

Chapter 1

Introduction

Statement of the Problem

All diverse and complex societies confront important challenges of ensuring representation and participation of people from different sections of society at various levels of decision-making processes. A number of institutional arrangements, therefore, are adopted to secure representation of this kind. Academic literature discusses the need to provide a policy framework on how to craft institutions in such plural societies. While the relevance of this discussion is demonstrated by political developments in different parts of the world, the evidential base for judging the effectiveness of different institutional arrangements has remained somewhat limited. This is partly due to the lack of systematic inquiry into different types of policy interventions and consequences of choosing a specific mechanism of representation.

India is a land of diversity and plurality. Therefore, it faces a formidable challenge in ensuring representation and participation of all social groups. *This study is an attempt to understand the electoral mechanism framed for the representation of the Scheduled Castes¹ as it evolved in the pre-Independence period and during the Constitution formation in India and to analyze its consequences in the post-Independence period. It focuses on the electoral method and its consequences for the nature of political*

¹ Scheduled Castes are those castes or communities which are listed in the Indian Constitution by The Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order 1950. Published with the Ministry of Law Notification No. S.R.O. 385, dated the 10th August, 1950, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, 1950, Part II, page 163. According to the Census 2001 Scheduled Castes comprise around 17 per cent of India's total population. Though there exists thousands of castes in Indian society, the broad classification of this hierarchy, useful for the purpose of this study, can be understood into two- *Varnas* (Castes) and *Avarnas* (Outcastes). The difference between the two groups is primarily based in the concept of purity-pollution. The avarnas, at the lowest rung of the social hierarchy, are treated as polluted people and are denoted as untouchables. However, untouchability is not limited to purity-pollution alone. It is a belief system that involves an active denial of basic human rights by practicing various forms of oppression, exploitation and ultimately exclusion of certain sections of society. It is a process of imposing disabilities and preventing equal opportunities. In such a process certain castes have been suffering injustice in matters of allocation of scarce resources for centuries. In the post independent India, Scheduled Castes has been popularly known as Dalits (a Marathi word that means oppressed, broken or ground down by those above them in the social hierarchy in a deliberate and active way). See E. Zelliott, (1992) *From Untouchables to Dalits: Essays on the Ambedkar Movement*, Manohar Publications, New Delhi; Atul Chandra Pradhan, (1986) *The Emergence of the Depressed Classes*, Bookland International, Bhubaneswar.

representation of Scheduled Castes in the Lok Sabha and the State Legislative Assemblies. Although affirmative action in political representation has a history longer than India's independence,² what is certainly new is the way it has been practiced in the electoral framework as adopted by the Constitution of India in 1950. In addition to this, since the study confines itself to the political representation of the Scheduled Castes, we can stretch our memory only to the debates in the 1930s that laid the basis for the Communal Award granted after the Second Round Table Conference by the British Government in 1932. However, this attempt here should not be prematurely confused with that of revisiting this history only. The purpose of this task would be to critically review the debates on the issue in pre-Independence India and to analyze the ways in which these discourses have impacted upon and shaped the nature of political representation of the Scheduled Castes.

In the pre-Independence period, it elections first provided an outlet for the right to expression within the legal framework. It gave Indians an opportunity to be represented in the legislative bodies. Whether it really gave representation to the people remains questionable. The process that started with the inclusion of Indian representatives in governance started with the nomination of Indians in the Governor General's Council in 1861. Later, in 1873, it was extended to elections. First, this was restricted to membership in selected municipal committees, and then in local government in 1882.³ A few decades later, with the aim to further consolidate their base, the British introduced the Morley-Minto Reforms through the Indian Council Act in 1909 and established an electoral method called 'separate electorates'. However, the provision of separate electorates remained limited only to Muslims.⁴ Later, with the growing demand for better participation in

² Separate electorate model of electoral method started in 1909 through Morley-Minto Reforms.

³ Anil Seal (1968) *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 152-155.

⁴ This was primarily the response of the address presented at Simla by Muslim delegation led by Aga Khan in 1906. The delegation raised three important points: one, it argued for the recognition of communal identity in policy formation, reflecting the views that this should have 'due regard always to

governance by the Indian National Congress, the British Government in India gradually started introducing self-governing institutions through the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. The reforms were outlined in 1918 and, based on these, the Government of India Act 1919 was enacted. They aimed at expanding the involvement of the population through wider electorates and recommended that Muslims and Hindus continue voting in separate electorates as long as the demand remained. Although the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms expanded the scope of elections for other minority communities, including Muslims,⁵ it was still silent on the issue of representation for the Depressed Classes⁶ in the political institutions.

The representatives of the Depressed Classes, under the leadership of people like Namdeo Bagde, Subhendar Ganpatro and Govind Rokde, had been pressing for their representation in the legislative bodies since 1917.⁷ In the meantime, there emerged two important personalities: M.K.Gandhi and B.R.Ambedkar, who changed the very nature of

the diversity of race and religion'. Second, it argued that Muslim representation should be 'commensurate not merely with their numerical strength but also with their political importance and the value of contribution which they make to the defense of the Empire'. In a way, it argued that the proportional representation was not always sufficient. And third, it questioned the actual size of the 'Hindu majority' and their right to speak on behalf of the 'untouchables'. However, the British only considered the first point as it gave them the way for communal representation. It was during these days that the British had started the process of enumerating caste in the Census. For details see Address presented by a deputation of the Muslim Community of India on 1st October 1906 at Simla to H. E. Lord Minto, Viceroy and Governor General of India. Appendix- I; also see C.H. Philips, (1962) *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947: Select Documents*, London, Oxford University Press. Also see Alistair McMillan, (2005) *Standing at the Margins: Representation and Electoral Reservation in India*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press.

⁵ The communities namely were Sikhs, Europeans, Anglo- Indian and Indian Christians.

⁶ The term 'Depressed Classes' was in use since 1870 to identify those at the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy. However, in early 1900s, it started to be frequently used for the untouchables who were differentiated from the others on the basis of purity-pollution notion. [See Charsley, S. R and G K Karanth. (1998) *Challenging Untouchability: Dalit Initiative and Experience from Karnataka*, New Delhi, Sage Publication. However, the mobilizations of the depressed classes in the early twentieth century remained limited within the protocols of social reform movements and could explore ways of political representations only with the emergence of leaders like B R Ambedkar or M C Rajah in the 1920s. However, it was the Muslim's deputation query (see f.n. 2 above) in 1906 regarding the relationship between Hindus and the Untouchables brought in a panic among the caste Hindu leaders and forced them to speak on the issue. Some of such writings were LalaLajpatRai's article in *Indian Review* in 1910 and R G Bhandarkar's presidential address delivered at the Depressed Classes' Conference, later published in *The Indian Review* in 1913.

⁷ For more details see Eleanor Zelliot, (1988) 'Congress and the Untouchables, 1917-1950' in Richard Sisson, and Stanley Wolpert, *Congress and the Indian Nationalism: The Pre-Independence Phase*, Berkley, University of California Press, pp. 184.

the discourse of politics in India. While Gandhi emerged as a mass leader, Ambedkar became the champion of the Depressed Classes and brought the issue of political representation of the Depressed Classes into the mainstream discourse. Ambedkar questioned the representative character of the electoral methods as developed by the British and started advocating for political representation of the Untouchables. Presenting evidence before the Southborough Committee in 1919, Ambedkar (along with G. A. Gawai) demanded separate electorates for the Depressed Classes (see Appendix- II). However, the Committee did not accept this demand and, instead, added a provision in the Government of India Act 1919 for nominating members from the Depressed Classes in each Provincial Legislature.

With Gandhi's emergence on the Indian political scene, things had started changing slowly. However, his means and methods being diametrically opposed to Ambedkar's, the nature of political representation for the Untouchables came to be contested. While Gandhi's approach stressed more on changing the behaviour of the 'upper' castes towards the Untouchables,⁸ Ambedkar believed in pressing forequal rights and social and economic empowerment of the Untouchables. Notwithstanding his differences with Gandhi and other Hindu reformers, Ambedkar continued to maintain his independent position on the Untouchables and started a full scale socio-political-movement against the caste-based social hierarchy and for the empowerment of the Depressed Classes.⁹

⁸ Gandhi started his campaign against untouchability by extending his support to the Vaikom temple entry Satyagrah in Travancore in 1924-25, but at any point in time he did not feel it worthy enough to antagonize the caste Hindus either through any statements or actions. For details see *Collected Works of Mahatama Gandhi*, (henceforth referred as CWMG), Vols. 29-33. The approach of Gandhi towards the issue of untouchability though has been analyzed by few scholars, remained limited in its scope and therefore demands a more serious study

⁹ Making his first appearance at the conference of Depressed Classes on 20th March 1927 at Mahad in the Konkan region of Maharashtra, he demanded the abolition of untouchability and the caste system and declared; "We want equal rights in society. We will achieve them as far as possible while remaining within the Hindu fold or, if necessary by kicking away this worthless Hindu identity. And if it becomes necessary to give up Hinduism it would no longer be necessary for us to bother about temples". For details see M. S. Gore, (1993) *The Social Context of an Ideology: Ambedkar's Political and Social*

Ultimately, the government appointed a Statutory Commission in 1927, popularly known as the Simon Commission, to take a further constitutional review without giving the chance of representation to any Indian member. This was applauded by Ambedkar, who argued that, 'By their [read Indians'] non-appointment, the Depressed Classes, are at any rate, saved the prejudices that would have otherwise caused to their case.'¹⁰ Although it took nearly ten years for the Commission to culminate in the form of the Government of India Act 1935, it opened up the debate on various methods of political representation for the Depressed Classes.

