he, being a member of a depressed class, had pupils of all classes and found no difficulty in dealing with his higher caste pupils. If the untouchable classes were recognized by Government by the grant of seats, their status would be raised and their powers would be stimulated. He was not very particular about the number of their seats; all he wanted was something adequate.

The following persons were called and examined at Bombay between 24 January 1919 and 31 January 1919:

- (1) L. C. Crump, Esq., I.C.S. representing the Government of Bombay (24 January 1919).

- (2) The Hon'ble Major C. Fernandez, M. D. I. M. S. (Temporary) (24 January 1919).
- (3) The Rev. Cannon D. L. Joshi, representing the Bombay Indian Christian (Protestant) Association (24 January 1919).
- (4) Lieut. Colonel H.A.J. Gidney, I.M.S. (Retired), representing the Anglo-Indian Empire League (Bombay Branch) (25 January 1919).
- (5) Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, BART (25 January 1919).
- (6) W. A. Haig Brown, Esq., representing the Bombay Branch of the European Association (25 January 1919).
- (7) Mr. D. D. Sathaye, representing the Bombay National Union (25 January 1919).
- (8) The Hon'ble Mr. M. A. Jinnah (25 January 1919).
- (9) Mr. C. N. Wadia, representing the Bombay Millowners' Association (27 January 1919).
- (10) Mr. V. R. Shinde (27 January 1919).
- (11) Mr. K.R. Koregawkar, representing the Maratha Aikyecchu Sabha (27 January 1919).
- (12) The Hon'ble Mr. M. A. Jinnah (27 January 1919).
- (13) Mirza Ali Muhamad Khan (27 January 1919).
- (14) Bhimrao R. Ambedkar Esq. (27 January 1919).
- (15) The Hon'ble Mr. V. J. Patel (28 January 1919).
- (16) The Hon'ble Sahib Hiralal Desaibhai Desai (28 January 1919).
- (17) The Hon'ble Mr. Chunilal V. Mehta (28 January 1919).
- (18) A. B. Lathe, Esq. (28 January 1919).
- (19) The Hon'ble Mr. R. P. Paranjpye (28 January 1919).
- (20) Mr. V. R. Kothari, representing the Deccan Ryots' Association (28 January 1919).
- (21) Messrs. Umar Sobhani and S. G. Banker, representing the Bombay Home Rule League (29 January 1919).
- (22) H. N. Apte Esq., representing the Deccan Sabhn, Poona (23 January 1919).
- (23) N. C. Kelkar Esq. (29 January 1919).
- (24) The Hon'ble Mr. D. V. Belvi (29 January 1919).
- (25) Rao Bahadur Thakorram Kapilram (29 January 1919).
- (26) N. M. Joshi Esq., Member of the Servants of India Society (30 January 1919).
- (27) The Hon'ble Rao Bahadur Venkatesh Srinivas Naik (30 January 1919).
- (28) Pandit R. Chikodi (30 January 1919).
- (29) The Hon'ble Mr. S. J. Gillum and Sir Thomas Birkett, Kt., representing the Bombay Chamber of Commerce (30 January 1919).
- (30) Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai with Mr. Kasturbhai Lalbhai, Dalpatbhai representing the Ahmadabad Millowners' Association (30 January 1919).
- (31) Devidas Madhavji Thakersey, Esq., representing the Bombay Native Piece-goods Merchants Association (30 January 1919).
- (32) The Hon'ble Mr. Ghulam Hussain Hidayatulla (31 January 1919).
- (33) Mr. B. V. Jadhav (31 January 1919).
- (34) The Hon'ble Sir Pazulbhoy Currimbhoy, Kt., C.I.E. (31 January 1919).
- (35) H. P. Mody Esq. (31 January 1919).
- (36) Sardar V. N. Mutalik representing the Inamdars' Central Association, Sarara (31 January 1919).

APPENDIX III

*Dr.B.R.Ambedkar's Analysis regarding Election, to seats Reserved for Scheduled Castes in 1937, Province by Province*³

MADRAS

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by Successful Candidate			Votes Polled by Unsuccessful Candidates	Total Scheduled-Caste Votes Polled
			Scheduled-Caste Votes	Hindu Votes	Total		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Madras City (South Central)	Unopposed	Non-Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Chicacole	Contested	Congress	2,380	5,259	7,639	4,036	6,416
Amalapuram	Contested	Congress	9,742	Nil	9,742	5,523	29,111
Cocanada.	Unopposed	Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Ellore	Contested	Congress	7,532	6,796	14,328	4,848	12,380
Bandar	Contested	Congress	9,935	Nil	9,935	2,004	18,393
Ongole	Contested	Congress	6,513	Nil	6,513	3,807	11,973
Gudur	Contested	Congress	4,293	344	4,637	4,778	9,072
Cuddappah	Contested	Congress	8,284	344	8,628	4,047	12,331
Penukohda	Contested	Congress	4,731	Nil	4,731	1,749	9,801
Bellaly	Contested	Congress	4,019	Nil	4,019	910	8,124
Kurnool	Contested	Congress	5,362	Nil	5,362	5,929	13,164
Tiruttani	Contested	Congress	4,966	Nil	4,966	741	8,128
Chingleput	Contested	Non-Congress	12,360	Nil	12,360	6,110	22,852
Tiruvallur	Contested	Congress	3,107	6,216	9,323	14,140	17,247
Ranipet	Contested	Non-Congress	2,969	Nil	2,969	4,000	8,296
Tiruvannamalai	Contested	Congress	3,342	Nil	3,342	4,938	12,696
Tiadianam	Contested	Congress	6,396	Nil	6,396	2,541	12,480
Chidambaram	Unopposed	Non-Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Tirukkoyilur	Contested	Congress	9,957	4,436	14,393	6,133	16,090
Tanjore	Unopposed	Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Mannargudi	Contested	Congress	2,294	20,494	22,788	8,296	10,590
Ariyalur	Contested	Congress	1,208	10,064	11,292	8,759	9,967
Palni	Contested	Congress	1,469	29,436	30,905	10,615	12,084
Sattur !	Contested	Congress	Nil	18,514	18,514	11,894	6,980
Koilpatti	Contested	Congress	4,199	6,284	10,483	811	5,010

³ Ambedkar, B.R., What Congress and Gandhi have done to Untouchables, pp356-375

Pollachi	Contested	Congress	9,703	Nil	9,703	2,217	15,244
Namakal	Contested	Congress	8,141	8,153	16,294	3,217	11,358
Coondapur	Contested	Congress	1,425	Nil	1,425	1,798	11,673
Malappuram	Contested	Congress	7,154	Nil	7,154	2,606	10,148
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates			126,152			Total	321,616
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes 321,616							
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates 126,152							
Scheduled Caste Votes secured by Non-Congress Candidates 195,464							

BOMBAY

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by Successful Candidate			Votes Polled by Unsuccessful Candidates	Total Scheduled Caste Votes
			Scheduled-Caste votes	Hindu Votes	Total		
1	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Bombay City North & Bombay Suburban District	Contested	Congress	2,414	15,004	17,418	9,733	12,152
Bombay City (Byculla & Parel)	Contested	Non-Congress	8,494	4,751	13,245	11,662	8,494
Kaira District	Unopposed	Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Surat District	Contested	Congress	7913	Nil	7,913	7,245	12,101
Thana South	Contested	Non-Congress	4006	227	4,223	2,733	4,006
Ahmednagar, South	Contested	Non-Congress	6,499	296	6,795	1,976	6,499
East. Khandesh, East	Contested	Non-Congress	9519	Nil	9,519	4,689	10,846
Nasik, West,	Contested	Non-Congress	16605	Nil	16,605	5,679	18,472
Poona- West'	Contested	Non-Congress	9512		12,111	1 532	9.512
Satara, North	Contested	Non-Congress	6736	Nil	6,736	10,984	11.243
Sholapur. North East	Contested	Non-Congress	7622	Nii	7,622	2,891	9.303
Belgaum, North :	Contested	Non-Congress	21322	Nil	21,322	6,596	36,979
Bijapur, North	Contested	Non-Congress	4566	Nil	4,566	4,423	11,965
Kolaba District	Contested	Congress	2644	4,781	7,425	8,117	10,761
Ratnagiri, North .	Contested	Non-Congress	5523	Nil	5,523	not known	8,714

Total of Scheduled Caste Votes secured by Congress candidates			12,971			Total	171,047
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes							171,047
Total of Scheduled Votes secured by Congress Candidates							12,971
Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Non-Congress Candidates							158,076

BENGAL

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by Votes Polled				Schedul Caste Votes Polled	Total
			Successful Candidate			by Unsuccessful Candidates		
			Schedul Caste Votes	Hindu Votes	Total			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Bardwan, Central	Contested	Non-Congress	2,383	Nil	2,383	2,728	17,918	
Burdwan, North West	Contested	Non-Congress	2,332	Nil	2,332	2,506	9,388	
Birbhum	Contested	Non-Congress	4,832	Nil	4,832	848	18,876	
Bankura, West	Contested	Congress	5,100	4,501	9,601	1,838	6,938	
Midnapur, Central	Contested	Non-Congress	1,851	Nil	1,851	1,733	16,124	
Jhargram-cum-Ghatal	Contested	Congress	1,171	Nil	1,171	869	11,305	
Hoogly, North East	Contested	Congress	1,638	Nil	1,638	1,613	11,764	
Howrah	Contested	Non-Congress	10,373	Nil	10,373	5,986	14,380	
24 - Parganas, South East	Contested	Non-Congress	7,289	Nil	7,289	745	27,791	
24-Parganas, North West	Contested	Congress	14,964	Nil	14,964	2,361	20,987	
Nadia	Contested	Non-Congress	5,219	Nil	5,219	8,967	20,957	
Murshidabad	Contested	Non-Congress	2,529	Nil	2,529	2,129	10,522	
Jessore	Contested	Congress	20,198	15	20,213	11,936	32,134	
Khulna	Contested	Congress	16,575	Nil	16,578	20,307	76,887	
		Non-Congress	32,662	Nil	32,662			
Malda	Contested	Non-Congress	2,229	Nil	2,229	1,413	21,364	
		Non-Congress				—		
Dinajpur	Unopposed	Non-Congress			—	—		
Jalpaiguri-cum-Saliguri	Contested	Non-Congress	16,244	Nil	16,244	19,513	48,191	
		Non-Congress	7,261	Nil	7,261			
Bangpur Bogra-cum-Pabna	Contested	Non-Congress	12,212	Nil	12,212	17,345	53,632	
	Contested	Non-Congress	11,914		11,914		27,054	
		Non-Congress	10,502	Nil	10,502	9,920	30,869	
Dacca, East	Contested			Nil		12,062		
		Non-Congress	17,413	Nil	17,413	12,062		