For Gandhi and other caste Hindu leaders, it was important to keep the Untouchables within the Hindu fold for the larger politics of numbers. It was precisely for this reason that Gandhi did not want the Untouchables to have separate electorates and had launched his fast unto death in Pune in 1932. Under tremendous pressure to save the life of Gandhi, Ambedkar finally agreed to give up his demand of separate electorates for the Untouchables. An agreement, famously known as Poona Pact, was reached between the representatives of Hindus and the Depressed Classes, which altered the provisions of Communal Award by replacing the separate electorate by a joint electorate comprising of both voters from the untouchable castes and touchable castes or the caste Hindus (to be discussed in detail in Chapter III). Provisions of the Poona Pact were later incorporated in

Thought. New Delhi: Sage Publication. p. 91. However, this act of Ambedkar resulted in a near riot in the town. The caste Hindus performed rituals to purify the tank for it having been visited by Untouchables. However, a few months later Ambedkar planned another demonstration in the town and along with a large number of Dalits he burnt the *Manusmrition* Dec 26, 1927. To spread his message to the larger public he also started publishing a weekly *Bahiskrit Bharat* (Depressed India) where apart from articulating his position on the caste question, untouchability and Hinduism he also wrote critically about the failure of the British government in its duty towards the untouchables. Ambedkar had already started another weekly, *Mooknayak* (Dumb Leader), in the early 1920s. In the later phase of his life he also started *Prabuddha Bharat* (Buddhist India) and *Janta* (The People). For more details see S.S. Jodhka and Avinash Kumar (2010) 'Religious Mobilization for Development and Social Change: A Comparative Study of Dalit Movements in Punjab and Maharashtra, *RaD Working Paper 47*, www.rad.bham.ac.uk.

¹⁰ The other important leaders of the Depressed Class organizations like G.A.Gavai and M.C.Rajah too responded in similar ways. For more details see S K Gupta (1985) *The Scheduled Castes in Modern Indian Politics" Their Emergence as a Political Power*, New Delhi, MunshiramManoharlal, pp. 238-9.

the Government of India Act, 1935. The genesis of the term 'Scheduled Castes' is also to be found in the same Act, for it officially scheduled or listed a certain number of castes/communities who qualified the test of stigma untouchability.¹¹ Thus, the Act gave an indication, for the first time, that legally they were no longer Untouchables.

The Poona Pact, however, was not really an agreement about giving due representation to the Untouchable communities in the electoral process but about making them accept that they were a part of Hinduism. This was clearly evident from Gandhi's comment to Ambedkar in 1933 that "in accepting the Poona Pact you accept the position that you are Hindus."¹²

This method was followed in the 1937 and 1946 elections. The constituencies for these elections in the legislative bodies were either single member, double or, in some cases, even three member constituencies. The electoral college of voters, however, was comprised of fewer numbers since there was no universal adult suffrage before 1950. After India's independence, the Constitution of India dispensed with the two-stage election for Scheduled Caste candidates. However, the provision of double member constituencies was retained until its abolition and replacement by single member constituencies in 1961. The new procedure was implemented in the 1962 general elections to the Parliament, and the same system is in practice even now. But the issue raised by Ambedkar that the Scheduled Caste members elected to the legislative bodies under the present electoral method (ever since 1937 elections) were not true representatives of the Scheduled Caste communities still remains unanswered. As per the reservation policy, the only time that seats reserved for Scheduled Castes changed was when a new census took place or by administrative and

¹¹ To more on the details of the untouchability qualification test, see The Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order 1950. Published with the Ministry of Law Notification No. S.R.O. 385, dated the 10th August, 1950, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, 1950, Part II, page 163

¹² Cited in C. Jaffrelot, (2004), *Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste*, New Delhi, Orient Longman. p. 67.

legal changes. Table (1.1) illustrates the names of the Acts that led to changes in the reserved seats, the year of effect, the years of state elections when these were enacted, reasons for the change and the machinery responsible.

Table: 1.1

The Timing, Reasons and Names of the Acts for the Changes in Reservation in Political Representation for Scheduled Castes in India

Names of the Act	Year of Effect	Enacted in the Election Years	Reasons for Change	Machinery responsible
Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constitution Order 1956	1956	1957, 1962	State Reorganization Act 1956	Delimitation Commission
Two-Member Constituencies Abolition Act 1961	Jan 1961	1962 onwards	Two member jurisdiction abolished	Election Commission
Punjab Reorganization Act 1966	Nov 1, 1966	1967 onwards	Reorganization of Haryana and Punjab	Election Commission
Delimitation Commission Act 1962	July 1966	1967, 1968, 1971, 1972	Revised in line with 1961 census count	Delimitation Commission
Delimitation Act 1972	Oct 20, 1975	1974, 1976	Revised in line with 1971 census count	Delimitation Commission
SC-ST Orders Act 1976	1976	1977, 1978, 1980	Reorganization due to Area Restriction Removal Act	Election Commission
Delimitation Act, 2002	2002	2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009	Revised in line with 2001 census count	Delimitation Commission

Source: Election Commission of India: www.eci.nic.in

All states in India do not have elections at the same time, so the Commission's recommendations about the changes in Scheduled Castes' reservations are enacted in multiple years. The first institutional change that led to changes in the Scheduled Castes' reservation was in 1956 through the State Reorganization Act of 1956. This Act reorganized the boundaries of India's states along linguistic line and amended the Indian Constitution to replace the three types of states known as Part A, B and C states¹³ with a single type of state. The changes made by this act were enacted in state election years of 1957 and 1962. In January 1961, two member jurisdictions were permanently abolished to

¹³ Part A states include Andhra, Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Orissa, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Part B includes Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Saurashtra, Travancore-Cochin, Jammu and Kashmir, and Sikkim. Part C includes Ajmer, Bhopal, Coorg, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Kutch, Vindhya Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura, for more details see *States Reorganization Act of 1956*; available at <http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/election/volume%201/states%20reorganisation%20act,%201956.pdf>.

form a single member jurisdiction.¹⁴ On November 1, 1966, a new state, Haryana, was carved out of the state Punjab. Then, in 1976, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders Act mandated that a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any part of the state would be defined as so in the entire state.¹⁵ There has been no change in the representation of assembly constituencies since then.

The very purpose of providing affirmative action in political representation for Scheduled Castes was to create space at various levels of decision-making processes to represent their aspirations and claims and thereby ensure their rapid development and uplift. Probably, this was the reason for which the original period for political representation was ten years under the Constitution of India, 1950. The same arrangement continues, and under the present status it remains valid up to 2020.¹⁶ But, the question is whether this system of affirmative action in the political representation of the Scheduled Castes has fulfilled the objective for which it was introduced. The development of the Scheduled Castes, according to the available literatures and official statistics and reports (discussed later), has not reached the desired level despite the repeated extensions of the ten-year restriction over the last six decades of the Indian Republic.

Before we enter into an in-depth discussion on this issue, it is important to understand certain concepts used in this study. Some of these concepts, namely affirmative action; political representation; and electoral methods are briefly discussed below.

¹⁴ The only reason forwarded for doing so was the concern of politicians with the greater difficulty and expense of campaigning in a double-sized district. However, the real reason was the dissatisfaction and resentment among the general candidates due to the victory of few SC/ST candidates in the unreserved "general" seats. The upper caste leadership was opposed to the idea that the provision allowed the SC/ST to compete for both seats, while they could compete only for the unreserved seat. (To be discussed in detail in the following chapters)

¹⁵ The plea was that area restriction were causing hardship to members of those communities in the area they were specified

¹⁶ Recently in August 2009, the Parliament adopted the 109th amendment to the Constitution for extending the reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assemblies for another ten years.

1.1: Affirmative Action

Most societies in the world have a sizeable presence of disadvantaged members and, therefore, the need to advance the cause of social justice is a phenomenon commonly understood to be important. However, there is a variation in the causes and degree of differences and inequalities in societies throughout the world. Some parts of the world have witnessed a long record of injustices perpetrated against certain communities or groups. Therefore, justice requires that such disadvantages be taken into consideration before reaching any meaningful redistributive strategy for their amelioration. It is important that the state identifies the nature of these disadvantages and explores all possible methods and strategies of the redistributive paradigm. This identification of means and strategies for rectifying historical injustices practiced towards certain groups in the society is called as Affirmative Action.¹⁷ This involves selection of individuals/community/social groups on the basis of caste, race, gender, or ethnicity for preferential treatment. This has generated intense controversy. Evidence shows that though they invoke some universal principles, the forms and strategies of affirmative action differ from society to society.