Mymenaingh, West	Contested	Non-Congress	11,822	Nil	11,822	8,987	21,025
Mymenaingh, East	Contested	Non-Congress	10,720	Nil	10,720	16,509	31,530
Faridpur	Contested	Non-Congress	27,342	Nil	27,342	57,699	97,608
		Non-Congress	25,924		25,924		
Bakarganj, South West	Contested	Non-Congress	10,515	Nil	10,515	18,801	26,526
Tippera	Contested	Non-Congress	19,388	Nit	19,388	8,017	29,673
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates			59,646			Total	684,443

Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes 684,443

Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates. 59,646

Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Non-Congress Candidates 624797

U. P.

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by			by Unsuccessful Candidates	Total Scheduled Caste Votes Polled
			Successful Candidate	Votes Polled			
			Scheduled-Caste Votes	Hindu Votes	Total		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Lucknow City	Contested	Congress	1,910	2,327	4,237	4,092	6,002
Cawnpore City	Contested	Congress	4,483	4,901	9,384	1,301	5,784
Agra City	Contested	Congress	1,018	4,389	5,407	3,132	4,150
Allahabad City	Contested	Congress	385	9,285	9,670	4037	4,422
Saharanpur District 1	Contested	Congress	3,252-	Nil	3,252	648	5,282
Bulandshahr District	Contested	Congress	3,853	547	4,400	2,365	6,228
Agra District	Contested	Non-Congress	1,851	Nil	1,851	2,513	5,550
Mainpuri District	Contested	Congress	2,317	932	3,249	4,431	6,748
Bodaon District	Contested	Congress	1,557	Nil	1,557	2,676	9,070
Jalaun District	Contested	Congress	3,791	Nil	3,791	4,840	12,428
Mirzapur District	Unopposed	Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Gorakhpur District	Contested	Congress	2,762	Nil	2,762	819	4,954
Basti District	Unopposed	Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Azamgarh District	Contested	Congress	949	Nil	949	196	9,256
Almora District	Unopposed	Non-Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Rae Bareilly District	Unopposed	Non-Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Sitapur District	Contested	Congress	12,535	Nil	12,535	955	20,000
Fyzabad District	Contested	Congress	5,771	Nil	5,771	22	13,848
Gonda District	Unopposed	Non-	—	—	—	—	—

		Congress					
Barabanki District	Contested	Congress	8,026	Nil	8,026	7,283	18,458
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates			52,609			Total	132,180
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes 132,180							
Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates 52,609							
Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by non-Congress Candidates 79,571							

PUNJAB

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by Successful Candidate			Votes Polled by Unsuccessful Candidates	Total Scheduled-Caste Votes ; Polled
			Scheduled-Caste Votes	Hindu Votes	Total		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
South East Gurgaon	Unopposed	Non-Congress	—	—	—	—	—
karnal, North	Contested	Non-Congress	3,318	Nil	3,318	1,299	3,777
Ambala and Simla	Contested	Non-Congress	5,237	Nil	5,237	4,911	10,960
Hoehiarpur, West	Contested	Non-Congress	8,599	Nil	8,599	14,640	11,701
Jullundur	Contested	Non-Congress	13,135	Nil	13,135	9,176	20,347
Ludhiana Ferozepur	Contested	Non-Congress	7,258	Nil	7,258	6,024	16,481
Amritsar and Sialkot	Unopposed	Non-Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Lyallpur and Jhang	Contested	Non-Congress	2,903	Nil	2,903	2,143	5,860
						Total	69,126
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes - 69126							
Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates - Nil							
Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by non-Congress Candidates - 69126							

BIHAR

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by Successful Candidate			Votes Polled by Unsuccessful Candidates	Total Scheduled-Caste Votes
			Scheduled-Caste Votes	Hindu Votes	Total		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
East Bihar	Contested	Non-	2,471	Nil	2,471	519	5,443

South Gaya	Unopposed	Congress Congress						
N Wada	Contested Unopposed	Congress Non- Congress	3,079	Nil	3,079	1,629	10,449	
East Central Shahabad								
West Gopalganj	Unopposed	Non- Congress	—	—	—	—	—	
North Bettiali	Unopposed	Congress						
East.Muzaffarpur Sadr	Unopposed	Congress						
Darbhanga Sadr	Unopposed	Congress	—	—	—	—	—	
South East Samastipur	Unopposed	Congress	—	—	—	—	—	
South Sadr Monghyr	Unopposed	Congress						
Madhipura	Contested	Congress	70	1,688	1,75	1,700	1,770	
South West Purnea	Contested	Congress	2,040	2,878	4,918	1,669	3,709	
Girdih-cum-Chatra	Unopposed	Congress						
North East-Palamau	Contested	Congress	3,465	3,419	6,884	626	4,091	
Central Manbhum	Contested	Non- Congress	2,539	Nil	2,539	1,973	5,379	
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates			8,654			Total	30,841	
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes 30,841								
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates 8,654								
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by non-Congress Candidates 22187								

C. P. & BERAR

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by Successful Candidate			Votes Polled by Unsuccessful Candidate	Total Scheduled Caste Votes
			Scheduled-Caste Votes	Hindu Votes	Total		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Nagpur City	Contested	Non-Congress	7,796	Nil	7,796	3787	9088
Nagpur-Umrer	Contested	Non-Congress	3,667	Nil	3,667	2774	6323
Hinganghat-Wardha Chanda	Contested	Non-Congress	2,964	262	3,226	3093	2964
Brahmapuri	Contested	Non-Congress	5,133	Nil	5,133	1764	5590
Chhindwara-Sausar	Contested	Non-Congress	1,477	Nil	1,477	4035	4400
Jubbulpur-Patan	Contested	Congress	473	2,017	2,490	1198	1671

Saugor-Khurai	Contested	Congress	2,986	Nil	2,986	1417	5147
Damoh-Hatta	Contested	Congress	3,056	259	3,315	958	4014
Narsinghpur-Gadarwara	Contested	Congress	1,023	95	1,118	480	1503
Raipur	Contested	Congress	3,856	Nil	3,856	1332	9361
Baloda Bazar	Contested	Congress	8,113	Nil	8,113	4451	17551
Bilaspur	Contested	Non-Congress Non-Congress	1,900	Nil	1,900	1655	15348
Mungeli	Contested		5,357	Nil	5,357	4730	14045
Jangir	Contested	Non-Congress	2,411	Nil	2,411	3299	17188
Drug	Unopposed Contested	Congress	---	---	---	---	---
Bhandara-Sakoli		Non-Congress	7,916	Nil	7,916	5197	309
Ellichpur-Daryapur-Melghat	Contested	Non-Congress	1,697	Nil	1,697	3086	2532
Akola-Balapur	Contested	Non-Congress Non-Congress	1,823	Nil	1,823	1726	3203
Yeotmal Darwaha	Contested		1,150	Nil	1,150	864	1329
Chikhli-Mehkar	Contested	Non-Congress	2,194	Nil	2,194	2164	3295
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress			19,507			Total	134861
Candidates							
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes 134861							
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates 19507							
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by non-Congress Candidates 115354							

ASSAM

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by Successful Candidate			Votes Polled by Unsuccessful Candidates	Total Scheduled Caste Votes Polled
			Scheduled-Caste Votes	Hindu Votes	Total		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kamrup Sadr (South), General	Contested	Congress	Nil	4,832	4,832	3,665	1,841
Nowgong (North East), General	Contested	Non-Congress	1,596	Nil	1,596	3,045	2,226
Jorhat (North), General	Contested	Congress	457	495	952	371	828
Sunamganj, General	Unopposed	Congress	—	—	—	—	—
Habiganj (North), General	Contested	Congress	4,863	Nil	4,863	4,397	10,356

Karimganj (East), General	Contested	Non- Congress	3,252	Nil	3,252	1,119	10,252
Silchar, General	Contested	Non- Congress	2,108	Nil	2,108	2,197	2,254
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates			5,320			Total	27,757
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes 27757							
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates 5320							
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by non-Congress Candidates 22437							

ORISSA

Name of Constituency	Contested or Uncontested	Party Ticket of Successful Candidate	Distribution of Votes Polled by Successful Candidate			Votes Polled by Unsuccessful Candidates	Total Caste Votes Polled
			Scheduled- Caste Votes	Hindu Votes	Total		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
North Cuttack Sadr	Unopposed	Non-Congress	—	—	—	—	—
East Jajpur	Contested	Congress	958	Nil	958	571	4,808
North Puri Sadr	Contested	Congress	3,416	602	4,018	339	3,755
East Bargarh	Unopposed	Non-Congress	—	—	—	—	—
West Bhadrak	Contested	Congress	1,504	Nil	1,504	734	5,049
Aaka Surada	Contested	Congress	Nil	917	917	1,402	973
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates			5,878				14,585
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes – 14585							
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by Congress Candidates – 5878							
Total of Scheduled-Caste Votes secured by non-Congress Candidates – 8707							

APPENDIX IV: Part A

On the refusal of Patel's settlement and on the context that Ambedkar has 'abused' Mahatma Gandhi! Ambedkar wrote:⁴

"Your reference to my quarrel with Mr. Gandhi is, to say the least is, in my judgement, quite out of place. This is not the first time you have known that I 'abuse' Mr. Gandhi. Whether you agree or not I have reasons to be angry with him. I have written a whole book giving my reasons why I am opposed to Mr. Gandhi on the issue of Scheduled Castes. I am prepared to back my charge against Mr. Gandhi if he were to show that my facts and agreements are wrong. Many agents⁵ have been engaged to refute the allegations contained in my book. Unfortunately for Mr. Gandhi they have all failed ignominiously.

You seem to think I am the only one who 'abuse' Mr. Gandhi. I know hundreds who do the same. They include some of those who are in the inner circle of Mr. Gandhi's kindergarten and are occupying the posts of the Executive councillors⁶ in the present Government of India. The only difference between them and me is that they 'abuse' Mr. Gandhi privately and praise him publicly. My misfortune is that I have not learnt the art of double-dealing, say one thing in public and quite opposite of it in private.

Since you have taken my attack on Mr. Gandhi to heart in a manner which shows that but for the 'abuse' there would have been a settlement, I must say that you think Mr. Gandhi is greatest than the country. You think to be a Congressman and to be a nationalist are synonymous.

I think a man can be nationalist without being a Congressman. If you will forgive me I will cite my own case. I am a greater nationalist than any Congressman and If on occasions I have not been able to present the full front of a nationalist; it is because men like Mr. Gandhi have been stabbing me in there back by their opposition to the demand of untouchables for political safeguards."

⁴ *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches*, (1993-2006, 21 volumes) Bombay, Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, Vol. 21, pp. 228-232.

⁵ C. Rajagopalachari and K. Santhanam

⁶ Ministers in the Central Government Cabinet under Jawahar Lal Nehru

APPENDIX V

*Memorandum by the Working Committee of the All India Adi-Hindu depressed classes Association*⁸
April 15, 1947

Historical survey

1. The position of the Scheduled Castes in India is unique. It is impossible to find a parallel to it. They are 70 million in population and thus on a population basis they constitute the third largest community in India, the other two being the Caste Hindu and Muslims. It is not necessary to dwell at length on their past history and how their degradation has taken place. Suffice it to say that on arrival in this country, they Aryans, now known as Caste Hindus, took the first step towards the original inhabitants now known as Scheduled Castes- they submerged and suppressed them. The conflict of their economic and political interests with those of the children of the soil made the "Arya" or virtuous and from time to time styled the original inhabitants as "Dasyu", "Chandal", "Pancham", "Antyaj", "Varnasankar" and "bahiskrita" etc. Eventually they went so far as to assign to the children of the soil the status of "Asprisha" viz., untouchables a system to which the world's history bears no parallel.
2. The latest name given by them to the depressed classes is "Harijan" which connotes the offspring of "Devadasis" or "Murlis" dedicated in temples in the service of Gods or "Hari". This is in keeping with the names given to them in succession and is meant to perpetuate the inferiority complex. With the utmost emphasis at its command, the Working committee of the All India Adi Hindu Depressed Classes Association protests against and condemns the use of this disgraceful and humiliating term for the Scheduled Castes.

The Poona Pact

3. This much for the past. Let us now take stock of the present and look forward to the emancipation of the depressed classes in the new Constitution of a self governing India. The experience of the last two elections held under the Government of India Act 1935 has proved that the system of joint electorates has deprived the Scheduled Castes of the right to send true and effective representatives of the legislatures and has given the caste Hindu majority the virtual right to nominate members of the Scheduled Castes who are prepared to be the tools of the Caste Hindu majority. In the Poona Pact, the panel system was provided to allay this but has proved totally ineffective. The process is not only cumbersome but does not provide any guarantee for the return of the real representatives of the scheduled castes. It is obvious that a candidate securing the lowest number of votes in the panel is returned by Caste Hindu votes and the candidates securing the highest number of votes in the panel is defeated. This gives a chance to the Caste Hindus to set up dummy scheduled caste candidates and get them returned by Caste Hindu votes. The working committee of the All India Adi Hindu Depressed Classes Association is opposed to the panel system because it involves double election and does not ensure the return of the real representatives of the scheduled castes. Hence the committee urges the abrogation of the Poona Pact.

The working committee of the All India Adi-Hindu Depressed classes association demands that the new constitution shall contain itself provision for securing the following purposes:-

- (1) For representation of the scheduled castes in proportion to their population :
 - (i) In the central and the various provincial legislatures.
 - (ii) In the central and the provincial executives.
 - (iii) In municipalities and all statutory local bodies.
 - (iv) In the public services.
 - (v) On the public service commissions.
- (2) For their representation in the central and the various provincial legislatures by :
 - (a) Adult suffrage

⁸ B Shiva Rao (ed.) (1966-1968: 5 volumes) *The Framing of India's Constitution*, New Delhi, IIPA, New Delhi; Distributed by N. M. Tripathi Private Ltd: Bombay, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd: London, Volume II.

- (b) By separate electorates or by reservation of seats in joint electorates provided that a candidate to be declared elected must secure 40 percent of the total number of votes recorded by members of scheduled castes.
 - (3) For embarking a definite sum in the budgets of the provincial and central governments for the secondary, university and advanced education of the scheduled castes.
 - (4) For reservation of government lands for scheduled castes who are landless agricultural labourers through a settlement commission.
 - (5) For the recognition of above provisions as fundamental rights beyond the powers of the legislatures or the executives to amend or alter or abrogate.
- (4) The working committee further demands that the following fundamental rights shall be made part of the constitution of India:
- (1) All citizens are equal before the law and possess equal civic rights.
 - (2) All citizens have the right to education without any distinctions of castes or creed in the matter of admission into any educational institutions, maintained or aided by the State.
 - (3) No person shall, by reason of his caste or creed be prejudiced in any way in regard to public employment, office of power or honour and the exercise of any trade or calling.
 - (4) All citizens have an equal right of full enjoyment of the accommodation, advantages, facilities, privileges of inns, rivers, streams, wells, tanks, roads, paths, streets, public conveyances on land, air and water, theatres and other places of public resort or amusement.
 - (5) No form of forced labour shall be permitted.

APPENDIX VI

First Report of Advisory Committee on Minorities⁹ No, CA/24/Com./47.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA
COUNCIL HOUSE
New Delhi

8th August, 1947.

From
The Hon'ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel,
Chairman
Advisory Committee on Minorities Fundamental Rights, etc.

To
The President,
Constituent Assembly of India

Dear Sir,

1. On behalf of the members of the Advisory Committee appointed by the Constituent Assembly on the 24th January 1947 and subsequently nominated by you. I have the honour to submit this report on minority rights. It should be treated as supplementary to the one forwarded to you with my letter No. CA/24/Com./47, dated the 23rd April, 1947 and dealt with by the Assembly during the April session. That report dealt with justiciable fundamental rights; these rights, whether applicable to all citizens generally or to members of minority communities in particular offer a most valuable safeguard for minorities over a comprehensive field of social life. The present report deals with what may broadly be described as political safeguards of minorities and covers the following points-

- (i) Representation in legislatures; joint versus separate electorates and weightage.
- (ii) Reservation of seats for minorities in Cabinets.
- (iii) Reservation for minorities in the Public Services.
- (iv) Administrative machinery to ensure protection of minority rights.

2. Our recommendations are based on exhaustive discussion both in the Sub-Committee on Minorities as well as in the main Advisory Committee. From the very nature of things, it was difficult to expect complete unanimity on all points. I have pleasure in informing you, however, that our recommendations, where they were not unanimous, were taken by very large majorities composed substantially of members belonging to minority communities themselves.

Joint versus separate electorates and Weightage

3. The first question we tackled was that of separate electorates; we considered this as being of crucial importance both to the minorities themselves and to the political life of the country as a whole. By an overwhelming majority, we came to the conclusion that the system of separate electorates must be abolished in the new constitution. In our judgement, this system has in the past sharpened communal differences to a dangerous extent and has proved one of the main stumbling blocks to the development of a healthy national life. It seems specially necessary to avoid these dangers in the new political conditions that have developed in the country and from this point of view the arguments against separate electorates seem to us absolutely decisive.

4. We recommend accordingly that all elections to the Central and Provincial legislatures should be held on the basis of joint electorates. In order that minorities may not feel apprehensive about the effect of a system of unrestricted Joint electorates on the quantum of their representation in the legislature, we recommend as a general rule that seats for the different recognised minorities shall be reserved in the various legislatures

⁹ B Shiva Rao (ed.) (1966-1968: 5 volumes) *The Framing of India's Constitution*, New Delhi, IIPA, New Delhi; Distributed by N. M. Tripathi Private Ltd: Bombay, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd: London, Volume II, pp.400-1.

on the basis of their population. This reservation should be initially for a period of 10 years, the position to be reconsidered at the end of that period. We recommend also that the members of a minority community who have reserved seats shall have the right to contest unreserved seats as well. As a matter of general principle, we are opposed to weightage for any minority community.

5. For two reasons the application of the above principles to specific minorities was considered in detail by the committee. In the first place, it was known to us that minorities are by no means unanimous as to the necessity, in their own interests, of statutory reservation of seats in the legislatures. Secondly, the strict application of the above principles to a microscopic minority like the Anglo-Indian seemed to require very careful examination. We accordingly classified minorities into three groups 'A' consisting of those with a population of less than 1/2 per cent. in the Indian Dominion excluding the States, group 'B' consisting of those with a population of more than 1/2 per cent. but not exceeding 1 1/2 per cent. and group 'C' consisting of minorities with a population exceeding 1 1/2 per cent. These three groups are as follows-

Group 'A'- 1. Anglo-Indians. 2. Parsees. 3. Plains' tribesmen in Assam. **Group 'B'**- 4. Indian Christians. 5. Sikhs. **Group 'C'**- 6. Muslims. 7. Scheduled Castes.

6. Anglo-Indians.-The population of the Anglo-Indian community excluding the States is just over a lakh, that is, .04 per cent. Mr. Anthony on behalf of the Anglo-Indians, contended that the census figures were inaccurate but even admitting a larger figure than the one given in the census, this community is microscopic, and to deal with it on a strictly population basis would mean giving it no representation at all. The representatives of the Anglo-Indians on the committee asked originally that they should have the following representation in the legislatures:-

House of the People 3; West Bengal 3; Bombay 2; Madras 2; C.P. & Berar 1; Bihar 1; U.P. 1

Subsequently they asked that they should be guaranteed two seats in the House of the People and one in each province in which they have representation at present, that is, a total of 8 altogether. After very considerable discussion, in the course of which the representatives of the Anglo Indian community gave full expression to their views, the committee unanimously accepted the following formula, namely, that there shall be no reservation of seats for the Anglo-Indians but the President of the Union and the Governors of Provinces shall have power to nominate representatives of the Anglo-Indian community, to the lower house in the Centre and in the Provinces respectively if they fail to secure representation in the legislatures as a result of the general election. We wish to congratulate the representatives of the Anglo-Indian community on the committee for not pressing their proposals which would not merely have introduced the principle of special weightage which was turned down as a general proposition by an overwhelming majority but would also have encouraged other small minorities to ask for representation wholly out of proportion to their numbers. We feel sure that by the operation of the formula recommended by us Anglo-Indians will find themselves given adequate opportunity effectively to represent in the legislatures the special interests of their community.

7. Parsees.-In the Minorities Sub-Committee, Sir, Homi Modi had urged that in view of the importance of the Parsee community and the contribution, it has been making to the political and economic advancement of the country. Parsees should have adequate representation in the Central and Provincial Legislatures. The Sub-Committee were of opinion that this claim should be conceded. In view, however, of the opinion expressed to him by several members that an advanced community like the Parsees would be adequately represented in any event and did not need specific reservation.

Sir Homi Modi had asked for time to consider the matter.

When the issue came before the Advisory Committee, Sir Homi Modi stated that though the committee had already accepted the Parsee community as a recognised minority entitled to special consideration on the same basis as other minorities in Group 'A' he had decided to follow the traditions which the community had maintained in the past and to withdraw the claim for statutory reservation. He assumed that Parsees would remain on the list of recognised minorities and urged that if, during the period prescribed in the first instance for the special representation of the minorities it was found that the Parsee community had not secured proper representation, its claim would be reconsidered and adequate representation provided, if the separate representation of minorities continued to be a feature of the constitution. The Committee appreciated the stand taken by Sir Homi Modi and agreed to his proposal.

8. Plains' tribesmen in Assam.-The case of these tribesmen will be taken up after the report of the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas Sub-Committee is received.

9. Indian Christians.-The representatives of the Indian Christians stated that, so far as their community was concerned, they did not desire to stand in the way of nation building. They were willing to accept

reservation proportionate to their population in the Central Legislature and the Provincial legislatures of Madras and Bombay. In the other provinces, they would have the liberty of seeking election from the general seat. They were against any weightage being given to any community, but made it plain that if weightage was given to any minority, in Groups 'B' and 'C', they would demand similar weightage. As weightage is not being conceded to any community, this means that the Indian Christians are prepared to throw in their lot with the general community subject only to the reservation of certain seats for them on the population basis in the Central legislature and in Madras and Bombay.