Injustice in Indian society is primarily based on caste or *jati*--a core feature of the Hindu social order that thrives on belief in hierarchy based on birth. It has prescriptions for fixed occupations, endogamous marriage norms, and codes of ritual in order to maintain distance between any two specified castes at different levels. Being practiced since ages,

¹⁷ The term was first used in the United States by President John F. Kennedy on March 6, 1961 as a measure to achieve non-discrimination. Later in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson used the term to order the federal contractors to take to hire without regard to race, religion and national origin. In 1968, gender was also added to the anti-discrimination list. Matching procedures in other countries are also known as positive discrimination in the United Kingdom and employment equity in Canada. See "Affirmative Action: History and Rationale". Clinton Administration's Affirmative Action Review: Report to the President. July 19, 1995, accessed at <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/aa/aa02.html>. However, India is ahead of USA on in the arena of affirmative action in political representation for the marginalized sections of the society, see Raja Sekhar Vundru (2008), 'India Ahead of US-Remedies against discrimination', *New Indian Express*, November 12, available at http://epaper.newindpress.com/NE/NE/2008/11/12/ArticleHtmls/12_11_2008_011_001.shtml?wMode=1.

this has resulted in significant inequalities of power, wealth, and status in Indian society. The nature of interaction and attitudes between and among castes has experienced changes in recent times, the reasons for which scholars argue are modernization, industrialization and education.¹⁸ However, the caste hierarchy still stays deeply embedded, in the structure and psyche of the Indian mind. Several studies have traced several evidence of this fact.¹⁹

Affirmative action, as understood in India, is a deeply contested concept. Affirmative action, which includes the reservation policy in India, in a general sense, entails the state's approach towards addressing questions of injustice that disadvantaged persons of certain groups face through preferential policies. However, there is no general agreement as to which kind of preferential policies can be justifiably adjudged as just for a just society. While some argue that affirmative action as a policy is designed to remedy injustices that a few identifiable groups have suffered, others argue that in correcting the injustices the policy perpetuates reverse discrimination, it is nothing but a different kind of injustice. One cannot deny that the rationale for affirmative action may vary from place-to-place, but, its necessity for addressing structural inequalities between different groups in societies to invoke fairness towards the disadvantaged is beyond any doubt.

¹⁸ L. I. Rudolph and S. Rudolph, 1998 (1987) *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State*, New Delhi, Orient Longman; DeveshKapur, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett, D ShyamBabu (2010), 'Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 45 No. 35 August 28 - September 03.

¹⁹ A study carried out in the year 2001-2002, of 565 selected villages across 11 states demonstrated that "Untouchability is not only present in all over rural India, but it has survived by adapting to new socio-economic realities and taking on new and insidious forms...the study shows the systematic ways in which Dalit subordination is reproduced- in the public as well as the private sphere." See GhanshyamShah, Harsh Mander, SukhdeoThorat (et. al.) (2007) *Untouchability in Rural India*, Sage Publication, New Delhi. As per the 2005 Report (Crime in India) of NCRB, every 20 minutes a crime against Dalits is reported in the Police Station across the country, (see Crime in India 2005, National Crime Record Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 2006). According to the census 2001, its literacy rate is only 36 per cent compared to the general literacy rate of around 55 per cent and a vast majority of Dalits - approximately 80 per cent - lives in rural areas, half of whom are landless agricultural labourers. According to a Report presented by National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector on *Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganised Sector* (p.7) in 2005, nearly 88 per cent of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes belong to the poor and vulnerable group and they have remained poor at a bare subsistence level without any job or social security, working in the most miserable, unhygienic and unlivable conditions, throughout this period of high economic growth since the early nineties.

Electoral reservations, like job reservations and educational assistance, is one of a series of measures used in India directed towards achieving greater equality of outcome across social groups. These are described by Marc Galanter in his comprehensive survey of the legal basis of such measures, as 'compensatory discrimination'.²⁰ Such measures have been used when a perception exists that social attributes of a group hinder its ability to take certain opportunities, leading to an unequal outcome that requires redress. Galanter, while presenting a cost-benefit analysis of affirmative action with the help of twelve pairs of counterpoised statements (discussed later in Table 1.2), argues that their effects may differ among various participants and observers; it provides no room for those who claim affirmative action as reverse-discrimination.²¹

The notion of equality in liberal perspective holds that every individual is equal before the law. However, it would certainly amount to injustice if the law does not take into consideration the difference between individuals based on religion, race, caste, sex, language and ethnicity. The state cannot remain blind to group differences by merely adhering to a principle of equal protection of rights of individual citizens. This is so especially when the differences lead to discrimination and exclusion which denies access to resources and equal participation to disadvantaged sections of the population. In principle, the state is bound to engage in a more favourable treatment of the disadvantaged and marginalized sections of the society through policies of affirmative action, in addition to creating a level playing field for all in the present context. During his address at Howard University the former US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, said:

'You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say "you are free to compete with all the others," and still justly believe that you have

²⁰ For details see Marc Galanter (1984), *Competing Equalities - Law and the Backward Classes in India*, London, University of California Press.

²¹ Ibid.

been completely fair. Thus, it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates...To this end equal opportunity is essential, but not enough, not enough. Men and women of all races are born with the same range of abilities. But ability is not just the product of birth. Ability is stretched or stunted by the family that you live with, and the neighborhood you live in-- by the school you go to and the poverty or the richness of your surroundings. It is the product of a hundred unseen forces playing upon the little infant, the child, and finally the man.²²

Affirmative action as practiced in India today is the continuation of the preferential policies introduced by the British ensuring representation of rights of different communities. There exists a major difference of objective between the British and the Indian approaches; the poignant expression of the Dalits that "Colonizers came late and left early" describes the providential role of the colonial state as the liberator of the depressed and the marginalized. The British started with a preference for Dalits in political representation in legislatures, and the focus of inquiry of this study is primarily restricted to analyze this.

1.2: Political Representation

The extensive literature available on the concept of political representation offers many different definitions. But we first need to ask what we mean by 'representation'. The common view holds that it means a form of government where the law-making responsibility is delegated by the citizens to duly-elected public officials—representatives of the people.²³ The parliament, therefore, could be said to be 'representative' because it constitutes of those elected. However, this idea of liberal representation has, in recent

²² Lyndon B. Johnson, (1965) 'To Fulfill These Rights' in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Volume II, entry 301, pp. 635-640. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966.

²³ It is linked to the fact that not all citizens go to vote, but the theory is that though many would not have voted for any of the elected officials, those elected actually govern the whole community, and so is a representative of the community as the whole.

times, attracted criticism. Critics have pointed to the similarity of the peoples' representatives in many legislatures, a phenomenon that indicates the difficulty of some sectors of society in gaining representation. The typical Lower House Member of Parliament as in a European democracy has appeared everywhere, with remarkably few variants: he is male, mature, middle-class, well-educated, and nowadays increasingly likely to be a professional politician.²⁴ Generally speaking, groups such as women, manual workers, religious and racial minorities, and, in the case of India specifically, Dalits, have always remained under-represented or represented inappropriately.

Theories of political representation, on all accounts, exhibit four components: (1) who is representing (the representative, an organization, a movement, state agency, etc.); (2) who is being represented (the constituents, the clients, etc.); (3) what is being represented (opinions, perspectives, interests etc.); and (4) how is the representation taking place (the political context). Anne Phillips presents the changing nature of the debate over representation as a conflict between what she terms the *politics of presence* and the *politics of ideas*.²⁵ However, perhaps the most widely accepted definition has been provided by Hanna Pitkin, who defines it as the activity of making citizens' voices, opinions, and perspectives "present" in the public policy-making processes.²⁶ It means that for the necessary conditions for the political representation to occur, the political actors should speak, advocate, symbolize, and act on behalf of those whom they represent in the political arena. It is a kind of political assistance. One can understand Pitkin's overview of the concept of political representation from the Chart (1.1) below.

²⁴ For details see Mény Yves (1993) *Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy and Germany*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 179.

²⁵ For details see Anne Phillips (1995), *The Politics of Presence*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

²⁶ For more details see Hannah F. Pitkin (1967) *The Concept of Representation*, Berkeley, University of California.