10 Sikhs.-In view of the uncertainty of the position of the Sikhs at present, pending the award of the Boundary Commission in the Punjab-, the committee decided 'that the whole question of the safeguards for the Sikh Community should be held over for the present.

11. Group 'c'-Muslims and Scheduled Castes.--The Committee came to the conclusion that there are no adequate grounds for departing from the general formula in the case either of the Muslims or of the Scheduled Castes. Accordingly it is recommended that seats be reserved for these communities in proportion to their population and that these seats shall be contested through joint electorates.

12. A proposal was made in the committee that a member of the minority community contesting a reserved seat should poll a minimum number of votes of his own community before he is declared elected. It was also suggested that cumulative voting should be permitted. The Committee was of the view that a combination of cumulative voting and a minimum percentage of votes to be polled in a community would have all the evil effects of separate electorates and that neither of these proposals should be accepted.

Representation of minorities in Cabinets

13. Some members of the committee proposed that there should be a Provision prescribing that, minorities shall have reserved for them seats in Cabinets in proportion to their population. The committee came unhesitatingly to the conclusion that a constitutional provision of this character would give rise to serious difficulties. At the same time, the committee felt that the constitution should specifically draw the attention of the President of the Union and the Governors of Provinces to the desirability of including members of important minority communities in Cabinets as far as practicable. We recommend accordingly that a convention shall be provided in a schedule to the constitution on the lines of paragraph VII of the Instrument of Instructions issued to Governors under the Act of 1935 and reproduced below.

“VII. In making appointments to his Council of Ministers, our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgement is most likely to command a stable majority in the legislature those persons (including so far as practicable members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the legislature. In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers”

Representations in Services

14. A proposal was made to us that there should be a constitutional guarantee of representation in the public services of the minority communities in proportion to their population. We are not aware of any other constitution in which such a guarantee exists and on merits, we consider, as a general proposition that any such guarantee would be a dangerous innovation. At the same time, it is clear to us that consistently with the need of efficiency in administration, it is necessary for the State to pay due regard to the claims of minorities in making appointments to public services. We recommend, therefore, that, as in the case of appointments to Cabinets, there should be in some part of the constitution or the schedule and exhortation to the Central and Provincial Governments to keep in view the claims of all the minorities in making appointments to public services consistently with the efficiency of administration.

The Anglo-Indian members of our committee have represented to us that owing to the complete dependence of the economy of their community on their position in certain services and their existing educational facilities, their case required special treatment. We have appointed a sub-committee to investigate this question and to report to us-

15. The minorities' representatives in the committee naturally attached importance to the provision of administrative machinery for ensuring that the guarantee and safeguards provided for the minorities both in the constitution and by executive orders are in fact implemented in practice. After considerable discussion, we have come to the conclusion that the best arrangement would be for the Centre and for each of the Provinces to appoint a special Minority Officer whose duty will be to enquire into cases in which it is alleged that rights and safeguards have been infringed and to submit a report to the appropriate legislature.

16. We have felt bound to reject some of the proposals placed before us partly because, as in the case of reservation of seats in Cabinets, we felt that a rigid constitutional provision would have made parliamentary democracy unworkable and partly because, as in the case of the electoral arrangements we considered it necessary to harmonise the special claims of minorities with the development of a healthy national life. We wish to make it clear, however, that our general approach to the whole problem of minorities is that the State should be so run that they should stop feeling oppressed by the mere fact that they are minorities and that, on the contrary, they should feel that they have as honourable a part to play in the national life as any other section of the community. In particular, we think it is a fundamental duty of the State to take special steps to bring up those minorities which are backward to the level of the general community. We recommend accordingly that a Statutory Commission should be set up to investigate into the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes, to study the difficulties under which they labour and to recommend to the Union or the Unit Government, as the case may be, steps that should be taken to eliminate their difficulties and suggest the financial grants that should be given and the conditions that should be prescribed for such grants.

17. A summary of our recommendations is attached in the Appendix.

Yours truly,
The 8th August 1947.
VALLABHBHAI PATEL
Chairman

APPENDIX A

Representation in Legislatures

1. Electorates.-All elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures will be held on the basis of joint electorates. Provided that as a general rule, there shall be reservation of seats for the minorities shown in the schedule in the various legislatures on the basis of their population. Further provided that such reservation shall be for 10 years, the position to be reconsidered at the end of the period.

SCHEDULE

Group A- Population less than 1/2 per cent. in the Indian Dominion, omitting States.

1. Anglo-Indians. 2. Parsees. 3. Plains' tribesmen in Assam.

Group B - Population not more than 1½ per cent

4. Indian Christians. 5. Sikhs.

Group C- Population exceeding 1½ per cent

6. Muslims. 7. Scheduled Castes.

2. Anglo-Indians.-
 - (a) There shall be no reservation of seats for the Anglo-Indians, but the President of the Union and the Governors of Provinces shall have power to nominate their representatives in the Centre and the Provinces respectively if they fail to secure adequate representation in the legislatures as a result of the general election.

Parsees

- (b) There shall be no statutory reservation in favour of the Parsee Community, but they would continue to remain on the list of recognized minorities. Provided that if as a result of elections during the period prescribed in proviso 2 to Para I above, it was found that the Parsee Community had not secured proper representation, their claim for reserved seats would be reconsidered and adequate representation provided should the separate representation of minorities continue to be a feature of the Constitution.

Note.-The above recommendations represent the view taken by the representatives of the Parsee Community.

3. Indian Christians.-
 - (a) There shall be reserved representation for Indian Christians in proportion to their population in the Central Legislature and in the Provincial Legislatures of Madras and Bombay. In other provinces, they will have the right to seek election from the general seats.

Sikhs

- (b) The question of minority rights for the Sikhs will be considered separately.

Muslims and Scheduled Castes

- (c) There shall be reservation of seats for the Muslims and Scheduled Castes in the Central and Provincial Legislatures on the basis of their population.

4. Additional right to minorities.-The members of a minority community who have reserved seats shall have the right to contest unreserved seats as well.

5. No weightage.-The minorities for whom representation has been reserved will be allotted seats on their population ratio, and there shall be no weightage for any community.
6. No condition for a minimum number of votes of one's own community.-There shall be no stipulation that a minority candidate standing for election for a reserved seat shall poll a minimum number of votes of his own community before he is declared elected.
7. Method of voting.-There may be plural member constituencies but cumulative voting shall not be permissible.

Representation of Minorities in Cabinets

8. No reservation for minorities.- (a) There shall be no statutory reservation of seats for the minorities in Cabinets but a convention on the lines of paragraph VII of the Instrument of Instructions issued to Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935 shall be provided in a Schedule to the Constitution.

VII. "In making appointments to his Council of Ministers our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his Minister in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgment is most likely to command a stable majority in the legislature those persons (including so far as practicable members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the legislature. In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers."

Recruitment in Services

9. Due share to all minorities guaranteed.-In the all-India and

Provincial Services, the claims of all the minorities shall be kept in view in making appointments to these services consistently with the consideration of efficiency of administration.

(NOTE.--Appropriate provision shall be embodied in the Constitution or a schedule thereto to this effect.)

10. Position of Anglo-Indian community.-Owing to the complete dependence of the economy of the Anglo-Indian community on their position in certain services and their existing educational facilities, a subcommittee consisting of the following members has been appointed to submit a report:

1. Pandit G. B. Pant. 2. Mr. K. M. Munshi. 3. Mrs. Hansa Mehta. 4. Mr. S. H. Prater, and 5. Mr. F. R. Anthony.

Working of Safeguards

11. Officer to be appointed.-An Officer shall be appointed by the President at the Centre and by the Governors in the Provinces to report to the Union and Provincial Legislatures respectively about the working of the safeguards provided for the minorities.

12. Statutory Commission for backward classes.-Provision shall also be made for the setting up of a Statutory Commission to investigate into the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes, to study the difficulties under which they labour and to recommend to the Union or the Unit-Government, as the case may be, the steps that should be taken to eliminate the difficulties and the financial grants that should be given 2nd the conditions that should be prescribed for such grants.

APPENDIX 'B'

No. CA/60/Com./47.

COUNCIL HOUSE,

New Delhi, the 25th August, 1947.

From

The Honourable Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel,
Chairman, Advisory Committee in Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc.

TO

The President,
Constituent Assembly of India.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 14 of my letter No. CA/24/ Com. 47, dated the 8th August and to submit this supplementary report on the position of Anglo-Indians in certain services and the grant of special educational facilities for them. This report is based on a consideration of the findings of a sub-committee appointed by us.

2. (a) Position of Anglo-Indians in certain services:

We find that, as a result of historical circumstances the whole economy of this community is at present dependent on finding employment in certain types of post in the Railways, the Post and Telegraphs and the Custom Departments. A recent survey conducted by the Provincial Board for Anglo-Indian Education in Bombay showed that 76 per cent of the employable section of the community there were dependent for their livelihood on these appointments. We believe that the position is almost the same all over India; the total number of Anglo-Indians at present employed in these three departments being about 15,000. The special reservation „given to them in the Government of India Act, 1935 does not however extend to all the categories of posts in these departments, but only in those with which they have had long past associations. In view of this we feel that if the existing safeguards in this regard are not continued in some form for some years to come, the community will be subjected to a sudden economic strain which it may not be able to bear. We therefore recommend that:

(i) The present basis of recruitment of Anglo- Indians in the Railways, the Posts and Telegraphs and the Customs Departments shall continue unchanged for a period of two years after the coming into operation of the Federal Constitution. After that, at intervals of every two, years, the reserved vacancies shall be reduced each time by 10 per cent. This shall not however bar the recruitment of Anglo-Indians in the categories of posts in which at present they have reserved places over and above the prescribed quota of reserved appointments, if they are able to secure them on individual merit in open competition With other communities. It shall also in no way prejudice their recruitment on merit to posts in these departments, or any other in which they have not been given a reserved quota.

(ii) After a period of ten years from the date of the coming into operation of the Federal Constitution all such reservations shall cease.

(iii) In these services there shall be no reservation for any community after the lapse of 10 years.

(b) Special educational facilities for Anglo- Indians.

There are at present about 500 Anglo-Indian Schools in India. The total Government grant to these schools is about Rs. 45 lakhs being approximately 24 per cent. of the expenditure incurred by the schools. We feel that a sudden reduction in the grant will seriously dislocate the economy of these schools; and that it would only be fair to bring them gradually into line with other similar educational institutions after giving them sufficient time and opportunity to adjust themselves to the altered conditions now prevailing in the country. We also feel that in this way these institutions might become a valuable educational asset which would cater to the growing educational needs of the whole nation and not only to those of the Anglo-Indian community. We accordingly recommend that:

(i) the present grants to Anglo-Indian education made by the Central and Provincial Governments should be continued unchanged for three years after the coming into operation of the Federal Constitution.