Chart 1.1

Pitkin's Four Views of Representation

Four Views	Brief Description	Main Research Question within each View	Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives
1. Formalistic Representation	The institutional arrangements that precede and initiate representation. Formal representation has two dimensions: authorization and accountability	What is the institutional position of a representative?	None
(Authorization)	The means by which a representative obtains his or her standing, status, position or office.	What is the process by which a representative gains power (e.g. elections) and what are the ways in which a representative can enforce his or her decisions?	No standards for assessing how well a representative behaves. One can merely assess whether a representative legitimately holds his or her position.
(Accountability)	The ability of constituents to <i>punish</i> their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes (e.g. voting an elected official out of office) or the <i>responsiveness</i> of the representative to the constituents.	What are the sanctioning mechanisms available to constituents? Is the representative responsive towards his or her constituents' preferences?	No standards for assessing how well a representative behaves. One can merely determine whether a representative can be sanctioned or has been responsive.
2. Symbolic Representation	The ways that a representative "stands for" the represented — that is, the meaning that a representative has for those being represented.	What kind of response is invoked by the representative in those being represented?	Representatives are assessed by the degree of acceptance that the representative has among the represented.
3. Descriptive Representation	The extent to which a representative resembles those being represented.	Does the representative look like, have common interests with, or share certain experiences with the represented?	Assess the representative by the accuracy of the resemblance between the representative and the represented.
4. Substantive Representation	The activity of representatives—that is, the actions taken on the behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the represented.	Does the representative advance the policy preferences that serve the interests of the represented?	Assess a representative by the extent to which policy Outcomes advanced by a representative serve "the best interests" of their constituents.

Source: Hannah F. Pitkin (1967) *The Concept of Representation*, op. cit.

Pitkin's argument identifies four different views of representation: formalistic representation, descriptive representation, symbolic representation, and substantive representation. However, it fails to answer how different views of political representation fit together. The multiple and competing dimensions of political representation are also not answered adequately by Pitkin and other theorists. In fact, political theorists often analyze particular kinds of political actors within a particular context, and have, consequently, failed to clarify how different forms of representation relate to each other.

The recent advancement in the idea of political representation has been made through radical views on group representation, challenging the strong tradition of individualistic liberalism that had previously opposed all attempts to introduce ideas based on group rights. The most notable among this group of scholars is Melissa Williams. Williams' recommendations in her book titled *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation* must be seen in the light of limited experiences of historically disadvantaged groups of the USA. She sets out clearly the reasons why institutional procedures based on group membership are required for them.²⁷ The interests and feelings of a marginalized group in the legislatures can be represented and articulated only by members of that group, and the others simply cannot do justice with that.

Williams views representation as "mediation" of three particular dimensions: the dynamics of legislative decision-making, the nature of legislator-constituent relations, and the basis for aggregating citizens into representable constituencies. She argues that historically disadvantaged groups need a "voice" in legislative decision-making and the

²⁷ Melissa Williams (1998) *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

“heavily deliberative” quality of legislative institutions requires the presence of individuals who have direct access to historically excluded perspectives, for relationships of distrust can be “at least partially mended if the disadvantaged group is represented by its own members.”²⁸ Thus, Williams goes beyond the liberal concept of political representation based on institutional design and challenges those who understand representation as simply a matter of formal procedures of authorization and accountability.²⁹

Another important work on the concept of political representation is that by Iris Marion Young.³⁰ Young, by illustrating the example of Latinos, argues that the problem for all representation is the suppression of differences. She believes that the legitimacy of a representative is often confused by his or her similarities to the represented; therefore, the representative should not be treated as a substitute for the represented. Young opposes characterizing representation by a “relationship of identity” and recommends reconceptualizing representation as *a differentiated relationship*.³¹ Thus, while on the one hand Young explains that the concept of representation needs to take into consideration the diversity of those being represented, on the other hand also clarifies the institutional patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Young argues that the universal standard norms or policies usually reflect the cultural and behavioral stereotypes of the dominant groups and thus percolate disadvantages to other groups. She further argues that the politics of the disadvantaged group against such domination is emancipatory as it constructs an independent group by rejecting the ideals of inclusion.³² Consequently, Young provides an

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Will Kymlicka though justifies special treatment of certain groups, she replaces the concept of ‘mirror’ representation by that of a ‘threshold of representation’ to prevent exclusion for certain groups. For more details see Will Kymlicka (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

³⁰ Iris Marion Young (2000) *Inclusion and Democracy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

³¹ Ibid pp.125-127; also see Iris Marion Young (1986) ‘Deferring Group Representation’, in Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro (eds.) *Nomos: Group Rights*, New York: New York University Press, pp.349-376. (*emphasis added*).

³² Iris Marion Young, (1990) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp. 163-168. (*Emphasis added*).

alternative account of democratic representation that oscillates between moments of authorization and accountability and the fluidity of which allows citizens to authorize their representatives and trace what the representatives do and how accountable they are. Assessment of representation in Young's sense should be done dynamically, that is by assessing the whole processes of authorization and accountability of the representatives.

Criticism of preferential policies as argued by group representation theorists have come from liberal proceduralists. Arguing for them, Thomas Sowell in the 1990s presented a comparative study of the effects of preferential policies in the United States, South Africa, India, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and Malaysia.³³ He argues that privileging certain groups within society acts as a distraction from questions of socio-economic inequality. Sowell finds solution in universal freedoms rather than in a focus on the special rights of particular groups. However, Sowell's own conclusion is based on his presumption of four common patterns,³⁴ which are not universal in any case, and therefore, it loses its credibility naturally.

1.3: Electoral Methods

Presumably, the prime requirement of an electoral system is that it enables the citizens of a nation to elect their legislative members and, in many cases, the head of state. However, with a number of important factors that have been introduced in this chapter so far coming into play, there is more to it than just that. In fact, the first important question that arises

³³ Thomas Sowell (1990) *Preferential Policies: An International Perspective*, New York, Quill.

³⁴ (1) 'Preferential programmes, even when explicitly and repeatedly defined as "temporary", not only persists but also expands in scope'; (2) the benefits of preferential treatment have usually gone disproportionately to more fortunate members within the designated recipient groups; (3) preferential programmes increases group polarization and the non-preferred groups are forced to react adversely; and (4) there is growing chance of claims, although fraudulent, of belonging to the designated beneficiary group. Ibid; also see Andrew McIntye, 'Discrimination Laws and Its Abuses' available on <http://www.hrnicholls.com.au/archives/vol19/vol19-7.php>; accessed on June 25, 2010.

from the discussion made so far is “What electoral method one should employ in the electoral system so that the issue of political representation is targeted justifiably?” Also, one should ask, “Is there something known as ‘the best’ electoral system/method?” These questions constitute the major focus of this study and will be discussed in detail in the chapters that follow. However, what this section attempts primarily is to explain what an electoral system is, what is required of an electoral system and what its major categories are.


While some argue that the term ‘electoral system’ means all the structures and operations that are used to run an election, the means for drawing up of electoral boundaries, the qualification of voters and candidates, the method of voting and the means of settling disputes,³⁵ others believe that it simply and specifically means to describe the voting method.³⁶ The purpose of an electoral system is to translate the will of the electorate, as expressed through the ballot box, into members of a legislative body. The ways this can be achieved are many and varied. Electoral systems throughout the world vary from one form to another. There a host of electoral systems used for national elections in different countries, but they can be broadly classified into three major categories: plurality, majoritarian and proportional representation. Some systems are also a mix of two or more (see the chart 2 below).

³⁵ Martin Harrop and William L. Miller (1987), *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction*, Basingstoke, Macmillan.

³⁶ Austin Ranney (1993) *Governing: An Introduction to Political Science*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.

Chart 1.2

The Electoral Systems



Source: International IDEA's databases, http://www.idea.int/esd/world_pie.cfm

However, the point that needs to be made here is that to treat electoral systems simply as neutral statistical arrangements that enable MLAs/MPs to be chosen for a legislature is not appropriate. Although it is true that the electoral system adopted by a country probably depends more on the country's political past rather than any abstract consideration of the relative merits of different voting methods,³⁷ the study of the electoral system of particular location certainly has to be based on several factors that may sometimes be more historical, economic, and social rather than mere political.

1.3.1: *Plurality Systems*

Plurality systems are always used in conjunction with single-member electorates. It is the simplest of all electoral systems. Plurality systems are commonly used for the election of Heads of State through first-past-the-post method. By this electoral method a candidate contesting an election is declared the winner who receives the highest number/percentage

³⁷ For example, countries with a British political heritage are more inclined to plurality and majority systems, while those of continental Europe have been more inclined towards proportional systems.

of votes, regardless of whether the votes received is majority or not. The other electoral methods practiced in the Plurality Systems are Block Vote (BV), Alternative Vote (AV), Two-Round System (TRS) and Party Block Vote (PBV).³⁸ India, after getting independence, adopted this electoral method for the election of representatives for the state legislatures and the Parliament.