(ii) After the expiry of the first three years, the grants may be reduced by 10 per cent and by a further 10 per cent after the 6th year and again by a further 10 per cent after the ninth year. At the end of the period of 10 years, special concessions to Anglo-Indian schools shall cease.

(iii) During this 10 years period, 40 per cent of the vacancies in all such state aided Anglo-Indian schools shall be made available to members of other communities.

The term 'Anglo-Indian' used in this Report has the meaning given to it in the Government of India Act, 1935.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

Appendix – VII

*Amendments moved by K.T.M. Ahmed Ibrahim Sahib Bahadur (Madras) and Kazi Syed Kareemuddin (C.P. & Berar) in support of Sardar Nagappa in the Constituent assembly on Qualified Joint Electorate on 28th August, 1947.*¹⁰

K. T. M. Ahmed Ibrahim Sahib Bahadur: Mr. President, Sir, I move:

"That on a consideration of the Report of the Advisory Committee on minorities, fundamental rights, etc. on minority right this meeting of the Constituent Assembly resolves that in case the elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures are to be held on the basis of joint electorates for all communities with reservation of seats for minorities, the election should be held on the following basis"

I am not moving (a)-

Out of the candidates who have secured at least 30 per cent of the votes polled of their own community the candidates who secures the highest number of votes polled on the joint electoral roll shall be declared elected. In case there is no candidate, who has secured not less than 30 per cent. of the votes polled of his own community, then out of the two candidates',-Who Secures the highest number of votes of their own community, that candidate shall be declared elected who secures the highest number of voter of the total votes polled.

Mr. President, this amendment is in-tended to secure the fulfilment in a satisfactory manner of the object of the reservation of seats accorded to the minorities by Clause 1. If a person is elected to the reserved seat by a constituency it will generally be presumed that that person represents the members of that community and that he would reflect the views and the opinions of that particular community in whose favour that seat has been reserved in that constituency. Now, Sir, for that person to represent in any adequate manner that particular community, he must command the confidence of that community. We want therefore that if he does not command the confidence of the majority of the community, he must have the confidence of at least 30 per cent. or even less of the voters of that community who went to the poll. This will concede. Sir is a very reasonable request. It is a fundamental you and vital right of every citizen in every form of democracy that his views and opinions must be given expression to on the floor of the Legislatures of the country. How can any citizen be confident that his views Will be adequately represented on the floor of the House if the person sent to the legislature does not have the confidence of at least a fair proportion of the members of the community, if not the majority of that community? You will also remember, Sir. that a provision of this nature was, adopted by general agreement at the Third Unity Conference held at Allahabad in December 1932, i.e., as a result of the agreement reached between all the communities and parties in this land.

My amendment is only an adaptation of the agreement which was arrived at on that occasion. I wish to Point out, Sir, that if there is no such provision, the person who is elected to the reserved seat cannot be expected to represent the views of the community in whose, favour that seat has been reserved It would be imposing on a community a who has been virtually elected by another community to represent the community which has been given the benefit of reservation, of mats, but has not been elected by it. Now it is too late in the day to contend that there are no minorities in this country and that there are no special interests of minorities to be safeguarded. The very appointment of the Advisory Committee no, Fundamental Rights and on Minorities and the Minorities Sub-Committee presupposes the existence of minorities and their special interests. The Report also has proceeded on the assumption that there are certain interests of minorities to be protected. Therefore I say this House 'would not now take up the position that there are no minorities and there are no special interests to be provided for. Now, the issue as to how best to give protection to these minorities has to be considered. One of chief problems of modern democracy is how best to temper the rigours of the majority in order that the minorities may be protected from such rigours.

Now, Sir, in this age the divine right of kings has given- place to the divine right of the majority, as has been put by a jurist. Our aim must be how best to temper the rigours of the majority in order that the

¹⁰ Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume V, p.259-270. available at <http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol5pm.htm>.

minorities may have confidence in the majority and in the constitution framed by the majority and may work out the constitution with all sincerity and honesty of purpose. We are assembled here as citizens of the State to frame a constitution in such a manner as to assure 'all sections of the population of their rights and to infuse confidence in the minds of all the sections of the population that their rights-Will be safeguarded'. This amendment does not go any further than this, which in respect of the election of all representatives who are expected to reflect the views of a particular minority or community at least a fair proportion of the voters of that particular minority or community should have voted for the said representatives. This is a very legitimate request and by passing this amendment, Sir, we are not taking away the right of the majority to finally determine the representative of the constituency. Therefore, Sir, I appeal to this House to dispose of this question, in the words of the Honourable Mover "in an atmosphere of friendliness". As the Honourable Mover rightly said "we must leave behind us the legacy of bitterness" and we must look at this question devoid of all passion. I am anxious, Sir, that this matter should be considered in an atmosphere of extreme calm. Left to myself, I would have wished that this Report on the Rights of Minorities was considered at a time when this country was free from all passion and the heat of the moment has subsided and died down, but unfortunately it has been taken up now. I appeal to you, following the appeal of the Honourable Mover, to consider this question in a dispassionate manner and not to import any heat. After all we request that the members of the minority community should be afforded 'the necessary facilities in order that the representatives elected in their' name for the purpose of speaking on their behalf may have the confidence of a fair proportion of the voters. There is nothing anti-national in it and there is nothing fundamentally wrong. On the other hand it would be granting one of the fundamental and vital rights of every citizen in any form of democracy that he should have the right to have his views represented in the parliament of the country by a person in whom he has got confidence and the members elected by the minority will after all be in a minority and the minority will not be able to dominate over the decisions of the majority in the legislature. The only purpose is that the views and opinions of the minorities and the other communities may be reflected on the floor of the House in a proper manner by a person in whom those communities have got confidence at least to a limited extent. This is the purpose of this amendment and I do not know how it will infringe on the rights of the majority or how it will convert the majority community into a minority in any manner.

Well, Sir, for the successful working of any constitution, there must be confidence created in all sections of the population by the constitution framed. We desire that the independence that has been achieved by the new-born independence must be independence and freedom for all sections of the population and this can be achieved only if the constitution to be framed by this House secures the freedom and independence of all sections of the people and infuses confidence in the minds of the members of all sections. My amendment is a step in that direction, and I submit this is the surest way to foster harmony, good-will, cordiality and amity between the various sections and communities. The pre-requisite for the creation of harmony and cordiality between the various sections of the population is the creation of confidence in the minds of the various sections of the population and therefore it is that I appeal to this House to remember that after all we want only that the representatives may be elected by a fair proportion of voters of the particular communities. Well, Sir, I would like to point out that the system of proportional representation by a single transferable vote is an accepted method of election in all democracies and this very House has accepted the said method in respect of certain elections to be held in pursuance of this country was free from all passion and the heat of the moment has the constitution we are framing and this amendment is only an approach towards the system of proportional representation by single transferable vote and therefore, I hope, Sir, that this House, will accept this amendment. I am glad that the same feeling was also expressed by my Honourable friend Mr. Nagappa on behalf of the Scheduled Castes. You will see that we are not actuated by any malice or ill-will against anyone, but we only desire that there should be, confidence in the minds of the minorities that their views are properly represented in the legislature by persons in whom they have confidence and in whose election they have a reasonably fair voice. I commend my amendment for the acceptance of the House.

Kazi Syed Karimuddin (C. P. & Berar: Muslim): Sir, I support the amendment of Mr. Ibrahim, and I have to say a few words. I have heard with great patience the admirable speech of Pandit Pant and Sardar Patel's spirited defence of joint electorates. My submission is that I do not agree that it is only due to the separate electorates that the present situation is created. I do not want to minimise the various factors which have led to the present situation; but on behalf of the Muslim League Party, Sir, I submit that we are equally determined to eradicate this evil, from India and we will not leave any stone unturned in offering our hand of co-operation in this matter.

Mr. Ibrahim has moved an amendment, Sir, that there should be joint electorates with reservation of seats and that a member of a particular community should secure 33 per cent. of the votes of his community. We cannot forget that there are misgivings. We cannot be blind to the present situation in the country. We all desire that it should not continue any more. But there are misgivings. There is mistrust and we have to move on very carefully and very calmly. This House has already decided on the abolition of separate electorates and we have to find out a formula that would satisfy the minorities. We must have the progress of the country in view also. The formula or amendment moved by Mr. Ibrahim lays down that there should be joint electorates. A candidate from a minority community will have to go with his cap in hand to beg the votes from other communities. Communalism will be gradually killed. Then he has to be a representative of his own community. For: which purpose have you given: reservation of seats? Reservation of seats is given for this purpose that he should represent a particular community,

An Honourable Member: No, Sir.

Kazi Syed Karimuddin: He should have the sentiments of his community in view, he should have the aspirations of his community before him. If a minimum number of votes from his community is not fixed and if he is not able to secure that, my submission is that it will be the position of a client engaging a pleader who will be opposed to the interests of his client. Even a man of straw, or even false convert will be able to defeat a genuine or real member; a community. Therefore, my submission is that in the interests of the provision of reservation of seats, it is necessary for a particular period that we should give this minimum number of votes to a candidate of a particular community. I do, not agree, Sir, that the mere introduction of joint electorates is a magic wand to do away with all these evils. The problem of the Schedule Castes is over and above this joint electorate for centuries. There are many other considerations which have contributed to the present position. I make an earnest appeal that as you have made a generous gesture of giving reservation of seats, you should also concede that for a particular period, the Muslim minority should be allowed to have a minimum number of voters from the community which will satisfy their political aspirations.

Mr. President: Then there remains Ahmed Ibrahim Sahib Bahadur's amendment-

That on a consideration of the Report of the Advisory Committee on minorities, fundamental rights, etc. on minority rights this meeting of the, Constituent Assembly resolves that in case the elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures are to be held on the basis of joint electorates for all communities with reservation of seats for minorities, the election should be held on the following basis:-'Out of the candidates who have secured at least 30 per cent. of the votes polled of their own community, the candidate who secures the highest number of votes polled on the joint electoral roll shall be declared elected. In case there is no candidate, who has secured not less than 30 per cent. of the votes polled of his own community, then out of the two candidates who secures the highest number of votes of their own community, that candidate shall be declared elected who secures the highest number of votes of the total votes polled.

The amendment was negated.

APPENDIX VIII

Amended Report of the Advisory Committee on Minorities¹¹

Constituent Assembly of India
Council House,
New Delhi

11th May, 1949.

From
The Hon'ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Minorities,
Fundamental Rights, etc.

To
The President,
Constituent Assembly of India.

Dear Sir,

The advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., in their report dated the 8th of August, 1947, had recommended certain political safeguards for Minorities. These were accepted by the Constituent Assembly during the August, 1947 session, and have been embodied in Part XIV of the Draft Constitution. According to these recommendations, all elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures were to be held on the basis of joint electorates with reservation of seats for certain specified minorities on their population basis. The reservation was to be for a period of ten years at the end of which the position was to be reconsidered. There was to be no weightage, but members of the minority communities for whom seats were reserved were to have the right to contest general seats. The communities for whom seats were to be reserved were Muslims, Scheduled Castes and Indian Christians, the latter only so far as the Central Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures of Madras and Bombay are concerned.