On the one hand, this electoral method is praised for its simple and uncomplicated functioning and a speedy outcome and is believed to keep the link clear between voters and elected leaders. On the other hand, it has been criticized for transforming a small share of votes into eligibility for ruling. It tends to favor a two-party system and discourage the development of third parties.³⁹ As this system gives a seat only to the winner of each constituency, a party which consistently comes third in every constituency will not gain any seats in the legislature even if it receives a significant proportion of the vote. This puts geographically thinly-spread smaller parties at a significant disadvantage and creates an artificial limit on the level at which smaller parties can engage in the political process. One can find several such examples throughout the world in general and India in particular. The chances are very rare that a government in any state or even the Centre in India can be

³⁸ Block Vote (BV): BV is used in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. The candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats. Usually voters vote for candidates rather than parties and in most systems may use as many, or as few, of their votes as they wish. Party Block Vote (PBV): PBV is used in multi-member districts in which voters cast a single party-centered vote for a party of choice, and do not choose between candidates. The party with most votes will win every seat in the electoral district. Alternative Vote (AV): The AV is a preferential plurality/majority system used in single-member districts. Voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the ballot paper. A candidate who receives an absolute majority (50 per cent plus 1) of valid first preference votes is declared elected. If no candidate achieves an absolute majority of first preferences, the least successful candidates are eliminated and their votes reallocated according to their second preferences until one candidate has an absolute majority. Voters vote for candidates rather than political parties. Two-Round System (TRS): The TRS is a system in which a second election is held if no candidate or party achieves a given level of votes, most commonly an absolute majority (50 per cent plus one), in the first election round. A Two-Round System may take a majority-plurality form—more than two candidates contest the second round and the one wins the highest number of votes in the second round is elected, regardless of whether they have won an absolute majority—or a majority run-off form—only the top two candidates in the first round contest the second round. For more details see www.idea.int.

³⁹ Maurice Duverger (1972) 'Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System', in his book *Party Politics and Pressure Groups*, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell.

formed with a majority percentage of votes. On the contrary, there have been several occasions when the proportion of seats in the assembly/Parliament has been significantly less than their proportion of the state/national vote. The use of First-past-the-post in India has on majority of occasions resulted in the election of a government that has not received support from a majority of the electorate, or even the largest number of votes.

1.3.2: Majority Systems

Majority systems are exactly what the Plurality systems are not. To ensure the victory of a candidate in a constituency, this system requires the winner to receive an absolute majority (more than half) of the vote. Such a majority, obviously, cannot be achieved through a single ballot system, and, therefore, requires a second ballot or means of preferential voting. The second ballot systems are restricted to electing members from single-member electorates while the alternative vote system can be used for both single- and multi-member electorates.⁴⁰

In the Second Ballot system two first-past-the-post elections are scheduled. Candidates who receive more than half of the vote are declared elected. In those electorates where no candidate receives more than half the vote, there will be a second, or run-off, ballot slip. This may be between the top two candidates on the first count, or it may be of candidates who receive a certain percentage of the vote. The Second Ballot system prevents the election of any candidate without an absolute majority of the vote, thus overcoming one of the main criticisms of plurality systems. Second Ballot systems are more likely to be used in presidential elections rather than for legislative elections. Preferential voting is less cumbersome than the Second Ballot system and it removes the need for voters to have to return to the polling booth on a second occasion. It also lessens any perceived dangers of

⁴⁰ For more details see www.idea.int.

vote-splitting. Voters can give preferences to two similar candidates, lessening the fear that a third, unacceptable, candidate may be elected.⁴¹

However, this system, like the plurality system, is not free from disadvantages. The principal disadvantage of Majority systems is that results do not always reflect the wishes of the electorate. The party winning the majority of the national vote may not necessarily win a majority of the parliamentary seats and can sometimes be capricious in its practical application by favouring the election of the least unfavoured, rather than the most popular, candidate. It also results in greater expense for the candidates and parties involved, greater inconvenience to the electors, and it delays the result of an election, causing uncertainty.

1.3.3: *Proportional Representation*

Proportional Representation systems have been developed in an effort to produce a system under which legislative seats are won by parties in proportion to the proportion of the popular vote they gain. By necessity, this requires more than one vacancy in an electorate, so multi-member electorates are used. The more parliamentarians there are to be elected from an electorate, the smaller the percentage of the vote that is required, and the more proportional the overall election result is likely to be. To avoid candidates being elected with very small votes, some countries establish an 'electoral threshold'. This is the vote that a candidate or party must exceed in order to gain parliamentary representation—examples include 5 per cent in Germany, 4 per cent in Italy, 1.5 per cent in Israel.⁴²

⁴¹ Since Majority and Plurality Systems follow similar electoral methods (as shown in Chart 2 above), so for details on other electoral methods see f.n. 41. Also see Matt Golder, (2005) 'Democratic Electoral Systems around the World', 1946–2000, *Electoral Studies*, 24, pp.103–121.

⁴² For more details see Gerard Newman, (2006), "Electoral Systems", Politics and Public Administration Section, Department of Parliamentary Service, Australia, no. 10, 2005–06, ISSN 1832-2883, available at www.aph.gov.au/library; accessed on August 2010; also see Matt Golder, (2005) *ibid*.

Proportional Representation systems can be broadly grouped into two categories: List (List PR) Systems and Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems. Under the List PR each party or grouping presents a list of candidates for a multi-member electoral district, the voters vote for a party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. List systems can be (1) closed, allowing no choice at all, (2) flexible, where the voter can vote for a party or a candidate, or (3) free, where the voter may vote for individual party candidates.⁴³ In some (closed list) systems the winning candidates are taken from the lists in order of their position on the lists. If the lists are 'open' or 'free', the voters can influence the order of the candidates by marking individual preferences. The Single Transferable Vote is a preferential system in which the voter has one vote in a multi-member district and the candidates that surpass a specified quota of first preference votes are immediately elected. In successive counts, votes are redistributed from least successful candidates, who are eliminated, and votes surplus to the quota are redistributed from successful candidates, until sufficient candidates are declared elected. Voters normally vote for candidates rather than political parties, although a party-list option is possible.⁴⁴

The basic concept of Proportional Representation systems is to allocate seats to parties in the legislature in proportion to the votes cast at an election. Duverger identified that the use of Proportional Representation would make a two-party system less likely.⁴⁵ In countries that use proportional representation, especially where the whole country forms a

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ For more details, see Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. (2005) *Electoral System Design: the New International IDEA Handbook*, Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; also available online at <http://www.idea.int/publications/esd>.

⁴⁵ India though seems to be an exception to Duverger's law if seen at the national level where despite having the FPTP, there are multiple regional parties that have managed to gain importance as equal as that of the two major national parties Congress and BJP and they also have been able to successfully rule in different parts of the country, such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in West Bengal and Kerala, the BahujanSamaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh, the DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, the RJD and JD(U) in Bihar. However, it may be argued that Duverger's law becomes true when we analyse the states as independent of the centre. In fact even at the centre, the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) and the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) multiparty coalitions serve as cognates of the two parties of Duverger's law. See Maurice Duverger (1972) 'Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System', op. cit. also see M. Duverger (1954) *Political Parties*, New York, Wiley.

single constituency (like Israel), the electoral rules discourage a two-party system; the number of votes received for a party determines the number of seats won, and new parties can thus develop an immediate electoral niche. However, other systems do not guarantee new parties access to the system: Malta provides an example of a stable two-party system using the single transferable vote, although it is worth noting that its presidential elections are won by a plurality, which may put a greater two-party bias in the system than in a purely proportional system.


One of the claimed benefits of proportional representation systems is that their use generally sees the election of people who might otherwise be under-represented. Major parties feel they can afford to allocate some place on candidate lists to candidates from diverse background. To achieve this, a number of different and quite complex arrangements have been devised; however, detailed treatment of this is beyond the scope of this study and will be touched upon in later chapters, if needed.⁴⁶ As for now, because our major focus of this study is to know whether the electoral method adopted in India has been effectively used to protect the interest of the Scheduled Castes or not, we move on to discuss the available literature available on the issue, and examine if there is any work done on it. A pie chart analysis of the electoral systems in the world looks something as shown in Chart 1.3 below.

⁴⁶ The methods adopted in the Mixed Systems are Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) and Parallel Systems (PS). MMP is a mixed system in which the choices expressed by the voters are used to elect representatives through two different systems—one List PR system and (usually) one plurality/majority system—where the List PR system compensates for the disproportionality in the results from the plurality/majority system. A Parallel System is a mixed system in which the choices expressed by the voters are used to elect representatives through two different systems—one List PR system and (usually) one plurality/majority system—but where no account is taken of the seats allocated under the first system in calculating the results in the second system.

In the category others (as shown in Chart 1.3) comes the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) where voters cast a single vote in a multi-member constituency. The candidates with the highest vote totals are declared elected. Voters vote for candidates rather than political parties; Limited Vote (LV) which is a candidate-centered electoral system used in multi-member districts in which electors have more than one vote, but fewer votes than there are candidates to be elected. The candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats; and Board Count (BC) where a candidate-centered preferential system used in either single- or multimember districts in which voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the ballot paper and each preference marked is then assigned a value using equal steps. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are declared elected. See *Electoral System Design* (2005), op. cit.

Chart 1.3

World Pie Chart by Electoral System Type



Source: International IDEA's databases, http://www.idea.int/esd/world_pie.cfm

However, it is important to mention that in the last few decades, issue of electoral reform has become the subject of serious debate in several countries, including India. There have been various examples where voices were raised against one or the other form of electoral method.⁴⁷ During the 1990s, the debate on electoral reform has moved from margin to the mainstream on the political agenda. India, too, is facing the same situation. This study though can be said to be an attempt in this direction, yet its focus will remain restricted to the question of the political representation of Scheduled Castes and not beyond.