2. I would recall to you mind at this stage that the Committee had observed in their report that minorities were "by no means unanimous as to the necessity, in their own interests of statutory reservation of seats in the legislatures". Nevertheless, the Committee has recommended reservation of seats "in order the minorities may not feel apprehensive about the effect of a system of unrestricted joint electorates on the quantum of their representation in the legislature."

3. When the above recommendations were being considered by the Assembly, events were taking place, following the partition of the country, which made it impossible to consider the question of minority rights in East Punjab, particularly in so far as the Sikhs were concerned. This question of East Punjab was accordingly postponed; and also the question whether the right to contest unreserved seats should be given to minorities in West Bengal.

4. The Advisory Committee in their meeting held on the 24th February, 1948, appointed a special sub-committee consisting of myself as Chairman and the Hon'ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Hon'ble Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Shri K.M. Munshi, and the Hon'ble Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as members to report on these minority problems affecting East Punjab and West Bengal. This special sub-committee met on the 23rd November 1948 and presented a report to the advisory Committee. A copy of the report is attached as an Appendix.*

5. This report came up for consideration before the Advisory Committee at their meeting held on the 30th December, 1948. Some members of the Committee felt that, conditions having vastly changed since the Advisory Committee made their recommendations in 1947, it was no longer appropriate in the context of free India and of present conditions that there should be reservation of seats for Muslims, Christian, Sikhs or any other religious minority. Although the abolition of separate electorates had removed much of the poison from the body politic, the reservation of seats for religious communities, it was felt, did lead to a certain degree of separatism and was to that extent contrary to the conception of secular democratic State.

¹¹ B Shiva Rao (ed.) (1966-1968: 5 volumes) *The Framing of India's Constitution*, New Delhi, IIPA, New Delhi; Distributed by N. M. Tripathi Private Ltd: Bombay, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd: London, Volume II, pp.400-1

Dr. H.C. Mookerjee, Mr. Tajmul Husain, Shri Lakshmi Kanta Maitra and certain other members gave notices of resolutions seeking to recommend to the Constituent Assembly that there should be no reservation of seats in the Legislatures for any community in India. Shri V.I. Muniswami Pillai gave notice of an amendment to the said resolutions seeking to exclude the Scheduled Castes from the purview of the said resolutions. At that meeting I pointed out that if the members of a particular community genuinely felt that their interests were better served by the abolition of reserved seats, their views must naturally be given weight and the matter allowed to be reopened. At the same time I was anxious that the representatives of the minorities on the Committee should have adequate time both to gauge public opinion among their people and to reflect fully on the amendments that had been proposed, so that a change, if effected, would be one sought voluntarily by the minorities themselves and not imposed them by the majority community.

Accordingly the Committee adjourned without taking any decision and we met again on the 11th of May, 1949. At this meeting, the resolution of Dr. H.C. Mookherjee found wholehearted, support of an over-whelming majority of the members of the Advisory Committee. It was recognised, however, that the peculiar position of the Scheduled Castes would make it necessary to give them reservation for a period of ten years as originally decided. Accordingly the Advisory Committee, with one dissenting voice, passed the said resolution as amended by Shri V.I.Muniswami Pillai in the following form:-

That the system of reservation for minorities other than Scheduled Castes in Legislatures be abolished.

It was further decided that nothing contained in the said resolution shall affect the recommendations made by the North East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-Committee with regard to representation of tribals in the Legislatures. The Committee also decided that the resolution should not affect the special provision made for the representation of Anglo-Indians in the legislature.

6. The Committee also accepted the unanimous proposal made by the Sikh representatives that the following classes in East Punjab, namely, Mazhabis, Ramdasis, Kabirpanthis and Sikligars, who suffer the same disabilities as other members of the Scheduled Castes, should be included in the list of Scheduled Castes so that would get the benefit of representation given to the Scheduled Castes. Subject to this change and to the above mentioned resolution, the report of the special sub-committee appointed by the Advisory Committee was approved.

7. As a result of the above decisions, the resolutions seeking to do away with rights of minorities to contest general seats in addition to reserved seats in Assam and West Bengal, of which notices had been given by some members of the Committee were withdrawn.

8. The Committee are fully alive to the fact that decisions once reached should not be changed lightly. Conditions have, however, vastly changed since August 1947 and the Committee are satisfied that the minorities themselves feel that in their own interests, no less than in the interests of the country as a whole, the statutory reservation of seats for religious minorities should be a whole, the statutory reservation of seats for religious minorities should be abolished. The Committee accordingly recommend that the provisions of Part XIV of the Draft Constitution should be amended in the light of the decisions now taken.

Yours truly,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL,
Chairman.

APPENDIX IX

*Delimitation of Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies: Guidelines and Methodology*¹²

I. Constitutional and Legal Provisions

The Constitution (Eighty-fourth Amendment) Act, 2001 and the Constitution (Eighty-seventh Amendment) Act, 2003 have, *inter alia*, amended Articles 81, 82, 170, 330 and 332 of the Constitution of India. The cumulative effect of these amendments to the Constitution is that –

- (i) the total number of **existing** seats as allocated to various States in the House of the People on the basis of **1971 census** shall remain **unaltered** till the first census to be taken after the year 2026;
- (ii) the total number of **existing** seats in the Legislative Assemblies of all States as fixed on the basis of **1971 census** shall also remain **unaltered** till the first census to be taken after the year 2026;
- (iii) the number of seats to be **reserved** for the **Scheduled Castes (SCs)** and **Scheduled Tribes (STs)** in the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies shall be **re-worked out** on the basis of **2001 census**;
- (iv) **each State** shall be **redelimited** into territorial parliamentary and assembly constituencies on the basis of **2001 census** and the extent of such constituencies as delimited now shall remain frozen till the first census to be taken after the year 2026; and

1 'State' here does not include the State of Jammu and Kashmir, but includes the National Capital

Territory of Delhi and Union Territory of Pondicherry (v) the constituencies shall be so re-delimited that **population** (on the basis of 2001 census) of each parliamentary and assembly constituency in a State shall, **so far as practicable**, be the same throughout the State.

In pursuance of the aforesaid amendments made to the Constitution by the Constitution (Eighty-fourth Amendment) Act 2001 and the Constitution (Eighty-seventh Amendment) Act, 2003, Parliament has enacted the Delimitation Act, 2002, as amended vide the Delimitation (Amendment) Act, 2003, entrusting the above mentioned tasks at (iii), (iv) and (v) above to the Delimitation Commission to be set up under section 3 of the said Act. The Delimitation Commission so set up has started functioning w.e.f. 04.07.2002 under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Kuldeep Singh (former Judge of the Supreme Court of India) with Shri B.B. Tandon, Election Commissioner of India, and the State Election Commissioner of the State concerned as defined in the explanation to Section 3 of the said Act (in respect of the work relating to that State) as *ex-officio* members.

The Commission shall also associate in its work, in respect of each State, five members of Lok Sabha elected from that State (or all such members if their number is less than five) and five members of the State Legislative Assembly. These Associate Members shall be nominated by the Hon'ble Speakers of the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies concerned. But these Associate Members shall have no voting right.

II. Division of States into Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies

The division of each State into assembly and parliamentary constituencies is thus to be made having regard to the total number of existing seats in each State Legislative Assembly and the total number of seats as allocated at present to each State in the House of the People. In other words, each State is to be divided into the same number of assembly constituencies as the total number of existing seats in the State Legislative Assembly and the number of parliamentary constituencies in the State would be equal to the number of seats presently allotted to that State in the House of the People (see First and Second Schedules to the Representation of the People Act 1950).

Further, all constituencies shall, as far as practicable, be geographically compact areas, and in delimiting them regard shall be had to the physical features, existing boundaries of administrative units, facilities of communication and public convenience.

III. Population

- (i) All assembly and parliamentary constituencies are to be delimited on the basis of the 2001 Census. The census figures of 2001 as published by the Census Commissioner are thus alone to be taken into account for this purpose.
- (ii) Each constituency in a State shall be so delimited that the population of all constituencies shall, so far as practicable, be the same throughout the State.
- (iii) For this purpose, the total population of the State (2001 Census) shall be divided by the total number of assembly constituencies in the State and the State average per assembly constituency shall thus be obtained. This State average shall be the guiding factor for delimiting the constituencies in such a manner that each constituency, so far as practicable, has an equal population.

¹² Available at eci.nic.in/delim/Procedure/Delimitation_of_Constituencies.pdf

(iv) The Delimitation Commission has, however, taken an internal decision that as constituencies cannot be delimited having exactly equal population in all cases, a deviation to the extent of 10 percent *plus or minus* from the State/district average would be acceptable to the Commission, if the geographical features, means of communication, public convenience, contiguity of the areas and necessity to avoid breaking of administrative units so demand.

IV. Administrative Units

Though the population to be taken into account is the population of 2001 Census, the Commission has decided that constituencies shall be delimited having regard to the administrative units, *i.e.*, district/sub divisions/ tehsils/patwar circles, panchayat samitis/panchayats, *etc.*, as in existence on 15th February, 2004. (The Commission had earlier written to all the State Govts. not to disturb the administrative units, as existing on 01.08.2002, till the completion of the delimitation exercise in the State in all respects, but in some cases, the Commission has permitted re-organisation of certain administrative units on sufficient justification and urgency being shown to it.)

V. Methodology for Allocation of Assembly Constituencies to the Districts and Delimitation of Assembly Constituencies

(i) The Delimitation Commission has taken decision that, so far as practicable, all assembly constituencies in a district shall be confined within the territorial limits of that district. In other words, an assembly constituency shall not **ordinarily** extend to more than one district.

(ii) Having regard to the above internal decision of the Delimitation Commission, the first step will be to allocate the number of assembly constituencies to each district on the basis of the total population of that district divided by the average population per constituency as worked out under sub-paragraph (3) of the preceding paragraph. Where the entitlement of a district on the basis of such State average contains a fraction, the fractions more than one-half shall be counted as one and fractions less than one-half shall be ignored. (iii) As a next step, the average population in each constituency in the district shall be worked out by dividing the total population of the district with the number of seats allocated to that district.

(iv) Then, the areas of the district shall be divided into the requisite number of assembly constituencies having regard to the average population per constituency in the district with a permissible deviation of 10 percent plus or minus from the district average.

(v) In delimiting the assembly constituencies, efforts will be made to ensure that, as far as practicable, sub-divisions/tehsils are kept intact and not unnecessarily broken. Further, in each State, an administrative unit shall need to be identified having regard to the administrative set up of that State which will be adopted as the *lowest administrative unit which should not be broken in any case*. For example, in the State of Madhya Pradesh, the administrative units are districts, tehsils, revenue inspector circles (RICs) and patwari circles (PCs). If a PC (consisting of a few villages) is adopted as the lowest administrative unit for the purpose of delimitation, the whole of that PC will be kept intact and included in one assembly constituency and the villages contained in that PC will not be divided into different assembly constituencies.

(vi) While delimiting the assembly constituencies on the basis of the administrative units as mentioned above, the contiguity of such administrative units will be the basic requirement, so that no constituency has an enclave/island within it of certain areas belonging to another constituency and having no contiguity to the other areas of that latter constituency.

(vii) Further, apart from contiguity, geographical features, better connectivity, means of communication, public convenience will also be kept in view and areas divided by rivers or hilly ranges or forests or ravines and other such natural barriers will not be put in the same constituency. (viii) As far as possible, the delimitation of the constituencies in a district shall be done starting from North to North-West and then proceeding in a zig-zag manner to end at the Southern side.

VI. Delimitation of Parliamentary Constituencies

Each parliamentary constituency in a State shall be an integral multiple of the assembly constituencies comprised therein. No assembly constituency shall extend to more than one parliamentary constituency.

VII. Reservation of Seats for SCs and STs

(i) Seats have to be reserved for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in proportion to their population to the total population of the State.

(ii) This allocation of seats for the SCs and STs is to be worked out separately both for the assembly and parliamentary constituencies in each State, on the basis of 2001 Census.

(iii) Under section 9(1)(d) of the Delimitation Act 2002, seats for the STs are to be reserved in the constituencies in which the percentage of their population to the total population is the **largest**. Therefore, after all the assembly constituencies in the State have been delimited, the constituencies to be reserved for STs will be those where the percentage of the ST population to the total population of the constituencies is the **largest**, in descending order equal to the number of constituencies to be reserved for STs.

(iv) Under section 9(1)(c) of the said Act, the constituencies for SCs are to be **distributed** in different parts of the State and seats are to be reserved for SCs in those constituencies where the percentage of their

population to the total population is **comparatively large**. Therefore, while working out the allocation of total number of seats for each district as mentioned above, the number of seats to be reserved for SCs in those districts will also have to be worked out separately. Subsequently, SC seats will be reserved in those constituencies in the district in which, so far as practicable, the percentage of their population to the total population is the largest, in descending order equal to the number of SC seats in the district concerned.

VIII. Preparation of Working Paper

A working paper will be prepared by the office of the Delimitation Commission having regard to the above principles and internal decisions of the Delimitation Commission. The working paper will consist of seven papers containing: -

- i) Paper I - District-wise 2001 population data and entitlement of assembly seats for each district;
- ii) Paper II - Entitlement of seats for scheduled castes in the assembly and distribution of SC seats among the districts;
- iii) Paper III - SC population in the proposed assembly constituencies and seats proposed to be reserved for SCs;
- iv) Paper IV - ST population in the proposed assembly constituencies and seats proposed to be reserved for STs;
- v) Paper V - Abstract statement of proposed assembly constituencies and total, SC and ST population in each constituency;
- vi) Paper VI - District-wise statement showing details of extent, total/SC/ST population in each of the proposed assembly constituencies;
- vii) Paper VII - Proposed Lok Sabha constituencies and their extent in terms of proposed assembly constituencies.

IX. Working Paper - Approval By the Commission

Preparation of Working Paper and its approval by Delimitation Commission will be done into two stages. In the first stage, Papers I and II showing the proposed allocation of Assembly seats to various districts in the States and further showing the proposed distribution of seats for Scheduled Castes among the various districts will be prepared by the office. Soon after Papers I and II are prepared by the office, the same will be submitted to the Chairman, Election Commissioner of India and the State Election Commissioner of that State, who are *ex-officio* Members, and a meeting will be held of the full Commission to tentatively approve these Papers I and II. The Commission has now decided to consult Associate Members by calling their first meeting soon after Papers I and II have been tentatively prepared by the Commission. Normally the Chief Electoral Officer of the State concerned will also be directed to attend such meeting to clarify any point relating to data and maps and any other related matter.

Thereafter, the remaining Papers III to VII showing the proposed territorial extent of Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies and the constituencies which are proposed to be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes will be prepared by the office and approved tentatively by the Commission after taking into consideration suggestions made by the Associate Members at the aforesaid first meeting. After approving the tentative proposals in the complete Working Paper (containing Papers I to VII), the Commission will direct the Secretariat to send copies of the complete Working Paper to the Associate Members who will be given a reasonable time to study the proposals and to come with their suggestions for further meeting(s) in the Commission. The CEO of the concerned State will provide the Associate Members with copies of required data and maps.

X. Meeting with Associate Members As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Commission will hold its first meeting with the Associate Members for considering Papers I and II showing the proposed allocation of Assembly seats to various districts in the States and further showing the proposed distribution of seats for Scheduled Castes among the various districts. The Commission will then hold further meeting(s) with Associate Members after the remaining papers (Papers III to VII) of the Working Paper showing the proposed territorial extent of Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies and the constituencies which are proposed to be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been prepared by the Commission after taking into consideration suggestions made by the Associate Members at the aforesaid first meeting. At the second round of meeting(s) of the Commission with the Associate Members (AMs), their suggestions with regard to the Working Paper will be duly considered, and the draft proposals of the Commission will then be prepared in the light of the suggestions of the AMs. A copy of the draft proposals so prepared will be sent to each of the AMs and they may give a dissenting note in respect of any of the draft proposals, if they so desire.

XI. Draft Proposals - Notification

The draft proposals of the Commission shall then be published in the Gazette of India and the concerned State's Gazette along with the dissenting notes, if any, submitted by the Associate Members and who desire publication thereof. These shall also be published at least in two vernacular newspapers. The CEO and DEOs and all election authorities will be directed to make copies of the notification containing

the draft proposals available to all those who may ask for it. Widest publicity will be given through print and electronic media. A notice will also be issued specifying a date on or before which the public is requested to send their objections and suggestions to the proposals. After the specified date, the suggestions and objections received will be tabulated and made into sets and distributed to all Members of the Commission including Associate Members.

XII. Public Sitings

After the last date for submitting suggestions and objections is over, the Commission will hold public sittings at one or more places in the State to hear the public in person. Wide publicity will be given to those sittings.

XIII. Final Orders

After hearing the public, the Commission will hold a final meeting attended by Associate Members (though they have no right to vote) to consider all suggestions received in writing as well as orally made at the public sittings and decide the modifications that are required to be made to the draft proposals and prepare a final order. The final order thus prepared, both for assembly constituencies and parliamentary constituencies of the State, will be signed by the full Commission and the Secretary to the Delimitation Commission will cause the final orders to be published in the Gazette of India and State Gazette. The final orders are also required to be published in two vernacular news papers in the State concerned. After the final orders are published, the President of India shall be requested to issue a notification specifying a date from which the said orders shall come into force. The copies of those orders shall also be laid before the House of the People and the State Legislative Assembly concerned, but no modification shall be permissible therein by them.

15. Has your MLA/MPs helped in getting other educational facilities?
 (A) YES (B) NO (C) DK
16. Has your MLA/MPs helped in getting employment?
 (A) YES (B) NO (C) DK
17. Have there been cases of Dalit atrocities/mistreatment/ by other castes in your area?
 (A) YES (B) NO (C) DK
- 17 (a) If yes, how often does it occur?
 (A) Every day (B) Every month (C) Every six months (D) sometimes
- 17 (b) What has been the response of your MLA/MP on this issue?

- 18 Are you satisfied with this system of political representation of the SCs?
 (A) Satisfied (B) Not Satisfied
 (B) Little Satisfied (D) Little Dissatisfied
- 19 What are main constraints faced by the SC MLA/MPs in representing the interests of SC?

- 20 Can you suggest any alternate electoral methods under the existing legal framework?

- 21 Do you think that the SC representatives should be elected only by SC votes?
 (A) YES (B) NO (C) DK
- 22 (a) If no, Why?

- 22 (b) If no, do you think that the SC representatives should secure at least one third of the SC votes polled in the constituency?
 (A) YES (B) NO (C) DK

APPENDIX XI

*NATIONAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW THE
WORKING OF THE CONSTITUTION*

A
Consultation Paper*
on

*REVIEW OF ELECTION LAW, PROCESSES
AND REFORM OPTIONS*

January 8, 2001

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On

Electoral Reforms; Standards in Political Life

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The Question of Representation and Winning on Minority Vote

16.1 The multiplicity of political parties, combined with our Westminster based first-past-the-post system results in a majority of legislators and parliamentarians getting elected on a minority vote. In other words, they usually win by obtaining less than 50% of the votes cast *i.e.* with more votes cast against them than in their favour. There are States where 85% to 90% of the legislators have won on a minority vote (*i.e.*, by having obtained less than 50% of the votes cast). In many cases candidates have won by getting less than 20% of the total votes cast in their constituency. To quote a few examples: in Uttar Pradesh, over the last three assembly elections an average of only 11% legislators won on a majority vote. In other words, almost 90% legislators won on a minority vote. The same proportion for Bihar is 18% and 82%; for Madhya Pradesh it is 40% and 60%; for Assam 29% and 71% and for Karnataka 31% and 69%. Only Tamilnadu displays a different characteristic where a large proportion of legislators have won on a majority vote – 1991 - 90%, 1985 - 83%.

At the national level, the proportion of MPs who have won on a minority vote is over 67% at an average for the last three Lok Sabha elections. Three years data for Lok Sabha and for some States is appended. It has taken into account at least three recent elections for a number of sample States which give a fairly representative picture on an all-India basis. This means that at an average, at the very least, two-thirds of our legislators all over India win on the basis of a minority vote.

16.2 In the first place, in a hugely divergent society such as ours, this has created a vested interest for political parties to progressively appeal to narrower loyalties. Clearly, if a candidate can win on less than one-third share of the votes polled, he does not need to generate a wider appeal. In the long-term, this has even more serious consequences for India, as the existing cleavages will only deepen thus dividing the society further. We have certainly seen it on the communal and caste fronts. By making caste and community a factor in political power play, we have made the divide even wider and deeper in the Indian society and made it nearly impossible for Babasaheb Dr. Ambedkar's vision and wish of a casteless and classless society ever coming true.

Secondly, given that we have territorial constituencies from which voters elect a representative, it is strange that most people of the constituency do not vote for a particular candidate yet it is he who becomes their representative. A question can arise: whose representatives are such candidates when a majority of voters did not want them?

16.3 The seriousness of this issue has generated suggestions from many quarters focused primarily on two possibilities. The first follows the list system somewhat along the lines of the German Bundestag whereby recognized political parties, in addition to winning seats on the FPTP system, get a further number of seats based on the number of votes polled by them. In the second approach many eminent persons have suggested that we should only have representatives who win on the basis of 50%+1 vote. If, in the first round, nobody gets over 50%, then there should be a run-off contest between the top two candidates so that one of them will win on the basis of over 50% of the votes polled. To save on the cost and trouble of a run-off, another suggestion made is that of each voter being asked to give an alternative vote so that in case of no one getting 50+ votes in the first count, the alternative votes get counted. With EVMs and technology available now counting of alternative votes need cause no delay or other problem.