⁴⁷ For example, in Britain, all the parties except the Conservatives have spoke for alternative systems to first-past-the-post for different levels of government (see P. Norris (1995).(ed) 'The Politics of Electoral Reform', *Special issue of the International Political Science Review*, 16(1) January; R. Blackburn (1995) *The Electoral System in Britain*, New York, St. Martin's Press). New Zealand, in 1993, after almost a century and a half of first-past-the-post, switched to a mixed-member system (MMS) (J. Vowles, (1995) 'The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand' in *International Political Science Review*, 16(1), pp-95-116). The United States has experienced growing interest in electoral reform, generated by increasing concern about the representation of women and ethnic minorities (W. Rule and J.F. Zimmerman (1992) *United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities*, New York, Praeger). This dissatisfaction has not been confined to majoritarian systems. In 1992 Israel introduced direct elections for the prime minister (see A. Diskin and H. Diskin (1995) 'The Politics of Electoral Reform in Israel', *International Political Science Review*, 16(1), pp.31-46) while the following year Italy, long seen as an exemplar of proportional representation, adopted a mixed system after prolonged debate (see M. Donovan (1995) 'The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy', *International Political Science Review*, 16(1), pp. 47-64). For a complete debate on electoral reform see, *Contrasting Political Institutions* special issue of the *International Political Science Review* Vol. 18(3) July 1997 edited by Jean Laponce and Bernard Saint-Jacques.

1.4: Review of Literature

A review of literature on the subject shows that although there have been several studies on the issue of affirmative action for the Scheduled Castes in general, the crucial question of affirmative action in political representation of the Scheduled Caste communities, addressing the issue of how representative the Scheduled Caste political representatives are, is hardly researched. This is primarily because no study has tried to look into aspects of electoral method and legal framework. S K Gupta, A C Pradhan, and Trilok Nath have traced the historical and political aspects of the rise of Untouchables and Depressed Classes in modern Indian politics, yet they primarily remain focused on the Congress party rather than on the Untouchables or the Depressed Classes as such.⁴⁸

The origins of the separate electorates and their use in the electoral system of pre-Independence India have been studied but only with reference to Muslims. It was primarily the existence of separate electorate for Muslims that gave Ambedkar the idea of demanding separate electorates for the Depressed Classes, too.⁴⁹ There have been many writings on the Poona Pact, in particular, but most of these studies have supposedly taken a pro-Gandhian/Congress approach. The only reliable works on this episode are the ones done by Ambedkar himself. Ambedkar, in the year 1946 and 1947, studied the impact of Poona Pact

⁴⁸ S.K.Gupta (1985) *The Scheduled Castes in Modern Indian Politics: Emergence of a Political Power*, New Delhi, MunshiramManoharlal; A.C. Pradhan, (1986), *The Emergence of the Depressed Classes*, Bhubaneswar, Bookland International; TrilokNath, (1987), *Politics of the Depressed Classes*, Delhi, Deputy Publications. Gupta's study presented the account of the multi-faceted struggle of the scheduled caste before the Poona Pact. A.C. Pradhan tells essentially the same story, but with a different frame work. Pradhan considers the developments prior to 1917 to be preparatory and treats them in a very summary form, but he then extends his period beyond 1935 to 1947. His analysis is centered less around the British initiated announcements, missions, and commissions and more around the three key parties to the emergence of Depressed Classes as a social reality, i.e. (1) the British policy-makers; (2) the Congress, Gandhi and caste-Hindu religious organizations and finally (3) the Depressed Classes' leaders and their organizations. TrilokNath in his study showed some light on the socio-political conditions which necessitated evolution of policies and made Dalits' participation in political arena. However, he like others again concentrates primarily upon the decade from 1927 to 1937.

⁴⁹ FarzanaShaik (1989) *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim representation in Colonial India 1860-1947*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

on the representation of Scheduled Castes.⁵⁰ Other than that, Kanshi Ram in his study *The Chamcha Age*, attempted to look back at the 50 years after Poona pact.⁵¹ The work of Kanshi Ram, though not fully academic,⁵² initiated a space for political criticism of the kind of representation and also the quality of representatives that have emerged from the present electoral system. It classified the Scheduled Caste leaders who emerged through reserved constituencies as stooges of the political parties and in a way attempted to point out the issues raised by Ambedkar in 1946 and 1947. However, the work failed to address the question of the electoral method as raised by Ambedkar in 1932-33.

The debates in the Constituent Assembly on the issue of political representation were very crucial. Although there have been several attempts to study this crucial phase, no scholar has ever studied it with a focus on the Dalit question. The issue of reservations for Muslims in the Constituent Assembly has once again been the dominant discourse.⁵³ The decisions that went into determining the Scheduled Caste representation (who were classified as minorities, along with Muslims and other minority categories in the draft Constitution) have attracted little academic attention.

The efforts of Ambedkar in bringing changes in the electoral methods were briefly referred by Sekhar Bandyopadhyay in his article entitled *Transfer of Power and the Crisis*

⁵⁰ B.R. Ambedkar (1946) *What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables*, Second Edition, Bombay, Thacker and Co. (Re-published in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches (henceforth referred as BAWS), 1990, Vol.9, Bombay, Government of Maharashtra) and B.R. Ambedkar (1947) *States and Minorities: What are their rights and how to secure them in the Constitution of Free India*, Bombay, Self Published. (Re-published in BAWS, 1979, Vol.1, Bombay, Government of Maharashtra)

⁵¹ Kanshi Ram (1982) *The Chamcha Age: An era of the Stooges*, New Delhi, Self Published.

⁵² The study used the purpose of analyzing 50 years of Poona Pact to a fresh political agenda set at the time called Dalit-Shoshit-Samaj-Sangarsh-Samiti DS4.

⁵³ Rochana Bajpai, (2000) Constituent Assembly Debates and Minority Rights, Economic and Political weekly, Vol.35 No.21, pp. 1837-45; also see (1999) "Minority Rights in the Indian Constituent Assembly Debates, 1946-1949", *QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS30*; Shefali Jha (2003) 'Rights versus Representation: Defending Minority Interests in the Constituent Assembly', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 38, No. 16, Apr 19-25, pp. 1579-1583.

of *Dalit Politics in India*.⁵⁴ The study analysed the politics of Dalits at the time of Partition, which gives an insight into the levels of political bargaining that the Dalits could attempt at a time when British were withdrawing from India. Though the pre-dominance of the issue of Partition and issues related to the Muslim minority had over shadowed the Dalit question, this study provides the best insight necessary to look into the issues related to electoral methods with the Partition as background.

The post-independence democratic polity that borrowed its ideological impetus from the history of British India has been a subject of research for many scholars but very few have studied the issue of representation and electoral reservation in India. One such attempt made in the recent times was the study done by Alistair McMillan.⁵⁵ However, although this study traces the history of electoral reservation critically, it does not actually address the question from the perspective of the Dalits. It looks at Scheduled Castes' political representation as interplay of history and rhetoric and shows that electoral reservation emerged more as a consequence of confrontation and compromise. Even though this study has been one of the few in this area, it has overlooked exploring the reasons for the marginalisation of Scheduled Caste political representatives in the electoral system of a multi-party democracy, and its approach has remained limited within the patterns established earlier.

Another such study is that by Lelah Dushkin.⁵⁶ Dushkin studied the electoral history of Dalits in the post independent India (up to the fourth general election in 1967). The study tried to document the changes in the electoral methods and looked at the electoral pattern that went into the elections of Scheduled Caste community representatives. No

⁵⁴ Sekhar Bandyopadhyay (2000) 'Transfer of Power and the crisis of Dalit Politics in India-1945-47', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.34, No.4, pp893-942.

⁵⁵ Alistair McMillan (2005) *Standing at the Margins: Representation and Electoral Reservation in India*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press.

⁵⁶ Lelah Dushkin (1972) 'Scheduled Caste Politics', in Michael J. Mahar, *The Untouchables in Contemporary India*, Tucson, University of Arizona Press.

scholar after this has attempted to study the detailed pattern of Scheduled Caste representation in elections even after 40 years that has seen ten more general elections.

In the north Indian context, a wider study of electoral patterns was analysed by Christophe Jaffrelot.⁵⁷ The study, however, focused on the rise of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in the electoral map of north India. Although in a limited way, it also analysed the rise of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP: primarily a Dalit based party) in Uttar Pradesh, the study has its limitations since the rise of 'low' castes was clubbed for both Dalits and Other Backward Classes under the title *Silent Revolution*. This study works within the paradigm of the present system of electoral representation methods and does not attempt to question the merits of such a system. Thus, in a way, it is basically a study on elections rather than that of electoral methods.