16.4 One major change proposed by the Law Commission was the "list system" in addition to the "first-past-the-post-system" being followed presently. The objective was to generate better representation by providing seats to recognized political parties in proportion to the votes obtained by them. It was suggested that the number of MPs in Lok Sabha should be increased by 25% and this additional number of MPs should be made up of candidates pre-nominated by political parties and the number should be in accordance with their share of the votes polled. They suggested that the strength of the Lok Sabha should be increased to 688, with about 138 candidates nominated on the basis of a list to be provided by various political parties. The Law Commission suggested that political parties that secured less than 5% of the valid votes cast in the Parliament or Legislative Assembly elections would not be entitled to any seat, based on their list system, in that legislature. It was also suggested that while bigger States would constitute a territorial unit for this purpose, the smaller States should either be clubbed with a bigger State or they should all be clubbed together for forming a territorial unit for elections to the Lok Sabha. Another variant of this suggestion was that voters be asked to vote on two ballot papers. One for the candidates and the other for one of the political parties. The votes polled by political parties would be considered for selecting the candidates on pre-nominated lists.

16.5 In whatever manner perceived, such suggestions of the Law Commission may be open to serious objection both on grounds of principle and practicability. Adoption of the partial list system would create two very unhealthy long-term trends in a multi-faceted society like India. In the first place, it would create even more difficulties in providing a stable government. Proportional representation is famous for creating non-majority legislatures where coalitions are a rule rather than an exception. This has serious implications for governance in India, as already borne out by our experience of the past few years. Because each coalition partner wields negative influence, the government may have to ignore even flagrant abuse of political positions by coalition partners. The idea of the "List System" runs against the grain of attempting to provide stability in the government because with many parties present with small but sometimes determining numbers it potentially enhances horse-trading to create artificial majorities for forming and maintaining governments. Weak governance results. Also, the suggestion would create two classes of members of Parliament in Lok Sabha – those elected directly by the people and those coming through party lists.

16.6 There is an interesting recent quote from Sir Peter Lloyd, MP from a House of Commons debate on proportional representation (2 June 1998), "When I visited the Netherlands earlier this year...some of our Dutch hosts said that they had heard that the UK was changing to PR. They could not understand why we might want to abandon a system that, in their view, had produced great governmental stability. They obviously admired the clarity and the personal involvement of the single member constituency system, which they do not have." He went on to say that "the additional member system, which produces two classes of members of Parliament, one with a constituency link and the other with none, is presumably favoured by the party hierarchy." There may be a message here for India.

16.7 Secondly and even more important, elections should be used to unite our very divided society, which is progressively getting more divided because individual players are constantly mobilizing support based on narrow loyalties. The idea of any form of proportional representation will aid in the divisive tendencies, as it will now pay the politician to appeal to a small group if he feels that he has a good chance of getting their vote en-bloc. The moment political parties are given the opportunity to have representatives in the Lok Sabha or the State assemblies based only on the number of votes that they obtain, it takes away the incentive to make their electoral appeal broader. Also, the parties which can have the resources to put up a large number of candidates even in areas where they do not hope to win, will have a distinct advantage under any scheme of additional seats through list system. It will then pay the political party to address itself to narrow interests because that may be the only safe way for it to ensure itself a few seats in the house. It should never be enough in such a diverse society as India to maximize support among a narrow grouping and then rely on being needed as a part of a coalition government. On the contrary a party must appeal broadly across the electorate. The Law Commission recognized this and stated that this could aid and enhance caste-based politics, yet it made a slightly toned down recommendation that instead of having 50% seats on the basis of list system, let us have 25%. The smaller percentage, however, does not take away from the negative influence that this policy is likely to create.

16.8 Proportional representation of this kind assumes a well educated and aware electorate and a type of matured political behaviour from both the electorate and the elected representatives and can only work for good governance if there are very strong conventions of behaviour that cannot be transgressed at all. India is really very far from it at the moment. This therefore, can only be left for posterity to decide when the time comes, if ever.

16.9 Several eminent persons, including the distinguished former President Shri R Venkataraman have therefore opposed this suggestion. They have however proposed that the option of electing only candidates with over 50% of the votes cast in their favour is a far better way to achieve the same objective of better representation. Here, each legislator is elected on a majority vote and can therefore be said to be a representative of a majority from his constituency. The Law Commission, who evaluated this suggestion in their report albeit with the inclusion of a "negative vote" did comment in their report that this was an excellent suggestion but they felt that there might be insurmountable practical difficulties with implementing it because of the run-off election that will happen at least in 2/3rd of the cases at present. The Election Commission however, does not feel so. The Chief Election Commissioner, has stated that he had himself made this suggestion of 50%+1 vote on a number of occasions and he confirmed that the daunting task of run-off elections can be managed by the Election Commission. Actually, the run-off vote is like a re-poll in certain constituencies. There is no revision of electoral rolls, no fresh nominations, no fresh campaigning or the like. It is the same polling booth with the same administration and therefore it should not be complicated.

16.10 A serious effort at implementing this suggestion should be possible. There are two substantial advantages of following the policy of 50%+1 vote. On the one hand, it resolves the problem of representation. On the other, it also makes it in the self-interest of various political parties to widen their appeal to the electorate. It can help push political rhetoric in a direction that the mobilizing language might take on comparative "universal" tones as opposed to "sectoral" tones of the present day. Currently the possibility of winning on a minority of votes polled has encouraged parties to function on caste, communal or other sectoral bases. When such parties get into positions of power, they also follow a sectoral agenda. With the need to be more broad based in their appeal, issues that have to do with governance rather than with cleavages and narrow identities might start to surface in the vocabulary of the politicians. On this count alone it may be considered worth pursuing.

16.11 Of course, the EC would have to find a practical way of handling the run-off election without permitting any distortions. With EVMs we can easily plan on a two-day election all over the country. The second day may be for run-offs. This means that at the end of the day, through the use of computer technology, the constituency will know whether someone has won by getting over 50% or that it is a run-off. If it is the latter the announcement would mention the names of the two candidates. The final results can be announced with all others. No doubt, there will be initial problems in this, but with 50 years of experience with us, we are in a much better position today than we were ever before, to find a way to implement this as well as to anticipate what intended and unintended consequences might follow this policy. The positive aspect of this will follow if all goes as planned. But what if it does not? Let us, therefore, attempt to look at the possible unintended results of this policy.

16.12 The main question might be that once a run-off is decided leaving only two candidates in the field, would it not lead to even more attempts at rigging and/or violence because now it would be a matter of do or die for each of these two candidates? Given our experience with elections and the political culture in which these have operated, yes, this may be possible. If not muscle power, it is also conceivable that yet bigger amount of money might change hands to get intermediaries to bring block votes to the polling station. This is also may be a possible scenario. It is also possible that for the run-off election the voter turn out will be lower due partly to election fatigue and mainly to the fact that one of the candidates may use muscle power to keep unfriendly voters away.

16.13 If the suggestion of holding election on two consecutive days is accepted (the second day being for run-offs), there will simply not be time enough to generate fresh violence or to indulge in other malpractices like horse trading and using money power to buy votes. As for voter turn out, battle lines being more sharply drawn between only two contestants, it is equally likely that the turn out may be better. But, the administration at least when the policy is first introduced, would of course have to be prepared to make special arrangements at sensitive constituencies.

16.14 If the two-day election plan is difficult or not acceptable, there should in any case not be a long gap between the main election and the run-off election. No further campaigning should be permitted. The less the time available between the two polls, the less are the chances for the candidates to create hurdles in the way of the system. Secondly, and more importantly, any electoral offence in the run-off should carry a higher penalty for the candidate than the original election. The possibility of disqualification and perhaps a mandatory hefty imprisonment and a hefty fine, should loom large on the horizon for both the finalists.

16.15 We would do well to remember that if implemented properly, this suggestion has the potential of forcing political parties and candidates to think of strategies to obtain over 50% votes in the first election itself. This will discourage the non-serious candidates and fringe players from jumping in the fray and it will encourage making of pre-election agreements between parties and if viewed together with the suggestions on defection, this should lead to moderation and stability. The proposal of run-off elections may push up the cost of elections marginally only. The mobilization is one time and when EVMs are used, there are no ballot papers to print either. Also, while on the first occasion, there may be many run offs, with each successive election the number may be reduced to only a few.

APPENDIX XII

Profile of the Respondents

1. Distribution of respondents in the four Vidhan Sabhas of the two states

		Frequency	Percent
Punjab	Hoshiar Pur	58	32.8
	Sham Chaurasi	50	28.2
	<i>Total</i>	<i>108</i>	<i>61.0</i>
Andhra Pradesh	P Gannavaram	37	20.9
	Mandapeta	32	18.1
	<i>Total</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>39.0</i>
Total		177	100.0

2. Distribution of respondents gender wise

	Frequency	Percent
Male	154	87.0
Female	23	13.0
Total	177	100.0

3. Educational profile of respondents

	Frequency	Percent
No Education	20	11.3
Primary (up to 7 th)	20	11.3
Secondary (8 th to 10 th)	74	41.8
Hr. Sec. (11 th -12 th /ITI)	22	12.4
Graduate	31	17.5
Above Graduate	10	5.6
Total	177	100

4. Degree of involvement in political activities

	Do you know the character of Your Legislative/ Parliamentary Constituencies?	Do You Vote In Every Election?	Are (Were) you a member of any political party?	Have/had you ever participated in any political rally?
Yes	171(96.6)	177 (100)	91 (51.4)	100 (56.5)
No	6(3.4)	-	85(48.0)	76(42.9)
No Answer	-	-	1 (0.6)	1 (0.6)
Total	177 (100)	177 (100)	177(100)	177(100)

5. Vidhan Sabha wise degree of involvement in political activities

		Do you know the character of Your Legislative/ Parliamentary Constituencies?		Are (Were) you a member of any political party?		Have/had you ever participated in any political rally?	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Punjab	Hoshiar Pur	58	0	23	35	36	22
	Sham Chaurasi	46	4	18	32	15	35
Andhra Pradesh	P Gannavaram	35	2	22	15	21	16
	Mandapeta	32	0	28	3	28	3
Total		171	6	91	85¹³	100	76¹⁴

Thus, though majority of the respondents in the sample had shown active political involvement, the breakup Vidhan Sabha wise (see Table above) shows that those from Andhra Pradesh had more inclination towards politics than the respondents in Punjab. And above all, the most important point to be noticed is the fact that on the question of asserting their right to vote, all answered in affirmative and nearly all of them knew about the character (i.e. either reserved or non-reserved) of their constituencies, both Parliament and Legislative Assemblies.

¹³ One had opted for "No Answer"

¹⁴ Ibid.