In addition to this, there are some empirical studies that have critically studied the mandated political representation of the reserved constituencies for the Scheduled Castes. Anil Bhatt, in a survey of four states done in 1966-67, dealt with the level of political activity among Scheduled Castes.⁵⁸ He found that although the Scheduled Castes were less knowledgeable, they took voting slightly more seriously and were likely to have partisan affiliations. They perceived themselves as less politically efficacious than others, which comports with a general perception that they are not influential. Although they scored low on political activity, interest and perceived influence, there was a pronounced increase on all these measures among younger age cohorts. A study by Eldersveld and Ahmed, based on 1967 and 1971 national surveys, confirmed this portrait.⁵⁹ It added that though this was so for many groups, it was markedly so for Scheduled Castes.

⁵⁷ Christophe Jaffrelot (2003) *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics*, New Delhi, Permanent Black.

⁵⁸ Anil Bhatt (1975) *Caste, Class and Politics: An Empirical Profile of Social Stratification in Modern India*, Delhi, Manohar Book Service.

⁵⁹ Samuel I Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed (1978) *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in India*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.

Satish Saberwal, in his study titled *The Reserved Constituency: Candidates and Consequences* in the early 1970s has done pioneering work on this issue.⁶⁰ Assessing the reserved constituencies (in Punjabi industrial town) for the Scheduled Castes as a mechanism for abridging inequalities, Saberwal finds that “due to the large package of measures of reverse discrimination favouring Harijans and the spectacular industrial growth in the town which has drawn Harijans into the roles of skilled machine worker and entrepreneur, inequalities based directly on caste”, though, “are on the wane; the wealth and power continued to be highly concentrated in high caste hands.” In addition to that, “the town’s Harijan political leaders tend to trade their political base for personal gains” and none among them seems to understand “the larger institutional mechanisms which underlie and renew the current inequalities, nor do any have the stamina for applying themselves to the tasks of changing the larger system so that its processes would generate effective social, economic, and political equality.”

Saberwal adds that, “Harijan leaders active in [...] politics can choose between - or mix in some manner - three basic options: (1) to enter into patron- client ties, usually with high caste patrons, (2) to act in reference to the solidarity of one's own caste or of Harijans at large, or (3) to act in reference to the solidarity of one's 'class' usually the 'working class' - regard- less of caste. Their choices seem to be influenced strongly by the arena(s) in which they operate. At the local or municipal level, the man from a pre-dominantly Harijan ward has little need for high caste support and, in [...] caste councils continue to have some influence on the Harijan vote; these men have to continue to respond to Harijan needs. A constituency at the state level, however, would have a large majority of high caste voters, making the candidates less dependent upon - and therefore rather less responsive to the Harijan vote. Support from high caste faction leaders is, therefore, crucial for success at

⁶⁰ Satish Saberwal, (1972) 'The Reserved Constituency: Candidates and Consequences', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Jan. 8, pp. 71+73-80

this level...The importance of high caste support is just as great for the national constituency.”⁶¹

In a similar kind of study, Oliver Mendelsohn, in the mid 1980s, while examining the emergence of the ‘Harijan elite’ through discussions with political representatives in Parliament and the state legislatures, observed that “reservation has failed to alter the relative prosperity between high or middle castes and untouchables or tribals” and that it had “only marginal effects on mass poverty.”⁶² Although Mendelsohn expressed some optimism about a group within the Scheduled Castes and tribes which, as a result of the political preference provided to the group, had actually or potentially grown as successful leaders in the communities, he made it very clear that their ability to further the interests of their communities were very limited. “Reservation of parliamentary seats for the Scheduled Castes”, he observed, was no doubt a means of giving political preference to these groups, but “it was never allowed by the national leadership to threaten its own dominance.” Despite the fact that “reservation system guaranteed a large block of Untouchable legislators”, no political party ever allowed them to reach at the top position. “Jagjivan Ram controlled the large contingent of Untouchable MPs from Bihar at the height of his power, but he could never have controlled the whole Congress Party in Bihar. He was shut out from this degree of power by virtue of being a Chamar, irrespective of questions of talent.”⁶³

Mendelsohn recommended strongly for the system to be continued, but his argument fell short of analyzing the reasons for its failures. This was despite the fact that his respondents, while explaining the reasons for the current weakness of Scheduled Caste parliamentarians, attributed it largely to the particular mechanism for reservation of constituencies which is now in force. The Scheduled Caste politicians, who remembered the two-member constituencies in the Lok Sabha which existed for the first decade of

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Oliver Mendelsohn, ‘A ‘HarijanElite’?: The Lives of Some Untouchable Politicians’, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 21, No. 12, Mar. 22, pp. 501-509.

⁶³ Ibid.

independence, had claimed it to have been “more conducive to the effective statement of priorities of the Scheduled communities”. Under that system, the reserved seats were located in constituencies which also returned a general member, and the Scheduled Caste representatives were conceived simply as representative of the Scheduled Castes, rather than of the whole population of the constituency. Some even went to the extent to describe the dismantling of the two-member constituency as “the first great sell-out of Untouchables after Independence”.⁶⁴

G.Narayana, in another study entitled *Social Background of Scheduled Caste Lok Sabha Members, 1962-71* analyzes the changing characteristics of the Scheduled Caste members of the third, fourth and fifth Lok Sabhas and concluded that although the gap in the social background between Scheduled Caste Lok Sabha members (the decision-makers) and that of the Scheduled Caste population which they represent is not as wide as compared to the gap between the non-Scheduled Castes, there is a growing tendency of emerging homogeneity among the political elites of the country irrespective of caste, and that the Scheduled Caste MPs had begun to acquire all the characteristics of the general members of the Lok Sabha. However, like the previous studies, Narayana too distanced himself from getting into the task of the inquiring for the reasons for the same.⁶⁵

This was soon followed by a very important work of Marc Galanter. His study titled *Compensatory Discrimination in Political Representation: A Preliminary Assessment of India's Thirty-Year Experience with Reserved Seats in Legislatures*⁶⁶ aimed at analyzing the cost-benefit pattern of the preferential policies for the Scheduled Castes. It looked at three basic questions: First, whether reserved seats should be extended or terminated. Second, since the goals and dangers of the compensatory discrimination policy are multiple, an evaluation of costs and benefits requires that some kind of weights and priorities be assigned to these goals or dangers. Third, evaluation must be comparative. Acceptance or

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ (1978), *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 13, No. 37, Sep. 16, pp. 1603+1605-1608.

⁶⁶ (1979) *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 14, No. 7/8, Annual Number: Class and Caste in India February, pp. 437-454.

rejection of the package of benefits and costs believed to be associated with reserved seats must be compared with the costs as well as the benefits anticipated to arise from any alternative that is believed to be preferable.

This is presumably the only one so far to assess the structural constraints imposed by the arrangements of reserved seats in the way it is being practiced now. Galanter argued,

Reserved seats were provided on the ground that the nation as a whole has an interest in affording these groups more representation than they would gain spontaneously in the political process....While other goals - notably integration, acceptance, redistribution and incubation [did] play a part -it [was] generally assumed that representation is the basic argument for reserved seats. Presumably separate electorates would accomplish this more directly and forcefully. But separate electorates were decisively rejected in favour of joint electorates with reserved seats. Thus in order to promote integration and acceptance, the reservations is designed in a way which filters and muffles the representation of the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in so far as they diverge from the interests of other groups. The reserved seat legislator - especially from the Scheduled Castes - is responsible to and dependent upon a constituency made up overwhelmingly of non-members of his group. Thus the reservations insure representation to distinctive community interests only to the extent that it can be secured by communal loyalty against the pull of political motivations. Representatives who occupy reserved seats can be expected to elevate the interests of Scheduled Castes, etc, over those of their constituents only to the extent that one assumes the Scheduled Caste representatives will be more responsive to the pull of ascriptive ties than to the expediencies of gaining and holding office. But to the extent that these reserved seat legislators are assumed to be responsible and prudent politicians, this arrangement serves as a filter to keep the divergent interests of these groups from being expressed too directly or forcefully. This is especially the case with the Scheduled Caste representatives, whose constituencies are populated overwhelmingly by others.⁶⁷

However, given the lack of availability of data such as voting behaviour in the reserved legislatures, legislator's sponsorship of legislation, their role in party affairs, in cabinets and committees, their participation in questioning and debate, and their activities "behind the scenes", that were essential for the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of the representation afforded by the reservations, Galanter's attempt could only bring a tentative picture in the form of a twelve pairs of counterpoised statements (see Table 1.2 below), the effect of which he argues may differ among various participants and observers.

⁶⁷Ibid.

Table 1.2
Alleged Benefits and Costs of Policy of Compensatory Discrimination

REDISTRIBUTION	vs	DIVERSION
Preferences provide a direct flow of valuable resources to the beneficiaries in larger measure than they would otherwise enjoy.		These resources are enjoyed by a small segment of the intended beneficiaries and do not benefit the group as a whole.
REPRESENTATION	vs	MISREPRESENTATION
Preferences provide for participation [and] decision making by those who effectively represent the interests of the beneficiaries, interest that would otherwise be under-represented or neglected.		By creating new interests which diverge from those of the beneficiaries, preferences obstruct accurate representation of their interests.
INTEGRATION	vs	ALIENATION
By affording opportunities for participation and well being, preferences promote feelings of belonging and loyalty among the beneficiaries, thereby promoting the social and political integration of these groups into Indian society.		By emphasizing the separateness of these groups, preferences reduce their opportunities (and feeling of) common participation.
ACCEPTANCE	vs	REJECTION
Preferences induce in other awareness that the beneficiary groups are participants in Indian life whose interests and views have to be taken into account and adjusted to.		Preferences frustrate others by what they consider unfair favouritism and educate them to regard the beneficiaries as separate elements who enjoy their own facilities and have no claim on general public facilities.
INTEGRITY	vs	MANIPULATION
Preferences permit forms of action that promote pride, self-respect, a sense of achievement, and personal efficacy that enable the beneficiaries to contribute to national development as willing parties.		Preferences subject these groups to manipulation by others, aggravate their dependency, and undermine their sense of dignity, pride, self-sufficiency and personal efficacy.
INCUBATION	vs	OVER PROTECTION
By broadening opportunities, preferences stimulate the acquisition of skills and resources needed to compete successfully in open competition.		Preferences provide artificial protection, which blunts the development of the skills and resources needed to succeed without them.
MOBILIZATION	vs	ENERVATION
By cultivating talents, providing opportunities and incentives, and promoting their awareness and self-consciousness, preferences enhance the capacity of the beneficiary groups to undertake organized collective action.		By making them dependent, blunting the development of talent, undermining self-respect, preferences lessen the capacity for organized effort in their own behalf.
STIMULATION	vs	SEDATION
By increasing the visibility of the beneficiary groups, promoting their placement in strategic locations, and emphasizing the national commitment to remedy their condition, preferences serve as a stimulus and catalyst of enlarged efforts for their uplift and inclusion.		By projecting an image of comprehensive governmental protection and preferment, preferences stir the resentment of others, allaying their concern and undermining initiatives for measures on behalf of the beneficiary groups.
SELF-LIQUIDATION	vs	SELF-PERPETUATION
The benefits of preferential treatment are mutually reinforcing and will eventually render unnecessary any special treatment.		These arrangements create vested interest in their continuation, while discouraging the development of skills, resources, and attitudes that would enable the beneficiaries to prosper without special treatment.
FAIRNESS	vs	UNFAIRNESS
Preferences compensate for and help to offset the accumulated disabilities resulting from past deprivation of advantages and opportunities.		Preferences place an unfair handicap on individuals who are deprived of opportunities they deserve on merit.
SECULARISM	vs	COMMUNALISM
By reducing tangible disparities among groups and directing attention to mundane rather than ritual standing preferences promote the development of a secular society.		By recognizing and stimulating group identity, preferences perpetuate invidious distinction, thereby undermining secularism.
DEVELOPMENT	vs	STAGNATION
Preferences contribute to national development by providing incentive, opportunity, and resources to utilize neglected talent.		Preferences impede development by misallocation of resources, lowering of morale and incentive, and waste of talent.

Although Galanter discusses about all the twelve contested arguments in detail, what is of importance for us is his opinion on representation vs. misrepresentation. The presence of the Scheduled Castes in legislative bodies, he felt, was largely a result of the provisions of reserved seats.⁶⁸ To express it more clearly, he went into measuring how well served were the residents of the reserved constituencies, as well as members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who reside outside the reserved constituencies. He also sought to explore how reserved seat legislators represent them, and if the presence of their fellows in reserved seats assure that they are better served by their own representatives. And finally, he asks, is the nation as a whole well served by these legislators? It was in assessing these points that Galanter opined about the structural constraints imposed by the arrangements for reserved seats mentioned above.

Another very important study on the politics of reservation in political reservation, titled *Political Reservations for the Scheduled Castes: a Politics of Reformism*, was done by Gopal Guru (1986). He found that the present arrangement of reservation for Scheduled Castes in political representation makes legislators dissociated from the masses, whom they claim to represent. Guru concluded that while, on the one hand, the Scheduled Caste legislators have, with the help of the political power, 'bourgeoisified' themselves, on the other hand they have allowed themselves to be used as an option for a choice of the 'dumping ground', which the ruling party (namely Congress) decides on the basis of their vote base. In other words, the system binds them to remain passive in the legislative system.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ With the help of available data Galanter showed that (1) the number of those SCs who were successful in open competition was very few, (2) even their presence in bodies where there is no reservation (upper houses, cabinets) was due largely to the political base provided by reservations. Thus, according to Galanter, reservations provided for a substantial quantitative presence that would otherwise be lacking. Ibid.

⁶⁹ Gopal Guru (1986), 'Political Reservations for the Scheduled Castes: A Politics of Reformism', in Ram Gopal Singh (ed.), *The Depressed Classes of India: Problems and Prospects*. New Delhi, B R Publishing Corp. and (1979) *Scheduled Caste Politics in Reserved Constituencies- A Case Study of*

However, the existing literature falls short of examining the structural constraints imposed by the electoral arrangements made for affirmative action in political reservation for Scheduled Castes. Most of the previous studies, except that of Galanter and Guru in some ways, have been engaged in measuring the welfare outcomes of mandated political reservation accorded to disadvantaged groups.

1.5: Research Questions

1. What were the electoral methods and legal framework used for Scheduled Caste communities who were allowed special representation in legislative bodies before 1950?
2. What was the impact of change in the electoral methods from separate electorate as per the Communal Award to Joint Electorate under Poona Pact till 1950?
3. What were the changes made in the electoral methods under the Indian Constitution and Representations of Peoples Act after 1950? What was the impact of such changes?
4. How representative have been the Scheduled Caste political representatives?
5. What are the main constraints faced by Scheduled Caste elected representatives under the present electoral method in representing the interests of Scheduled Castes?
6. What viable alternate electoral methods can be carved out of the current electoral method under the existing legal framework?

With the above mentioned research questions in mind, the objectives of the study can be summed up as following:

1. To understand the historical and political origin and evolution of existing legal framework of electoral methods used in the Indian democracy in implementing affirmative action in political representation of Scheduled Castes.
2. To understand how these methods have helped or have not helped in ensuring the expected representation of Scheduled Caste voters.

1.6 Research Methodology

The study has been conducted using:

- Both primary and secondary sources for the study of historical and political factors.
- A survey of a total of 177 Scheduled Caste voters has been conducted in one reserved assembly constituency and one non-reserved assembly constituency of two states—Punjab and Andhra Pradesh—with the help of a structured questionnaire.
- Several rounds of focused group discussion with the Scheduled Caste respondents were held with open-ended questions.

1.7 Hypotheses

Given the characteristic feature of Indian society, which is still caste-ridden and unequal and where resources are controlled by the dominant castes and classes, the Scheduled Castes continue to suffer the disabilities of the caste system and Untouchability and hence remain the most vulnerable; and given the electoral method and majoritarian politics of the country, the nature of the political representation of the Scheduled Castes, despite having reserved seats in the Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies, largely depends upon the non-Scheduled Caste voters and political forces.

1.8: Chapterisation

The study starts with introducing the problem in **Chapter-1**. In this chapter, there is also an explanation of the important concepts such as affirmative action, political representation, and electoral methods. It is then followed by a review of literature. The next chapters discuss the **Electoral Law and the Electoral Method for the Scheduled Castes**. This has been divided into two parts. While **Chapter 2**, as Part I, examines the electoral practice between 1919-1946 i.e. in British India, **Chapter 3** as Part II, examines the situation between 1947-1951. Important issues raised in these two chapters include Ambedkar's role in the Simon Commission; Communal Award by British Government 1932; the Poona Pact; Ambedkar's analysis of the Poona Pact; The Government of India Act, 1935; Hammond Committee; 1937 Elections; Cabinet Mission and the question of Scheduled Castes representation; Ambedkar's last attempt for separate electorates; Ambedkar's efforts for settlement with Sardar Patel; the composition of the Constituent Assembly; Sardar Nagappa and Qualified Joint Electorate; and abolition of reserved seats for religious minorities.

Chapter 4—Electoral Policies and Praxis for the Scheduled Castes in Republic India—starts with an analysis of the First General Election 1951-52; Ambedkar's defeat in that election; his appeal in the election tribunal; the delimitation of constituencies in 1953; the second General Election; extension of Political Reservation and abolition of Two-Member constituencies; General Elections after the abolition of Double Member Constituencies: 1962 & 1967 and the characteristics of the reserved seats between 1971-2010. **Chapter 5—Analyzing the implications of the system of Political Representation for Scheduled Castes**—is based on the field survey conducted in two states—Punjab and Andhra Pradesh. One hundred and seventy seven Scheduled Caste respondents were interviewed in four legislative constituencies (two in each state; one reserved and other non-reserved). The data has been analysed with the help of SPSS and is presented in the form of both quantitative as well as qualitative. Taking inferences from Chapter 5, the concluding remarks is presented in **Chapter 6**.